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NOTE ON THE FOREGOING.

BY PROFESSOR OLIVER J. LODGE, LL.D., D.Sc., F.R.S.,

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LIVERPOOL.

MR. HIGGINS' argument, as I understand it, may be shortly quoted somewhat as follows.

The properties and functions enjoyed by an organism 'must, in some sort, be derived from properties and functions of the cells of which it is composed. All that the complex organism is or can be, is a lofty manifestation and development of apparently lowly powers latent in its component cells.

It

Again, the properties of the most complex molecule known to chemists must derive themselves, somehow or other, from the properties of its constituent atoms. cannot be supposed that the mere grouping of atoms together introduces anything completely and intrinsically novel. All the properties of a molecule must be, in fact, latent in the atoms.

It may likewise be asserted that, since a cell is composed of an aggregation of similar molecules, all the functions possessed by the organic cell must be a development of powers latent in each molecule of which it is composed.

Now, supposing each of these three steps granted, they constitute a staircase capable of carrying us straight from an animal organism to the atoms of which it and the rest of the material universe are composed; and we are justified in asserting that the functions and processes manifested by the highest forms of life are all latent in the atoms of the chemical elements, and are thence derived.

Now, if this be so, how are we to explain it ? Are we to say that atoms possess something of the nature of life? Or

are we to say that the processes and functions of living beings are but a display of molecular forces acting according to a few simple mechanical laws?

This is the point at which Mr. Higgins appears to diverge and join issue with the speculations of certain men of science who would seek to reduce all vital phenomena ultimately to a complex play* of mechanical forces on inert atoms. Mr. Higgins prefers rather to argue that, inasmuch as vital actions and processes are conspicuously something higher and distinct from common mechanics-something not to be explained by or deduced from Newton's laws of motion-therefore the chain of argument, or staircase already constructed, leads us to postulate something of the nature of a life-potency or vital-principle, of however low an order of development, in the atoms themselves. For this germinal something he invents the sufficiently satisfactory name, "bios."

Well, then, the question raised by the paper is this:Granted the assumption that whatever a complex or aggregate of similar bits contains, the same must also be, in some sense or other, inherent in the bits themselves, Are we to say that life is a mechanical process of atoms and forces ? Or are we to say that the atoms themselves contain some lowly representation or nucleus of the higher life?

I cannot tell whether the enquiry is a new one. I cannot tell how long it will be before mankind can hope to attempt to really answer it in any complete and intelligible manner. But whether new or not, and whether presently answerable or not, it is something to be able to put the question; and it is well to have the question put with such clearness and * On this Mr. Higgins remarks that forces do work: they never "play." This is good as a pun, and good also as reminding us not to permit a rhetorical use of this convenient word to seem to convey vaguely more than is really known. Properly the word "play" in this connexion is approximately synonymous with "display."

ability, and copiousness of illustration, as it has been put with by Mr. Higgins.

For myself, I presume not to offer an opinion on the main points of the issue, but I may venture on one or two suggestions.

It is very natural for a biologist like Mr. Higgins, accustomed from his youth up to study life in all its forms,-it is very natural for such a man to see life, or resemblances to life, everywhere, and to detect in the marked "individuality" of an atom, and in the "family relationships" among atoms, close analogies with things sufficiently corresponding to bear the same names among organised living beings.

On the other hand, it would be very natural if a person like myself, whose tone of thought is physical and mechanical, should, if ever he happened to seek to explain the nature of life (a thing which I feel myself nowhere near the attempting), have his vision filled with mechanical forces and inert atoms, and seek to discover how a play of such forces and assemblages of such atoms could ever assume such mazes of intricacy as to put on the appearance, and perform the functions, of vital processes and living beings as we know them.

But now I want to suggest that these two apparently distinct modes of thought are not mutually exclusive. A different nomenclature is used, and different aspects are consciously attended to, by opposite schools; but perhaps the same objects are being regarded all the while.

May it not be possible that both modes of stating the facts contain some portion of the truth, even though neither goes very far towards exhausting it?

And the attempt to think of life as possibly ultimately explicable on mechanical principles has this advantage over the statement that life is inherent in matter, viz., that it is in its nature verifiable, and the attempt to verify it must

lead us, one way or another, nearer the truth; while the latter statement is in its nature unverifiable. Moreover, it does not explain a complex thing by anything more simple; it really leaves us in the dark, with the mystery unsolved, and apparently insoluble.

Perhaps this may seem an unfair way of putting the distinction I want to convey, but what I mean is this:--either life is ultimately explicable on mechanical principles or it is not. If it is not, then all attempts at elaborating such an explanation will, in the long run, conspicuously fail; and this failure will be very instructive. If, on the other hand, life is so explicable, then attempts to elaborate the explanation are attempts in the direction of the truth.

But if we start with the belief that life is, in its nature, inexplicable, being nothing but a marvellous development of properties already inherent in the atom-properties of a distinct nature, and not related to any common physical or mechanical or chemical laws, then the springs of effort are to that extent sapped, and not much more will be gathered by such a believer concerning the ultimate nature of the mysterious entity so postulated and conceived.

It may be that, in making these few suggestions, I am merely darkening counsel by words without wisdom. If anyone feels so, I should not be disposed to differ from him. Still less am I disposed, on the main contentions, to differ from my friend Mr. Higgins; for in one, and perhaps the highest, sense, some bios theory must undeniably be true.

If it is asserted that, underneath all these animate and inanimate beings, at the foundation of all this agglomeration of particles and cosmos of worlds, there lies a deep living and all pervading Ens-a being illimitably unknown and immeasurably unthinkable,* by whom, and in whom, and of

* Mr. Higgins objects to this statement as dogmatically agnostic. It is not so intended. Ignorance I confess; dogmatic agnosticism I hope to

whom all things consist; so that this stone, this drop of water, this plant, this animal, this conscious ego, as we know them, are but sensible and trivial manifestations of some fragment of the one great infinite and fundamental existence-then neither I nor any other student of natural knowledge can have one word to say against such a view: a view which, more than any other, seems to be the outcome of modern scientific gropings; a view which is being borne in upon students of many diverse kinds of learning; a view which, I believe, does, in a dim and indistinct way, represent some small portion of an ultimate truth.

But then be it noted, that not matter only is to be thus regarded as a fragment of the Divine; force also, and energy, time space and everything, must be equally submerged and transfigured in the higher pantheism.

To call matter inert is not to abuse it. It definitely is inert; it possesses inertia. So neither is it abusing force to call it mechanical. It definitely is mechanical; it can be used to drive machinery.

Until we know what is the ultimate nature of matter, and what the ultimate nature of force; until we are sure that their ultimate nature is something low and undignified; so long we may be permitted to hold that, if ever an explanation of life is forthcoming on mechanical, or physical, or chemical grounds, there will be no degradation to the sublime nature of life by the connection; for the things to which it is related must be, in their true nature, as lofty as itself.

keep free from. To the phrase infinitely unknowable objection might rightly be taken, but the phrase "infinitely unknown," applied to an infinite being, is mathematically correct, notwithstanding any finite knowledge of some aspects of such a being which may be possessed. How much is at present known concerning the Deity it is for students of Theology, not for me, to say; but, unless they can claim the possession of infinite knowledge, the object of their study is still illimitably unknown," and, to any finite mind," unthinkable."

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