⚫ le parlement se faisoit tant de peine d'enregistrer, et qui étoient 'si insupportables au peuple, il étoit bien plus simple et plus aisé 'de créer des rentes; qu'un million de rentes crées produiroit

tout d'un coup vingt millions, et que ce seroit un petit objet par • rapport aux revenus considerables dont jouissoit sa Majesté. Ce 'magistrat suivit de bonne foi l'avis qui lui étoit donné. Le Roi ravi de cet expedient, qui lui venoit d'un homme si approuvé, dit à M. Colbert qu'il n'y avoit qu'à créer des rentes. M. Golbert, qui en prévoyoit les suites et les inconveniens, voulut avant que de rendre l'Edit, se donner la satisfaction de parler au premier President. Il lui fit sentir les consequences du conseil qu'il avoit donné à bonne intention, et lui dit qu'il repondroit devant Dieu du prejudice qu'il causoit à l'état, et du mal qu'il ⚫ faisoit au peuple. '-(Forbonnais Recherches sur les Finances de la France, tome VI. p. 117.)

The family of Bourbon and the French nation have paid dearly for their folly, in sacrificing the lasting and permanent advantages that would have resulted from following the system of Colbert, for the sake of the delusive and momentary relief afforded by the plan suggested by Louvois. Had the former been adopted, France would have avoided the disgraceful and ruinously destructive bankruptcies of 1715 and 1769; and would most probably have been preserved from the Revolution of 1789.

Unfortunately, however, it is unnecessary to refer either to the history of Holland or of France, for a demonstration of the ruinous effects of the funding system. It has been hardly less injurious here. With the exception of the sum of 664,2631., being the compensation given to the merchants and others who had suffered by the robbery of the Exchequer by Charles II. in 1672, the national debt of Great Britain has been wholly contracted since the era of the Revolution. At the commencement of Queen Anne's reign, in 1702, the principal of the debt amounted to only 16,400,000l., and the interest to 1,310,000l. At the accession of George I., in 1713, the principal amounted to 52,000,000l., and the interest to 3,351,000l.; and at the accession of George II., in 1727, the principal still amounted to 52,000,000l.; but, in consequence of measures adopted in 1716, the charge on account of interest was reduced to 2,217,000/. Here the system of borrowing ought to have stopped; but thus far it was certainly justifiable. The Revolution involved us in a bloody and expensive contest with Louis XIV., who espoused the cause of the exiled family of Stuart, and exerted himself to reduce the people of Britain to the same state of abject slavery to their legitimate monarchs to which his less powerful, but equally bigotted and unprincipled successors are now attempt

ing to reduce the Spaniards! But the danger from without, though great and imminent, was inferior to the danger from within. A numerous and powerful faction were favourable to the views of the Pretender; and the imposition of such an additional load of taxes, as would have been required to defray the cost of the war it was necessary to wage for the independence and liberties of the country, would have afforded the Jacobites the means of traducing the new government, of inflaming popular discontents, and spreading disaffection, and most probably of overturning the revolutionary establishment. The difficulties of their situation-res dura et regni novitas-justify the revolutionary leaders in resorting to the system of loans. In point of fact, they had no other resource. The contraction of debt was then really not a matter of choice, but of necessity. The error consisted in continuing the system of loans after the new government had been firmly established, and after that necessity, which affords a complete justification of those who first introduced the plan of borrowing, had entirely ceased. But although the ruinous nature of the Funding System was very soon exposed, both by members in the House of Commons, and by writers of considerable ability out of doors, the facilities which it presented to each succeeding administration, of meeting any extraordinary expense, without endangering their popularity by the imposition of equivalent taxes, secured its ascendancy. The ministers of George II. and George III. were all bred in the school of Louvois. Sound policy, and a proper regard for the public welfare, imperiously required of them to act with firmness and vigour; and to impose, in despite of the clamours of the ignorant, whatever additional taxes might have been necessary to meet any extraordinary expense. But, instead of acting in this manly, open, and energetic manner, they resorted, either from a wish to conciliate the ephemeral applauses of the mob, or from some less worthy motive, to a system of deceit and delusion; which, while it enabled them to indulge in a course of wanton and prodigal expenditure, has entailed a greater permanent annual burden on the country, in time of peace, than would have been required to carry on the most expensive war.

