ance with the law of absolute rectitude. It is only in so far as they are so that these dictates are true and valid. For it may be noticed

2. That Conscience, in promulgating its law, does so with reference to a law higher than its own, and to a lawgiver more powerful to punish and reward than itself. "Hence," said Butler, "when it has given its sentence, it naturally and always of course goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter second and affirm its own." So that, while Conscience is a principle higher in kind than any of the other principles which assume the guidance of human conduct, it derives its authority from a law higher than its own, and a lawgiver higher than itself. (See Whewell, Elem. of Mor., book iii. ch. 14, art. 369-373.)

Should the Intellectual Theory as to the constitution of the Moral Faculty be adopted, the result of the foregoing observations may be thus articulately stated.

Ideas of Right and Wrong are natural to the human mind, in its mature and sound state.

Ideas of Right and Wrong arise in the same way and from the same source as other simple ideas,—that is, from the Intellect or Reason. And, as on witnessing phenomena and changes, we ascend to the ideas of Substance and Power; so, when we contemplate human character and conduct, we rise to the ideas of Right and Wrong, and pronounce one action to be Right and another Wrong; one agent to be virtuous and another to be vicious.

"Our moral judgments are not, like those we form in speculative matters, dry and unaffecting, but, from their nature, are necessarily accompanied with feelings of approbation or of disapprobation." (Reid.)

Neither the moral judgment by itself, nor the moral feeling by itself, but the concurrence of both, constitutes the Moral Faculty. In respect of its constitution, the Moral Faculty contains no peculiar power, as it consists of a perception or judgment, and an emotion or feeling — the perception proceeding on the Rightness or Wrongness of the action, and the feeling corresponding to the perception.

But, in the operation of the Moral Faculty, there is this peculiarity, that it extends to all the parts and principles of human conduct, and asserts a control and supremacy over them.

This prerogative of Conscience, as the master and governing principle, is thought sufficient to designate it as a distinct and peculiar power of our mental constitution.

The propriety of doing so is not lessened, but increased, when it is seen under the following head of inquiry, that the authority which Conscience exercises, although it be supreme over all our other principles, is yet a derived and delegated authority; and that this faculty in its actings has reference to a law or rule of life which is ultimate, and to the will of One who is Head over all.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE NATURE OR FOUNDATION OF VIRTUE.

THE principal theories of classical antiquity, as to the nature of Virtue, may be briefly noticed, on account of the influence which they have had on the moral theories of later times.

According to Plato, the supreme and governing power in man is Reason. The Passions and Appetites he arranged in two classes,— namely, the Irascible, which spring from a love of honour and superiority, and the Concupiscible, which spring from a love of ease and pleasure. The Soul, as in connection with, and partly in subjection to, the body and the desires which spring from it, he regarded as in a state of degradation and exile. And the great aim of philosophy should be to check and govern the lower principles of our nature, and to give full scope and development to the Reason, and thus to prepare the Soul for that higher state to which it will return, when freed from the incumbrances of the body.

According to Aristotle and the Peripatetics, virtuous conduct consists in pursuing a middle course, equally remote from the extreme n either side. Thus, Fortitude or true Courage is the medium etween Rashness on the one hand, and Cowardice on the other. emperance or Moderation consists in taking the course intermediate

between Austerity and Indulgence. Plato frequently referred to the Soul as having existed before its life in the body, and as destined to live after the death of the body. Aristotle confined his views to the present state. The chief difference between the two philosophers was, that the latter regarded Virtue as a practical habit—that is, a frame or disposition of mind resulting from the regular performance of virtuous actions; while the former thought that just sentiments and reasonable conclusions, as to what was fit to be done or avoided, were sufficient to lead to perfect virtue.

The ethical formula of the Stoics was, Vivere convenienter naturæ. According to Zeno, every being is entrusted with the preservation of its own existence, and the perfecting of its own nature. Man, therefore, ought to pursue that course of conduct which tends to preserve the body and its powers, and the mind and its faculties, in the best possible state. But we are not to regard ourselves as insulated individuals, but as members of one great community, as parts of a whole. While we have an end to accomplish, other beings have the same thing to do. All are but parts of one mighty scheme, which, under the guidance of Providence, is hastening to its happy accomplishment. Everything that can befall us here, whether we call it prosperous or adverse, is tending to the perfection and happiness of the whole. In contemplating the wisdom and the certainty of these results, and in discharging the part which has been assigned to us towards their completion, we put ourselves in alliance with the Power and Goodness which govern all things, and live in harmony with the scheme of universal nature.

