BOOK II. SOCIAL ETHICS. "Philosophy consists not In airy schemes or idle speculations: Is her great province."-THOMSON, Coriolanus. THE duties which respect our fellow-creatures are commonly treated of under the two great heads of Justice and Benevolence. In adopting this division, let it be understood that acts of Justice should be done with a feeling of Benevolence or good-will towards those who are the objects of them, and that what we call acts of Benevolence are in truth acts of Justice-they are due to our fellow-creatures in the circumstances in which they are placed-they are due to our own social and rational nature-and they are in accordance with the arrangements of Providence and the will of God. When we call the one class duties of Justice and the other class duties of Benevolence, it is not meant that the ethical obligation to discharge the one is stronger than the ethical obligation to discharge the other. Both have their foundation in our moral nature and in our social condition, and, in the eye of the moralist, both are equally binding. Mr. Hume says that "Benevolence is a natural virtue, while Justice is an artificial or conventional virtue." He confines the term natural to those virtues to which we are prompted by certain feelings and affections belonging to our constitution, which give strength and efficacy to the moral sentiments from which they derive their obligation. Thus, there are various affections and feelings in our nature which concur with our moral faculty in impelling us to kindness and compassion; but none, he thinks, that concur with that faculty in impelling us to Justice; and hence he would call the one natural and the other artificial. It may, however, fairly be doubted whether a sense of Justice is not as natural1 to man as a feeling of kindness or compassion. No sooner are we capable of framing the notion of what is just than we feel our obligation to do it. We are uneasy so long as it is not done, just as we are uneasy so long as distress is not relieved. The duty of doing justly is founded in our nature as deeply as the duty of showing mercy. They are both natural, and they are both binding. (See Reid, Act. Pow., Essay v. ch. 5; Stewart, Phil. of Act. and Mor. Pow., book iv. ch. 2.) But many of the duties of strict Justice are enforced by positive or civil law, while those of Benevolence are not. A man can be compelled to pay his debts, but not to give alms. And this is one of the points of difference between Morality and Jurisprudence. Both rest upon the great law of right and wrong, as made known by the light of nature. Morality enjoins us to do what is right, because it is right. Jurisprudence enjoins us to give to others their right, with ultimate reference, no doubt, to the truth made known to us by the light of nature, that we are morally bound to do so; but appealing more directly to the fact, that our doing so can be demanded by our neighbour, and that his demand will be enforced by the authority of positive law. This difference is sometimes expressed by saying that what is enjoined by Jurisprudence is of perfect obligation, and what is enjoined only by Morality is of imperfect obligation. But these phrases are objectionable, in so far as they tend to represent the obligations of Morality as inferior to those of Jurisprudence; whereas the latter rest upon the former, and the law of nations derives its binding force from the law of nature. The true ground of difference is that duties of the one class are determinate, and admit of being enjoined by positive law; whereas duties of the other class are indeterminate, and cannot well be enjoined by positive law. The difference between Morality and Jurisprudence, as to extent of range, has been illustrated by the difference between the word Right, when used as an adjective, and when used as a substantive. (Whewell, Elements of Morality, No. 84.) The sphere of Morality is wider than that of Jurisprudence—the former embracing all that is right, the latter only particular rights realized or vested in par 1 "Nos ad justitiam esse natos, neque opinione, sed natura constitutum esse jus."ICERO, De Legg. lib. i. § 10. ticular persons. Jurisprudence comprehends not even the whole of social duty, but only those parts of it which have been made the subject of positive institution. It will be proper, therefore, to consider the Social Ethics under the two heads of Justice and Benevolence. But in treating of the former, it may be well to take advantage of such terms and distinctions as have been introduced by Jurists, as a help towards a more clear and precise delineation of the duties comprehended under it. (Reid, Act. Pow., Essay v. ch. 3.) And, if the duties of Benevolence be first treated of, we shall then have done with the purely ethical part. What remains under this head will partake partly of the moral and partly of the jural; for all the duties of strict Justice can be enforced less or more by the authority of positive law. PART I. BENEVOLENCE. THE first great social duty is to acknowledge the natural equality of men. Aristotle argued (Pol., lib. i.) that some were born to be masters and others to be slaves; and that the Greeks were destined to rule other nations. The Romans called those who were beyond the limits of the empire barbarians, and regarded them with indifference. The Jews confined their