We have already observed, that the principal of the public debt amounted, in 1727, at the accession of George II. to fiftytwo millions, and the interest to 2,217,000l. The wars of 1799 and 1756 carried the principal of the debt, at the peace of Paris in 1763, three years posterior to the accession of his late Majesty, to one hundred and thirty-eight millions, and the interest to 4,852,0511. Since then, the debt has increased with a rapility unparalleled in any other age or country. The attempt to

enslave the American colonists, by making them pay taxes imposed without their consent, added above one hundred and twenty millions to the public debt-and the crusade, in favour of the Bourbons of France, has added to it upwards of SIX HUNDRED MILLIONS more! The following statement exhibits the progress of the public debt since the peace of Paris in 1763 :

The following is an account of the amount of the unredeemed, funded, and unfunded debt, of the total charge for both on account of interest, expenses of management, &c. in each year, from 1816 to 1823:

Years end

ing 5th Ja-Total unredeemed Total Unfunded Total Charge on

nuary.

1818
1819

account of both.

L.776,742,403 L.66,772,364 L.31,266,601 791,867,313 53,095,008 31,351,751 1820 794,986,481 48,408,323 30,792,025 1821 801,565,310 40,860,481 31,252,612 41,477,789 31,966,079 41,485,770 30,921,494*

1822 795,312,767

1823

796,530,145

* This is the total charge as given in the Finance Accounts for 1822 (p. 19), for the debt during the year ending 5th January 1823. But the charge for the debt as it stood on the 5th January 1823, amounted to upwards of 32 millions; and this because new debt, bearing an interest of 3,251,6871. was created in 1822, while the

But the main object of our investigation is not so much to show the rapid and appalling increase of the public debt, as to show the absolute waste of the national resources, occasioned by the Funding System. And that, in exhibiting its practical operation, we may not be accused of laying any stress on collateral or doubtful topics, we shall preface our inquiries into the operation of the Funding System, during the late war, by a very large admission indeed:-We shall suppose, and even the Laureate would not require us to do more, that the late war was not only what its advocates called it, just and necessary,' but that it was also conducted in the most frugal and parsimonious manner: We shall suppose that no subsidies were uselessly granted to foreign powers; that there was no jobbing either in the commissariat or any other department; no wanton expenditure in barracks and other buildings; no unnecessary changes in the dress and equipment of the troops, but that every thing was conducted in as laudable a spirit of economy as it could have been, had the proceedings of ministers and their agents been controlled by a committee of Dutch burgomasters! And, after allowing all this, we shall show, that, by raising the supplies within the year, the country could have defrayed the same amount of expenditure for ONE HUNDRED and forty-six MILLIONS less than it actually cost under the Funding System; while we should also have accumulated about ONE HUNDRED MILLIONS of capital, in addition to the accumulations that have really been made, by the more powerful spirit of industry and economy that would have been generated by directly burdening each individual with his full share of the expenses of the war.

This result is deduced from the statements in the following Tables, which we have drawn up either from the official accounts published by order of the House of Commons, or from those in the Journal Office, and on the accuracy of which our readers may place every reliance.- See TABLE, No. I.]

This Table is most important. The first column contains a statement of the total charge on account of the unredeemed funded and unfunded debt, as it stood on the 5th January 1793, and as it would have stood on the 5th January each succeeding year to 1816 inclusive, had no addition been made to it. We have included 1816; for though the war ended in 1815, the financial operations occasioned by it were not concluded till 1816. The reductions are occasioned by the falling in of annuities, &c.: The

second

debt paid off in that year only bore an interest of 1,902,240l. 17s. ; and hence it is obvious, that the charge for the debt this year will be considerably greater than it has been in any year since 1817-(See Finance Accounts for 1822, p. 157.)

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