scheme by which the tenor of their conduct should be regulated, will not be denied. It seems to be the natural or necessary result of placing rational beings in a world like this, where they are liable to feel pleasure and pain, and to experience good and evil, with the consequent desire to seek the one and to shun the other. During the stirring and thoughtless period of youth, pleasure and pain, good and evil, may come and go, without leaving any lasting lesson behind them. Unmindful of the past, and careless of the future, men may, for a season, yield to the random influence of fancy and feeling. But in beings "endowed with such large discourse of Reason, looking before and after," a period of reflection must come sooner or later. Under the teaching of experience they will learn to pause and to deliberate, to weigh actions and their consequences, and to adopt that course of conduct which promises, on the whole, to be productive of the greatest advantage.

If, in the course of experience and on the ground of experience, men come to frame some conclusion or conception as to what is best or most Advantageous for them, on the whole, then it is obvious to remark

1. That this conclusion, or conception, will prove a principle of action, and have an influence in directing and regulating their conduct.

As beings possessed of a sensitive nature, and susceptible of pleasure and pain, we no sooner know anything which gives us feelings of the former kind than we call it good, and have a desire to obtain it; and anything which gives us feelings of the latter kind we regard as evil, and seek to avoid. In like manner, those things which, though they may not directly give us feelings of pleasure or pain, yet do contribute to our happiness or misery, we call useful or hurtful, advantageous or disadvantageous, and have a correspondent desire to seek or to shun them. Knowing is different from Feeling; but in beings who are capable of feeling, the knowledge of what is likely to affect their susceptibility of pleasure or pain, naturally, perhaps necessarily, stirs some degree of emotion, and leads them to desire and endeavour to obtain the one and to avoid the other. It is plain, then, that such actions, and courses of action, as are contemplated as likely to give more pleasure than pain, to bring more advantage than disadvantage, will be done, and persevered in, by all who have come to any conclusion or conception as to what is best for them on the whole. Present pleasure will be weighed in

the balance against future pain, and temporary inconvenience against permanent benefit, and men will act upon the principle of securing the greatest amount of advantage.

2. A regard to what is Advantageous on the whole will, when entertained, not only prove a principle of action, but a superior and governing principle.

It is a principle different in nature from, and superior in kind to, the incitements of Appetite and Passion. It operates, not blindly nor impulsively, but calmly and with deliberation. It opposes itself to the violence of Appetite and Passion, and takes a careful survey of actions and their consequences; setting one thing over against another. When men act under the influence of this principle, guarding against the errors into which they see others fall, correcting such as they may have made themselves, and cautiously and prudently regulating their conduct, so as to avoid the pains and inconveniencies to which they are here exposed, and to secure the greatest possible amount of advantage, they are exercising their powers in the way and to the end for which they were intended, and are acting agreeably to their nature as rational beings. In addition to the advantages which result directly from such conduct, they feel a degree of self-satisfaction and self-gratulation, by which the enjoyment of these advantages is greatly enhanced. They commend and applaud themselves as having acted a prudent and becoming part, and rejoice that they have been able to keep the inferior and more turbulent principles of their nature in subjection to the calm and more authoritative dictates of reason. On the other hand, when men yield to the importunity of Appetite, or to the impetuosity of Passion, when they disregard the counsels of Prudence, and hurry on in a course of conduct which is foolish and hurtful, they are sure, when the season of exhaustion and reflection has arrived, to be filled with shame and self-dissatisfaction, as having acted in a manner unsuitable and disproportioned to their rational nature. (Butler, Sermon II., On Human Nature, Whewell's Edition, Nos. 35, 36.)

It thus appears that, in a Rational being, Prudence, or a Regard to what is Advantageous, is a principle of action, and should be a guiding and governing principle of action. "Ratio habet in se quiddam amplum atque magnificum, ad imperandum magis quam d parendum, accomodatum." (Cicero, De Finibus, lib. ii. cap. 14.) atio præsit, appetitus vero obtemperet." (Cicero, De Offic., lib. i.

cap. 28.) This principle may, and should, bring other principles into subjection. The conduct to which it prompts will be, when fairly followed out, in accordance with the nature and condition of man, and will tend to promote his true happiness and his best interest. Still, however, mere Prudence, or an enlightened self-love, cannot be set up as the supreme guide and ultimate arbiter of human actions.

Some of the defects of this principle have been pointed out by Dr. Reid (Act. Pow., Essay iii. pt. iii. ch. 4); and other views of its inadequacy may be added.

1. The influence of this principle does not extend directly to the whole of human conduct.

Prudence, or an enlightened self-love, may lead directly to the performance of many of the duties which a man owes to himself, in promoting his own comfort and advantage. But it has only a remote and indirect influence in leading to the performance of the social and benevolent duties. The discharge of these latter sometimes demands the sacrifice of our own ease and advantage; and, though the sacrifice may be attended with a satisfaction which more than compensates for it, this satisfaction cannot be enjoyed by those who are conscious that, in doing good to others, they were animated chiefly by a desire to promote their own advantage.

