But notice of the revocation of authority must be given to the servant or agent, and also to the public, and especially to the persons accustomed to deal with the servant or agent as such; and his bona fide acts until he receives such notice, and the bona fide transactions of third persons with him as agent, in the absence of notice to such persons, or to the public, through the newspapers or otherwise, will be obligatory upon the master or principal. (2 Kent's Com. 644; 1 Pars. Cont. 59-'60; 1 Tuck. Com. 93, B. I; Spencer & al v. Wilson, 4 Munf. 135; Morris v. Terrell, 2 Rand. 6.)

2. Termination of Servant's authority by his death, or that of the master.

The death of the servant terminates the agency, of course, because the confidence is a personal one, and cannot be transmitted to the personal representative; and so also it is when the authority is joint to two or more persons and one of them dies, the agency is ended, unless it be expressly stipulated otherwise in the power, or unless the power be coupled with an interest in the subject matter, or be founded on a valuable consideration. (1 Th. Co. Lit. 738-'9; Id. 344; 2 Kent's Com. 643.)

The death of the master terminates the agency, as it terminates, in general, all powers, instantaneously and absolutely, without reference to any notice to the agent, or other persons, or the possibility of notice. The only exception is where the power is coupled with an interest in the subject matter. The fact that it is given for a valuable consideration constitutes no exception to the general rule; for the act of the agent must ever be done in the name of the principal (Combe's case, 9 Co. 76 b), and it would be absurd that an act should be done. in the name of a dead man. (2 Kent's Com. 646; 1 Pars. Cont. 61-22; 2 Th. Co. Lit. 340, 344; Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 201; Clayton v. Fawcett's Adm'rs, 2 Leigh, 23; Houston's Adm'r v. Cantril & al, 11 Leigh, 173; Shipman v. Thompson, Willes Rep. 105; Wynne v. Thomas, Id. 565; Watson, &c. v. King, 1 Stark (2 E. C. L.) 421; S. C. 4 Camp. 274; Houston v. Robertson, 6 Taunt. 450; Blades v. Free, Ex'or, 9 B. & Cr. (17 E. C. L.) 167; Smout v. Ilberry, 10 M. & W. 1.)

It is obvious that this doctrine, although it seems to be the logical result of well established principles, may endanger consequences anything but convenient. Thus, if one constitutes an agent with authority to provide supplies for his family whilst he goes upon a distant voyage, and during his absence he dies in a remote region,

so that intelligence of his death is not received for six months, during all which period necessaries are furnished the family by order of the agent, according to the doctrine in question the decedent's estate cannot be charged, because the agency was revoked by his death (Blades v. Free, 9 B. & Cr. (17 E. C. L.) 167); and it is certain that the agent cannot be charged personally upon the contract, because he made it as agent only. (Smoot v. Ilberry, 10 M. & W. 10). The loss, then, must fall, so far as the contract is concerned, on the innocent tradesman. The best solution seems to be that, although the agent cannot be subjected upon the contract for the price of the goods furnished, he may be, by a special action on the case, for deceit, or by an action of trespass on the case in assumpsit, on the ground that, having represented himself, however bona fide, as the agent, and in that character obtained the goods, he is responsible for the truth of the representation, either as for a fraud, constructive, if not actual, or upon an implied contract that he was clothed with the requisite authority. (Ante, p. 216; Thompson v. Bond, 1 Campb. 6, 7.) This view is very well sustained by the reasoning of the court in Smout v. Ilberry, 10 M. & W. 10, in respect to the agent's be ing liable to an action on the case for deceit. It is also in conformity with several of the older cases. Thus, in Hern v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289, Lord Holt held a merchant liable in an action on the case for a deceit, where it appeared that he had sold certain silk as of a particular quality, bona fide believing it to be so, upon the statement of his foreign correspondent, when it was, in fact, of an inferior description; for, says Lord Holt, "seeing somebody must be a loser by this deceit, it is more reason that he that employs and puts a trust and confidence in the deceiver should be a loser than a stranger." So, in Schneider & al v. Heath, 3 Campb. 508, a ship was sold "with all faults" by a particular description, which turned out almost wholly untrue. The description was prepared by an agent, who did not know the falsity of it, and Mansfield, C. J., held that the sale must be vacated, for that it signified nothing "whether a man represents a thing to be different from what he knows it to be, or whether he makes a representation which he does not know at the time to be true or false, if in point of fact it turns out to be false." And to a like effect was the opinion of Lord Mansfield in Pawson v. Watson, Cowp. 788. So Lord Denman, in Evans v. Collins, 5 Ad. & El. N. S, (48 E. C. L.) 819, says, "the sufferer is wholly free from blame; but the party who caused the loss,

though charged neither with fraud nor negligence, must have been guilty of some fault when he made a false representation. He was not bound to make any statement, nor justified in making any which he did not know to be true; and it is just that he, not the party whom he has misled, should abide the consequences of his misconduct." This judgment, however, was reversed by the Court of Exchequer-Chamber (5 Ad. & El. N. S. (48 E. C. L.) 827); and it must be admitted that the weight of later English authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that in order to sustain an action for a deceit, the false representation must have been communicated for a de ceitful purpose, or have been known to be false. (Cornfoot v. Fowke, 6 Excheq. 358; Meens v. Hayworth & al, 10 M. & W. 147; Taylor v. Ashton, 11 M. & W. 401; Wilson v. Fuller, 3 Ad. & El. N. S. (43 E. C. L.) 639; Collins v. Evans, 5 Ad. & El. N. S. (48 E. C. L.) 826; Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51; Haycraft v. Creasy, 2 East. 92.) The American cases, on the other hand, favor the conclusion that an assertion, as of one's own knowledge, of some matter of fact which is not true, whether the person knew anything of the fact or not, renders him equally liable. "Such an averment has all the elements and all the consequences of a fraudulent representation. (Hazard v. Irvin, 18 Pick. 96, 109; Page & al v. Bent & als, 2 Metc. 371, 374; Lobdell v. Baker, 1 Id. 193, 201; Ballow v. Talbot, 16 Mass. 461; Stene v. Denny, 4 Metc. 151; Gough v. St. John, 16 Wend. 646.) In England, therefore, the action would be trespass on the case in assumpsit, upon the implied undertaking that the supposed agent had a valid authority, whilst with us it might be either an action of assumpsit or an action on the case for the deceit.

