58. Doctrine touching Foreign Sentences of Divorce; W.C. 1. Doctrine in England. The narrow and illiberal doctrine of the English courts is that marriages solemnized in England can only be dissolved (so as to make the dissolution valid in England, or by English law) in accordance with the law of England. Hence, if parties are married in England, and then remove their domicil to Scotland, a divorce, according to the law of Scotland, is not valid in England. In order to be valid there, the divorce must conform to the requirements of English law, which is wholly opposed to the general rule prevailing in most other civilized countries--namely, that the validity of a divorce is determined by the lex domicilii, the law of the parties' domicil. It is, besides, violative of international comity. (Bac. Abr. Mar. & Div. (F) 3; Stor. Confl. L. § 125, &c.; 2 Kent's Com. 116, 117.) 2. Doctrine in Virginia as to Foreign Sentences of Divorce; W. C. 1'. Doctrine in Virginia as to Foreign Divorces, pronounced outside of the United States. The general doctrine of all civilized States, except England, and the doctrine strongly sanctioned by international comity, is that the validity of a divorce is regulated by the lex domicilii, the law of the place of the actual bona fide domicil of the parties. The proper courts of that place have jurisdiction to decree a divorce for any cause allowed by the local law, without reference to the law of the place of the original marriage, or of the place where the offence for which the divorce is allowed was committed. This doctrine is firmly established in the United States, and is substantially recognized in Scotland, and for the most part on the continent of Europe. (Stor. Confl. L, § 230, a; Id. 221, &c.; 2 Kent's Com. 107, &c.; V. C. 1873, c. 105, § 8; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wal. 124.) The domicil of the husband must, in general, be treated as the domicil of the wife, but not so as to oust of their jurisdiction the courts of the State where the parties were domiciled when the right to a divorce accrued; nor so as to deprive the injured wife of the protection of its laws, and of her right thereby to a divorce. The rule upon the subject, indeed, is that she may acquire a separate domicil whenever it is necessary or proper that she should do so. The right, on her part, springs from the necessity for its 280 exercise, and endures as long as the necessity continues. The proceedings for a divorce in such cases may be instituted where the wife has her domicil. The place of the marriage and of the offence, and the domicil of the husband, are then of no consequence. (Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wal. 124; 2 Bish. Mar. & Div. § 475; Barbee v. Barbee, 21 How. 582, 593.) 2. Doctrine in Virginia as to Foreign Divorces obtained in other States of the Union. By the Constitution of the United States full faith and credit are to be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any other State; and this, by the Supreme Court of the United States, is held to attach to the judgment of the State Court the same validity and effect in every other State in the Union, which it has in the State where it is rendered, provided the parties thereto appear, or be personally summoned, and there is no fraud or collusion. (Const. U. S. Art. IV, § i; Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234; Mayhew v. Thatcher, 6 Wheat. 129; Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cr. 484; D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 175; Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wal 302.) Hence, if a divorce a vinculo be obtained in another State, according to the laws thereof, the defendant being personally summoned, and submitting to the jurisdiction, although neither party be domiciled there, and after a fair investigation of the merits (that is, an investigation without fraud or collusion), the sentence, it seems, must be received as having the same validity and effect everywhere in the United States, and amongst the rest in the State of the parties' actual domicil as it had in the State where it is rendered. (2 Kent's Com. 108-'9; 1 Tuck. Com. (B. I.) 107-'8; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wal. 123.) 65. Sundry Matrimonial Causes besides Divorce. Let us see, (1), What are such matrimonial causes; and (2), The courts in which they are cognizable; W. C. 1h. What are such Matrimonial Causes. The matrimonial causes, other than divorce, are (1), 1. Suit for Jactitation of Marriage. When one party gives out or boasts (jactitat) that he or she is married to another, whereby a common reputation of their marriage may ensue, it may be expedient to institute a suit, in order to inquire into the fact of the imputed marriage, upon the application of the party complaining; and if it appear that there has been no such marriage, to impose silence upon the boaster. Such a proceeding is called a suit for jactitation of marriage. Suits for jactitation of marriage, with other matrimonial causes, are submitted in England to the ecclesiastical courts, or since 1858, the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes. In Virginia no tribunal was provided for the determination of jactitation suits until the revisal of 1849, when more comprehensive provisions for matrimonial causes than ever before existed were introduced into our Code. The courts charged with this class of cases are the circuit and corporation courts on the chancery side. (3 Bl. Com. 93; Watson v. Rider, 1 Lee, (5 E. E. R.) 16; Wescombe v. Dods, Id. 59; Duchess of Kingston's case, 20 How. St. Tri. 355; Meadows & ux v. Duchess of Kingston, 2 Amb. 760; V. C. 1873, c. 105, § 5, 8; Id. c. 154, § 38.) 