Classes. As in a watch, or other piece of mechanism, there are some parts which give commencement and continuance to the movement, while there are other parts which direct and moderate that movement; so, in the constitution of the human mind, there are some principles which give impulse and energy to human activity, and there are other principles which direct and regulate that activity. To the one it belongs to rouse and incite-to the other, to guide and govern. Principles of the one Class may be called Springs of Human Action; and principles of the other Class may be called Guides of Human Action.

In the First Class will be included

principles to which the epithet Active is commonly applied. In connection with these Dr. Reid places DISPOSITION and OPINION.

In the Second Class will be included

giving a

A REGARD TO WHAT IS ADVANTAGEOUS, AND

A REGARD TO WHAT IS RIGHT; OR,

REASON, AND

CONSCIENCE,

SENSE OF PRUDENCE, AND A
SENSE OF DUTY.

These are more commonly called Rational and Governing principles, or Rational and Moral principles; but they are also Active-they powerfully contribute to the formation of human character and conduct; and the difference between them and the principles which are more commonly called Active is, that the influence which they have upon the Will, is not so much in the way of impulse or incitement, as in the way of direction and government.7

7 Dr. Reid's classification of the principles of human action is as follows:"There are some principles of action which require no attention, no deliberation, no will. These, for distinction's sake, we shall call Mechanical."-These are Instinct and Habit.

"Another class we may call Animal. They are such as operate upon the will and intention, but do not suppose any

exercise of judgment or reason; and are, most of them, to be found in some brute animals, as well as in man." These are Appetite, Desire, Affection, Passion, Disposition, and Opinion.

"A Third Class we may call Rational, being proper to man as a rational creature. In all their exertions they require, not only intention and will, but Judgment or Reason."-These are a Regard to our good on

BOOK I.

OF THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION.

"We have springs of action, an elasticity within us, which is constantly pushing itself outward, and urging us to take part in the scenes among which we live."-HAMPDEN, Introd. to Mor. Phil., Lect. 3.

THE principles of this Class admit of being arranged in Three Orders, according to their nature and origin.

The common origin of them all is to be found in our capacity of feeling pleasure or pain-of being affected by good or evil. But these feelings, before they prompt to action, assume the form of Appetence or Aversion-that is, inclination to, or from, an act, or an object; or desire to seek or to shun it, according as we are affected towards it; and the various Springs of action may be classified according to the nature and origin of that element of inclination, or tendency, or propension, or desire, which gives energy and elasticity to them all.

Now, in some cases, the form of Desire, by which we are prompted to act, is a blind impulse; accompanied by no conception of the act to which it prompts, of the means by which it is to be accomplished, nor of the end to be answered by it. These are cases of Instinctive or Implanted impulse; and, in this Order, may be included the various manifestations of Instinct and Appetite, as Springs of action. In other cases, the feeling of Desire is not a blind impulse; but s accompanied with knowledge of the act to which it prompts.1 Now, among the many and various objects of human desire and human pursuit, there are some which, from the first moment of their being contemplated or obtained, affect us in a way that is agreeable, while there are others which do not so affect us at first, although they may come afterwards to do so. On the other hand, there are some objects which, from the first moment of their being contemplated or

1 The distinction was formerly expressed thus.-Appetitus est vel innatus vel eli

citus; ille est inditus creatura' hic excitatus ab objecto.

conceived of, affect us in a disagreeable manner although, through the influence of Habit and Association, they may come ultimately to be contemplated without our being affected in a manner that is at all disagreeable, but rather the reverse. Now, between those things, the first conception or acquisition of which is agreeable, and the constitution of the human mind, there is implied an original suitableness or adaptation; while, between those things which do not affect us agreeably at first, but which come to do so afterwards, and the human mind, no original adaptation is implied; and any tendency towards them, or any complacency in them, which may be subsequently experienced, is acquired. These facts furnish a clear ground of distinction between those Springs of action which remain to be arranged.

Those Desires which can be traced to an original adaptation between the object desired and the constitution of the human mind, may be called Primary and Natural; Primary, to denote the affection of the Sensitivity which is experienced on the first presentment of their object; and Natural, to denote the fact, that, from an original suitableness between those objects and the human mind, all men experience the correspondent desires, in a greater or lesser degree. The Desire of knowledge, the Desire of society, &c., may be called Primary; inasmuch as there is an adaptation between the objects of these desires and the constitution of the human mind, so that, on their first presentment, they excite a pleasing feeling; and, inasmuch as all men seek after or desire the objects, in a greater or lesser degree, they may be called Natural. In like manner, Joy and Sorrow, Love and Hatred, Fear and Anger, may be called Primary and Natural; because all men are affected by them, under suitable circumstances; and the feelings being cherished in the mind, as an intelligent view of the circumstances will warrant, from mere affections of the Sensitivity, they assume the form of Passions. Some of the Affections also, such as Esteem, Gratitude, Friendship, &c., may be called Primary and Natural, rather than Instinctive or Implanted; because, they are felt by all men, under suitable circumstances, and, because, in their growth and exercise, they are aided and strengthened by our Intellectual and Rational powers.

On the other hand, there are Desires, and Passions, and Affections which are irregular and fantastic, springing from some malconforma tion of mind, or body, or both, or produced by the effect of circumstances which are peculiar, and by the modifying influence of Habit

and Association. Habit and Association, aided by the effect of circumstances, have also a great sway in forming our Opinions and practical rules of conduct, as well as our prevailing temper and Disposition, and our ordinary manners and mode of life. So that, after having set down, in the Order of Primary and Natural, such of our Desires, and Passions, and Affections, and Dispositions, and Opinions, as arise from the constitution of the human mind, and the common circumstances of the human condition, there will still remain to be noticed under the Order of Secondary and Factitious Springs of action, the power of Habit and the influence of Association, in altering and modifying all the other Springs of Action, and producing artificial Appetites, irregular Desires, singular Passions, fantastic Affections, peculiar Dispositions, and eccentric Opinions.

According to these views, the classification of the Springs of Action will stand thus:

I. Instinctive or Implanted. These are blind impulses, which do not imply, in their first manifestations, any knowledge of the end to which they prompt, nor of the means of attaining it. This Order includes Instinct and Appetite.

II. Primary or Natural. These are not blind impulses; but are accompanied with knowledge, and intention, and imply an original adaptation between the objects towards which they tend, and the constitution of the human mind. This Order includes Emotion, Desire, Passion, Affection-Disposition, and Opinion.

III. Secondary or Factitious. Between the Springs of Action in this Order and the objects towards which they tend, there is no original adaptation. They are generated according to the law of repetition, or Custom, and acquire form and pressure under the influence of Habit and Association, altering the direction or degree of the original Springs of Action.

In this Classification, a distinction is taken between what is Instinctive and what is Natural. This is a distinction which has been recognised and applied, in reference to Principles of Knowledge; as many who have objected to the epithet Innate being applied to ideas, have agreed to call them Natural. But in a Classification of Springs of Action, there is room for the application of both epithets; inasmuch as some of them are inserted in the human constitution, in full form and elasticity from the first, and may therefore be called sect. 2. Stewart, Act. and Mor. Pow., vol. i. p. 351.

2 Hutcheson, Oratio Inauguralis, p. 20, 4to., Glasg., 1730. Reid, Inquiry, ch. i.