it being provided that if in either of these cases the court shall omit to require a bond before the guardian is allowed to qualify (unless, in case of a testamentary guardian, the will shall so direct), or if it accept as sureties such persons as do not satisfy it of their sufficiency, the judge is himself liable to the infant for any loss ensuing; and until such bond is given, a temporary guardian, under the name of curator, may be designated by the court, who may be permitted to qualify, in the discretion of the court, without security. (V. C. 1873, c. 123, § 2, 5, 6; Id. c. 12, § 6.)

Let us now see when one or the other of these several kinds of guardianship occurs.

If there be a father, he is guardian by nature, and as such is charged with the custody of the child's person, and with his education, but not with his estate, which can only be committed to such parent, or to some other person, by virtue of an appointment by the court, and giving bond, &c. He may, on the other hand, be deprived by a court of chancery, in its discretion, even of the custody of the child's person, if he shall seem grossly unfit for it. (Bac. Abr. Guard'n (C); 2 Stor. Eq. § 1341 & seq; V. C. 1873, c. 123, § 13.)

If the father be dead, the mother succeeds, as guardian by nature, to the care of the infant's person, and the conduct of his education; and she thus succeeds notwithstanding there be a guardian by the father's will, or by appointment of the chancery court, while she remains unmarried, and is fit for the trust. (V. C. 1873, c. 123, § 7; Armstrong v. Stone & ux, 9 Grat. 105-107.) And in the absence of a testamentary or chancery guardian, the mother's guardianship by nature prevails, although she be married again. (Villa Real v. Mellish, 2 Swanst. 533. Potinger v. Wrightman, 3 Meriv. 67, 79; Armstrong v. Stone & ux, 9 Grat. 105.)

Á testamentary guardian, and a guardian elected by the ward, or appointed by the court, are entitled generally to the care of the ward's person and estate; but the father and mother are for the most part not thereby divested of their parental control. (V. C. 1873, c.. 123, § 7.)

The wardship may be terminated before the minor attains his age of twenty-one years, by the guardian's death, by his resignation (with consent of the court which appointed him), by his removal by the court of chancery, for neglect or breach of trust, or in case of a testamentary guardian, by the lapse of the period assigned

in the will for its duration. But the ward is not at liberty (as has been sometimes thought), after the age of fourteen, to change at pleasure even a guardian previously nominated by himself, and a fortiori not one designated by his father's will, &c. Good cause must exist for the change, in order to justify it, and courts ought by no means to be indulgent in hearkening to such applications. (Bac. Abr. Guardian (E); Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 1 Russ. (1* Eng. Ch.) 528; Newell's case, 1 Johns. C. R. 25; Ham v. Ham, 15 Grat. 74; V. C. 1853, c. 123, § 7, 13.)

If the guardian does not die nor resign, and is not previously removed, or in case of the testamentary guardian, if the period named in the will does not expire first, his office terminates (V. C. 1873, c. 123, § 7) as to male wards at twenty-one, and as to female wards at twenty-one, or marriage. This statutory provision in respect to female wards is merely declaratory of the common law, which holds marriage to put an end to the guardianship, and to transfer to the husband, if adult, and if not, to the husband's guardian, the care of her estate, and to the husband in all cases the custody of her person. As to male wards, the common law holds marriage to emancipate the person, but still to leave the estate, including that of the wife, in the care of the husband's guardian. And this probably will be the construction of the statute, since it is hardly compatible with the relation of husband and wife that the husband's person should be subject to the control of another. (Guerrant v. Hooker, 7 Leigh, 366; Mendez v. Mendez, 1 Ves. Sen'r, 91; Roach v. Garvan, Id. 159-'60; Reeve's Dom. Rel. 328; Bac. Abr. Guardian (E); 2 Kent's Com. 225; Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wms. 123.)

It should be observed that the authority of a guardian. (except of a guardian by nature, if, indeed, that be an exception) extends not, by the common law, beyond the jurisdiction under which he received his authority, although many of the continental jurists hold otherwise. It is settled, however, that a Virginia guardian has, in general, no authority outside of Virginia, nor has a guardian, appointed in England, Canada, or Mississippi, any power in Virginia. (Stor. Confl. L. § 495, &c., 504, 504 a, &c.) However, this principle has proved so inconvenient in practice as to lead to the enactment of a statute which provides that where any minor (and the same. principle is applied in the case of insane persons) entitled to money or property in this State, resides out of

it, on the petition of a guardian of such minor, lawfully appointed and qualified in the State or country of his residence, the circuit or corporation court of the county or corporation in which the estate may be, may order the delivery of such personal property, &c., to the foreign guardian, including the accruing rents of his real estate, to be removed to the State or country where he qualified, with certain precautions against abuse and against prejudice to the interest of the minor. (V. C. 1873, c. 125; § 3 to 5, 8, 9; Id. c. 154, § 7, 38.) 3f. The Powers and Duties of Guardians.

The fundamental principle touching this subject is that the guardian's office is one of obligation and duty for the benefit of the ward, and not of speculation and profit for his own aggrandizement. He cannot lawfully reap any advantage from the use of the ward's money. He cannot lawfully act for his own emolument in any contract, or purchase, or sale, as to the ward's property; but in all that he does the law obliges him to consult the ward's interest alone, and whatever profits arise from transactions with or concerning the minor's estate, redound in law to the minor, and not to the guardian. (2 Kent's Com. 229; Bac. Abr. Guardian (G).)