21. Suits for Restitution of Conjugal Rights. Whenever either party lives separate from the other without sufficient reason, a suit may be instituted to compel cohabitation, if the party complaining is weak enough to desire it contrary to the inclination of the consort; and such a suit is called a suit for restitution of conjugal rights. But the only duty which in the nature of things is capable of being thus enforced is that of "living together." (3 Bl. Com. 94; Bish, Marr. & Div. § 507; Orme v. Orme, 2 Add. (2 E. E. R.) 382; Molony v. Molony. Id. 249; 1 Hagg. C. R. (4 E. E. R.) 358, 363.) It seems the better opinion that this jurisdiction does not exist in this country, unless conferred by statute; and as we have no statute in Virginia bestowing it, it is supposed to be wanting in our system. The only relief, if any, which could be here obtained, is a decree of divorce for desertion. (Bish. Marr. & Div. § 279, 502, 506 & seq.) 31. Suit for Alimony. In England alimony, which means an allowance for the maintenance of the wife, is a mere incident to a decree of divorce a mensa, and it is generally granted, of course, by the same court, that is, the court christian, or since 1858 by the court for divorce and matrimonial causes. There are instances, indeed, of the court of chancery enforcing a previous agree ment to provide maintenance for a wife, and also of its decreeing maintenance as incidental to some other principal object within the scope of its powers; but the doctrine seems to be settled there that alimony is always an incident only, and that no court has any jurisdiction to give a wife a separate maintenance where it is the sole relief sought. (2 Burn's Eccles. L. 506 & seq.; Bac. Abr. Bar. & F. (H); 2 Stor. Eq. § 1422 & seq.; Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. Jun. 191.) In Virginia not only is alimony granted as incidental to divorce of either kind, with the largest discretion, as we have seen (ante, p 269, 1'), as to the estates of the parties, but it may be granted by the court of chancery, independently of any divorce, or any application for one, as where the misconduct of the husband drives the wife from her home, or he turns her out of doors, or perhaps wherever a divorce from bed and board, or a restoration of conjugal rights would be decreed. (Purcell v. Purcell, 4 H. & M. 507; Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. 662; Spencer v. Ford, 1 Rob. 648; Bish. Mar & Div. § 555.) But no alimony will be decreed to a wife who without adequate reason deserts her husband and refuses to live with him. Whilst she thus disregards her husband's comfort and happiness, her own duty, and the decencies of society, she has no right to demand of him a support in a separate establishment, and to concede it would be a reward to misconduct, and would give a rude shock to the sanctity of the marriage contract. Nor is it an adequate cause for such desertion that the husband has behaved with too little tenderness and consideration; that he has been at times coarse, rude and petulant, when he should have been gentle, soothing and affectionate; that he has left her to bear alone burdens and trials which it should have been his highest pleasure to share and relieve; or that he has been close, exacting, and penurious, when he should have been, to the extent of his means, open-handed, liberal and generous. (Carr v. Carr, 22 Grat. 173, 175.) The various questions connected with alimony cannot be here discussed. It must suffice to say that, as upon the marriage the husband has vested in him all the present available means of the wife, together with the right to claim her future earnings and acquisitions, so the law casts upon him the duty suitably to maintain her according to his ability and condition, a duty which he cannot renounce; so that when the law in any case judges that the parties may be separated for her protection, or that otherwise the intervention of the court is requisite in consequence of his wrong-doing, it must also judge that he shall maintain her while such a state of things continues. It may be added, also, that in cases of divorce it is common to distinguish between the temporary alimony, granted during the continuance of the suit, and the permanent alimony, allowed at its close, the latter being in amount always greater than the former. (Bish. Mar. & Div. § 560, & seq., 613, 616.) The amount of alimony to be allowed is matter of discretion with the court, not, however, an arbitrary, but a judicial discretion, to be exercised according to established principles, and upon a view of all the the circumstances of the case. The general rule, especially in respect to permanent alimony, is that the wife is entitled to a support corresponding to her husband's condition in life, and his fortune and resources, including his and her earnings, or ability to earn money. Ordinarily, it is said, the wife ought to be allowed, for temporary alimony, about one-fifth of the joint income, as just defined, and for permanent alimony, from one-half to one-third, two-fifths being no uncommon proportion. (Bish. Mar. & Div. 603, & seq.; Id. 614, & seq., 616, & seq.; Bailey v. Bailey, 21 Grat. 52, & seq.; see Carr v. Carr, 22 Grat. 168.) 2h. The Courts in which these several Matrimonial Causes are cognizable; W. C. 1. The Courts of England. They are in general, at common law, the ecclesiastical courts, except, perhaps, that in a few cases of previous agreement, or as incident to other equitable relief, alimony is decreed by the court of chancery. But since 1858, by Statute 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, amended by certain subsequent statutes, matrimonial causes have been transferred to a new court, called "The Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes," which may exercise, in respect to alimony, even a larger jurisdiction than belonged, at common law, to the ecclesiastical courts. (Wms. Pers. Prop. 360.) 21. The Courts in Virginia. They are the Circuit and Corporation courts, on the chancery side. These courts have jurisdiction "of suits for annulling or affirming marriages, whose validity is denied or doubted, or for divorces," with |