Benevolence to the descendants of Abraham. But Christians are commanded (1 Pet. ii. 17) to Honour all men,―to respect human nature, and the rights of that nature in the persons of all who share it. The law of Benevolence, or brotherly love, is universal, and knows no limits but those of the race for whose benefit it was established. The various relations of human life may modify, but ought never to confine it; and while we are duly attentive to the stronger claims of intimate connection, as the waves on the bosom of the waters spread wider and wider, so we are to extend our regards beyond the distinctions of friendship, of family, and of country, and grasp in one benevolent embrace the universe of human beings. God hath made of one blood all nations of men hat dwell upon the face of the earth; and although the sympathiest of friendship and the charities of patriotism demand à more early and warm acknowledgment, we are never to forget those great and general relations which bind together the kindreds of mankind, who are all the children of one common parent, heirs of the same frail nature, sharers of the same unbounded goodness, and expectants of the same glorious immortality. But as the exertions of any individual can only extend to a limited sphere, it would be wrong to exhaust, in wide and general wishes towards all, a Benevolence which may be useful if directed towards a few. And as it is more necessary to regulate our conduct than to guide our speculations, while no limit is prescribed, an object is proposed, to our charity, and we are commanded to love our neighbour. “The Scripture," says Bishop Butler (Sermon on the Love of our Neighbour), "not being a book of theory and speculation, but a plain rule of life for mankind, has, with the utmost possible propriety, put the principle of virtue upon the love of our neighbour, which is that part of the universe, that part of mankind, that part of our country, which comes under our immediate notice, acquaintance, and influence, and with which we have to do.” All The commandment is that we love our neighbour as ourselves, according to the strict interpretation of which, our Benevolence should in degree be commensurate with Self-love. The two affections are directed towards beings of the same nature, perhaps equally deserving of love, and therefore the degree of feeling which they excite, and of activity which they prompt, should be the same. this may be true; but it is equally true that we have a perception of what concerns ourselves, which it is impossible for us to feel in regard to what concerns others, without losing our individual existence. "Moral obligations," says Bishop Butler (Sermon on Love of our Neighbour), can extend no further than to natural possibilities. Now, we have a perception of our own interests, like consciousness of our own existence, which we always carry about with us; and which, in its continuation, kind, and degree, seems impossible to be felt in respect to the interests of others." But in as far as it is possible for us to enter into the views and feelings of our neighbour, in the same degree we are bound to promote his interest equally with our own, and, remembering our common humanity and its equal rights, whatsoever we would that men should do to us, that we are to do to them. 66 The duties to which Benevolence, or Brotherly Love, will prompt may be considered under three heads, according as their more direct aim and tendency may be,-I. To increase Happiness. II. To alleviate Misery. III. To forgive Injury. CHAPTER I. BENEVOLENCE PROMPTING TO INCREASE HAPPINESS. SECTION I.-By our Conversation and Manner. This will give rise to the duties of Civility and Politeness. These belong to what have been called the lesser moralities; but still they are of considerable importance. The exercise of them is necessary to carry on the common intercourse of society with comfort and advantage; the neglect of them occasions uneasiness and mortification, and lessens the lustre of higher excellencies. According to Dr. Ferguson, Civility avoids giving offence, while Politeness seeks to please. In order to Civility there must be the desire to avoid giving offence, and understanding to distinguish what is likely to be offensive. The knowledge of what is likely to be offensive may be very much cultivated by intercourse with society. But if there be the disposition to avoid giving offence, the duty of Civility will be easily practised. It lies not in any set form of words, or any studied peculiarity of manner. It is confined to no rank nor condition, but belongs to the peasant as well as to the finished gentleman. It springs from Benevolence, and is a branch of that charity of which an Apostle hath said, that "it vaunteth not itself, and doth not behave itself unseemly." And he points to its true source when he connects it with brotherly love, and says (1 Peter iii. 8), “Love as brethren, be pitiful, be courteous." The fault opposed to Civility is Rudeness. It implies a want of attention to the rights and feelings of others. It springs from a want of Benevolence, and is aggravated by want of discernment as to what is likely to prove offensive. Politeness is a stronger manifestation of Benevolence than mere Civility. It not only avoids saying or doing what is disagreeable, but seeks to say and to do what may be gratifying to the feelings |