3. Termination of the Servant's authority by a change in the condition of the Master or Principal.

Such a change as determines the power of the principal to control the subject matter of the agency puts an end to the agent's authority. Prominent amongst these changes are bankruptcy, lunacy, and marriage in case of a female, all of which extinguish the agency. But in these cases also, as in others, the revocation or determination of the agent's power may be arrested by its being coupled with an interest in the subject matter, or founded on valuable consideration, whereby a lien on the subject may be created, even in case of a bankrupt. (2 Kent's Com. 644-25; Alloy, &c. v. Hotson, 4 Camp. 326.)

In case of lunacy, the existence of the lunacy must be

established by a judicial sentence before it will operate to revoke the power. (2 Kent's Com. 645.)

4. Termination of the Servant's authority by the completion of the business, or by the lapse of time prescribed for its duration.

A servant or agent with power to sell goods is functus officio as soon as the sale is made, and cannot then change the terms so as to bind the principal; and so, whilst his declarations at the time of sale are good evidence against the principal, as we have seen, yet those made afterwards, although during the continuance of the agency, are inadmissible. The agent himself, however, is of course a competent witness to prove the facts at any time. (Blackburn v. Scholes, 2 Camp. 343; Helyear v. Hawke, 5 Esp. 74. Pete v. Hague, 5 Esp. 134; Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wal. 140; Auditor v. Johnson, 1 H. & M. 540; Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174; 1 Am. L. C. 567.)

5. Termination of the Servant's authority by the occurrence of war between the countries of which he and the Master are respectively subjects.

Hence

No transactions of trade or commercial intercourse are permitted between the subjects of belligerent States, without special license, in consequence of the mischief and abuses to which such intercourse would be liable. war, for the most part, terminates all agencies (unless, perhaps, where they are coupled with an interest), and all partnerships; but not so as to preclude the continuance of an agency in the enemy's country in order to collect debts and to preserve property. (Hale v. Wall, 22 Grat. 430; Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Warwick, 20 Grat. 637 & seq.; Ward v. Smith, 7 Wal. 447, 452; 1 Pars. Cont. 178; Potts v. Belt, 8 T. R. 548; The Hoop, 1 Rob. Adm. R. 167; Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438; Scholefield v. Eichelberger, 7 Pet. 59.) And this principle applies as well to civil as to international wars. (Billgerry v. Branch & Sons, 19 Grat. 393.)

6. Doctrine touching the liability of the Master, where government is concerned; W. C.

1. Liability of Government for the tortious acts and defaults of its Servants.

The government is bound, like any other principal, by the contracts of its agents, but upon considerations of public policy, is never answerable for their tortious acts or defaults. The maxim respondeat superior is not applicable in such cases. (Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 646; Whitefield v. Ld. De Spencer, Cowp. 754, 763; City of Richmond v. Long's Adm'r, 17 Grat. 378; Weightman

v. City of Washington, 1 Black. 40; Chicago City v. Robins, 2 Black. 418.)

2. Liability of superior Government-officer for act or default of Subordinate.

When the subordinate is himself a government-officer (in contradistinction to a private servant of the superior), whether nominated by the superior or not, the latter is not responsible for the subordinate's act or default, such subordinate being not an agent of his, but of the government. Hence the postmaster-general is not liable for losses arising from the act or default of his deputies, nor is a deputy postmaster answerable for the default of an official assistant, although appointed by himself. (Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 646; Whitworth v. Ld. De Spencer, Cowp. 754; Dunlop. v. Monroe, 7 Cr. 242; Wilson v. Peverly, 1 Am. L. C. 621.)

On the other hand, if the subordinate be not a government-officer, but the superior's private servant, the maxim of respondeat superior applies, and the master is responsible for his acts and defaults. (Wilson v. Peverly, 1 Am. L. C. 621.) Thus, a mail-carrier, being the private agent of the contractor, and not a governmentofficer, the contractor is liable for any injury sustained by third persons, through the carrier's negligence or default. (Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Grat. 230.)

This distinction is not only logical, seeing that the subordinate, when a public officer, is the agent, not of his chief, but of the government, but it is also rendered needful by sound policy, as well as by justice. For who otherwise would consent to take the responsibility of a public office, wherein he must have assistants, and in administering which the largest fortune might be hopelessly wrecked by the acts of persons whose conduct the superior cannot possibly, practically and effectively supervise and control. Thus is explained the responsibility of the high-sheriff for the default of his deputy (ante p. 97-8, 5*,) for originally the deputy was merely the principal's servant, and not a public officer; and the doctrine has been silently retained, notwithstanding the deputy-sheriff is now to some purposes a public officer. (Shepherd v. Lincoln, 17 Wend. 250; Wilson v. Peverly, 1 Am. L. C. 621-22.)

But whilst the superior is not liable for the official delinquency of his official subordinate public officer, he is answerable for not properly superintending, and perhaps for fraudulent neglect in appointing him. (Dunlop v. Monroe, 7 Cr. 242; Wilson v. Peverly, 1 Am. L. C. 621.)