The powers and duties of guardian are summed up in two particulars-namely, (1), The custody of the ward's person and care of his education; and (2), The care and management of his estate;

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15. The Custody of the Ward's Person, and Care of his Education; W. C.

1h. Right to the Custody of the Ward's Person and the Care of his Education.

In these particulars the power and reciprocal duty of guardian and ward are very similar to those prevailing between parent and child; but they are not exactly the same; for a guardian, as he can do nothing but for the benefit of the infant, so he has no private interest as a parent, or at least as a father has, in his ward's services and earnings. He cannot recover for such services, nor can he maintain an action in his own name for the seduction of a female ward, nor for any injury to the ward's person, But see Bac. Abr. Guardian (F); Fernsler v. Moyer, 3 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 416.

The guardian's right to the custody of the ward's person is undeniable, as it is also to the care of his education, in respect to which a court of chancery will assist him, if need be, with all its powers. (2 Stor.

Eq. § 1340; Hill v. Turner, 1 Atk. 516; Hall v. Hall, 3 Atk. 721; Tremain's Case, 1 Stra. 167.) And this authority, at least in guardians appointed by the court and by the father's will, and in the father and mother as guardians by nature, is pretty distinctly recognized with us by statute. (V. C. 1873, c. 123, $ 7.)

It is the duty of a guardian to protect and defend his ward, and he is justified in assisting him to obtain redress for any wrong done him. He is also required to provide, out of the profits of the ward's estate (and sometimes out of the principal), for his maintenance and education; and when his estate is not sufficient for this purpose, it is the guardian's duty, if the ward's age and health admit, and a suitable person will take him, to bind the ward apprentice, with the consent of the court of the county or corporation, if the child be under fourteen, and if over fourteen, with his own consent; or, with like consent, to place him in some incorporated asylum for destitute children. But the guardian is in no case personally responsible for his ward's support and education, unless by agreement. (V. C. 1873, c. 123, § 7, 8; Id. c. 122, § 1, 2; Barnum v. Frost's adm'r, 17 Grat. 398.) It is the guardian's duty also to control that most important interest of the ward, his marriage, no license therefor being obtainable without his consent. (V. C. 1873, c. 104, § 3.) And therefore a guardian is justified in stopping his ward's elopement, and detaining his clothes if he has eloped (1 Bl. Com. 463, n (9); Barker v. Taylor, 1 Carr. & P. (11 E. C. L.) 101.)

As to the removal of the ward from the country by his guardian, it is not necessarily inadmissible, if it seem to have been dictated by no bad motive, nor likely to be attended with ill consequences; but the act is regarded with jealousy and distrust by a court of equity, and not a little quickens the disposition of the court to intervene and to exert its extraordinary power of taking the infant from the custody of the guardian altogether. And on the other hand, in no case whatever will the court make an order for taking an infant out of its jurisdiction. (2 Stor. Eq. § 1339; 2 Kent's Com. 220, n (d); Creuze v. Hunter, 2 Bro. C. C. 500, note; DeManneville v. DeManneville, 10 Ves. 52; Mountstuart v. Mountstuart, 6 Ves. 363; People v. Mercien, 8 Pai. (N. Y.) 47.)

2. Remedies for the Abduction of the Ward.

The only injury which a guardian can personally

suffer in his tutorial capacity or relation, is by the abduction of his ward. For this wrong, the law affords five remedies, four of which are the same as in case of a parent similarly aggrieved, which having been already explained, will be merely stated, along with their general effect respectively;

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1. Action of Trespass vi et armis.

This action is adapted to recover damages for the wrong, but not to regain possession of the person of the ward. (1 Bl. Com. 463, n (9); Bac. Abr. Guard'n (F); Hussey's Case, 9 Co. 72 a; Rex v. Smith, 2 Stra. 982.)

2. Writ de Custodia Terra et Hæredis.

This is denominated the writ of Right of Ward, and lay, at common law, for a guardian in chivalry and in socage. Thereby the guardian recovered the custody of the ward's body, and of his lands; but if, meanwhile, the ward had been married, the body was not recoverable, and this writ lay not; the guardian being then driven to the action of trespass, wherein he recovered, besides other damages, the value of the marriage. This, however, was remedied by Stat. of Merton, 20 Hen. III, c. 6, which restored the benefit of the writ of right of ward. (1 Th. Co. Lit. 338, & n (C); 3 Bl. Com. 141; Bac. Abr. Guard'n (F).)

As we have no tenures in Virginia, either chivalry or socage, this remedy is supposed not to exist here. 3. Writ of Ravishment of Ward.

By this writ, given by Stat. Westm. II, 13 Edw. I, c. 35, it recovered the body of the ward, together with damages for the taking and detention, and not damages only, as by the action of trespass at common-law. The benefit of the statute is not restricted to any particular class of guardians, and it may be employed certainly, not only by guardians in socage, but also by testamentary guardians, and guardians by nature. (1 Th. Co. Lit. 338; Bac. Abr. Guardian, (F); 1 Bl. Com. 463, n (9); 3 Bl. Com. 141; Hussey's case, 9 Co. 72, 74 b; Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wms. 122.)

The writ of ravishment of ward being a remedial writ, granted by a general statute of England, prior to 4 Jac. I, and not repealed in Virginia, is reserved for the use of our people. (V. C. 1873, c. 15, § 2.) 4. Writ of Habeas Corpus.

This writ is adapted to recover a ward only when