2. This principle does not confer the true character of virtue on those actions which flow from it.

The wise and prudent men of the world-they who are animated by an exclusive regard to their own advantage-may be sober and temperate, cautious and discreet, slow to anger and ready to overlook a fault, and may do many things that are lovely and of good report. But, when it is seen that their conduct proceeds from a predominating love of self, and that they walk in paths which are parallel to those of virtue, from the belief that these paths are the safest and the best, our approbation and esteem are diminished. Even they who do good from benevolent and disinterested motives may yet fail in commanding that respect and esteem which are due only to the truly virtuous. While full of kindness, they may be deficient in patience and discretion, and thus mar the amiableness and advantage of their benevolence. By carelessness or folly they may bring themselves into difficulty and danger; and by the indis"criminate and thoughtless diffusion of their liberality, may do more harm than good to others. Prudence may be a virtue, and Ber

volence may be a virtue; but the essence and formal nature of virtue must lie in something common to both, and to every other virtue. Neither one nor other can give its true dignity and worth to human conduct. Both must be cultivated, in subordination to a higher principle. Virtue must be loved and practised for its own sake, before the human character can reach its true elevation. Prudence, as leading to our own advantage, and Benevolence, as promoting the advantage of others, must be followed, not for the sake of that advantage, but because both are so far right and virtuous. It is only when so followed that they can promote the true perfection and happiness of a rational nature.

3. This principle is not adequate to advance to the utmost the perfection and happiness of human beings.

He who makes his own advantage the chief and ultimate aim of all his actions, may seem to take the surest and the shortest way to secure his happiness. But it is not so. The very anxiety and effort to secure it are self-defeating. Epicurus maintained that Prudence is an anxious and a troublesome virtue. "Disengagement is absolutely necessary to enjoyment; and a person may have so steady and fixed an eye upon his interest, whatever he places it in, as may hinder him from attending to many gratifications within his reach, which others have their minds free and open to." (Butler, Sermon on the Love of our Neighbour.) Repose and satisfaction are not likely to be the lot of him who has no sooner obtained one advantage than he sets off in pursuit of another, or who has only surmounted one difficulty to encounter a second; and who, even when his plans and exertions are most successful, fears that they may suddenly meet with interruption or disappointment. "The happy man," says Dr. Reid, "is not he whose happiness is his only care."

4. This principle cannot furnish a clear nor safe rule of human conduct.

It is not easy to determine rightly, in every case, what is most Advantageous. Discussions as to what constitutes the chief good of man have terminated in very different conclusions; and these have had little practical influence upon human conduct. If this principle were their supreme guide, men would be left to act according to their shifting views of expediency. Betwixt ignorance of what is best to be done, in many cases, and the urgency of desire And the eloquence of passion, pleading for their gratification, men

uld have no clear nor sure guide for their conduct; and would eld, by turns, to the counsels of caution and the impulses of ly. Nor could they be severely blamed for doing so, as it may remarked, that—

5. This principle is deficient in authority, and carries with it no nse of obligation.

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It may counsel, but it cannot command. It may lay down a rule, at it cannot impose a law. "The idea of a law implies something <ternal and superior to the person, something universal, which ɔmprehends and governs the individual. That which is personal, ot being superior to the person, cannot in any way oblige." Jouffroy, Droit Nat., tom. i. p. 81.) The general rule is supposed o be that we are to do what is most Advantageous. But who are he judges? Ourselves? Our judgment as to what is best may not always be clear; and in such cases we may feel at liberty to do what is Agreeable, rather than what is Advantageous, or to prefer a less advantage to a greater. Such conduct, it is admitted, is foolish. But, on the supposition that we are accountable to no higher tribunal than that of our own mind, we may take the matter into our own hand, seek happiness after our own fashion, and follow pleasure in the way we like best. There must, therefore, for the practical government of human life, be some principle of more anthority than a regard to what is Advantageous; some rules of greater clearness and force than those which are derived from calculations of expediency. There must be, as the guide of human conduct, some superior principle, having a just title to enforce submission to its intimations. We see men, in some cases, sacrificing their own interest for the good of others, and parting with advantages which they have gained, for the sake of doing what appears to be their duty. And in such cases they approve themselves and are approved by others. This could not be, unless there were a higher principle, to which self-love, even in its most reasonable form, is altogether subordinate. And,

Lastly. As this principle of a Regard to what is Advantageous does not carry obligation with it, it gives no ground for the rights and duties of social life.

Obligation and Right are correlative. It is only when I am under obligation to do an action that my neighbour has any right to expect or demand that I shall do it. So that, if private interest, well understood, were admitted to be the supreme principle of

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