....

According to Epicurus and his followers, "the most perfect state of human nature—the most complete happiness which man was capable of enjoying-consisted in ease of body and tranquillity of mind. To obtain this great end of natural desire was the sole object of all the virtues, which, according to them, were not desirable upon their own account, but solely upon account of their tendency to bring about this situation." "The system of Epicurus agreed with those of Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno, in making Virtue consist in acting in the most suitable manner to obtain primary objects of natural desire. It differed from all of them in two other respects: First, in the account which it gave of these primary objects of natural desire; and, Secondly, in the account which it gave of the excellence of Virtue, or of the reason why that quality ought to be esteemed."-See Smith, Theory of Mor. Sent., pt. vii. sect. 2.

Feuchtersleben says (Med. Psych., p. 28), “In these four types, the entire philosophy of antiquity is represented, and if we pursue them to their whole depth and extent, we may with truth affirm that they symbolise every direction of human thought which has assumed a complete and consistent character. If we would express their general scope in few words, we might, perhaps, say that Plato represents the freedom of rational ideality, Aristotle the legality of intelligible realism, Zeno the intellectual view of the world; Epicurus the material view―tendencies which are repeated at all times and in all places."

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"The writings of Hobbes," says Sir James Mackintosh (Dissert., p. 112), gave rise to those ethical controversies which more peculiarly belong to modern times." The passage which is usually quoted, as containing the views of Hobbes as to the nature of Virtue, is the following, from his work entitled Leviathan (Of Man, ch. 6). "Whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he, for his part, calleth Good; and the object of his hate and aversion, Evil; and of his contempt, Vile and inconsiderable. For these words, Good and Evil and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply nor absolutely so; nor any common rule of Good and Evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man (where there is no commonwealth), or in a commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or person, or arbitrator, or judge, whom men, disagreeing, shall by consent set up and make his sentence the rule thereof." Passages to the same purport may be found, De Cive, cap. 4, sect. 17; De Homine, cap. 11.

Hobbes is commonly represented as holding that the difference between Virtue and Vice is altogether arbitrary, and not founded in the nature of actions, but depending entirely on the opinion or prejudice of individuals, or the authority of public law and rule. A similar doctrine seems to have been held in ancient times: for we find it noticed and condemned by the ancient Philosophers. (See Plato, De Legibus, lib. x., and his Dialogue entitled Theœtetus; Andronicus Rhodius, lib. v. cap. 10; Cicero, De Legibus, lib. ii. cap. 1.)

In opposition to this doctrine, it has been shown, that Law is an

exposition, not an origination of Duty. The Law declares what is Right, but does not constitute anything Right. (Price, Review, ch. 1, sect. 1; Hutcheson, Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Virtue; Stewart, Act. and Mor. Pow., vol. i. p. 241.)1

There is a difference between a Rule and the reason of a Rule, between a Law and the principle of a Law, which it is of importance to attend to in this controversy. (See Wardlaw, Christ. Ethics, lect. 2.)

But although Virtue does not originate in the law or will of man, may it not originate in the law or will of God? This opinion was started in ancient times, as may be seen from one of the Dialogues of Plato, entitled Euthyphro; it was held by many of the scholastic divines; and is an opinion to which the philosophy of Descartes has been represented as favourable (Cudworth, Eternal and Immutable Mor., book i. ch. 3). It is maintained by Archbishop King in his Essay on the Origin of Evil, ch. 5, sect. 1, subsect. 4; Gale, Court of the Gentiles, pt. iv. book ii. ch. 5, sect. 3, p. 350.

The question has been stated thus: Is an action Right because God willed and commanded it? Or, Did God will and command the action because it is Right? Grave objections offer themselves on either side. But the two opinions, at first sight irreconcileable, are brought somewhat nearer to each other when it is recollected that the asserters of both maintain, that the will of God is, and can only be, exerted in accordance with the perfection of his nature. In short, the Divine will is the manifestation of the Divine nature; and if rectitude belong to the Divine nature it must be manifested in the Divine will, which is the expression of that nature. "The being of God," said Hooker (Eccles. Pol., book i. sect. 2), “is a law to his working (and consequently to his will); for that perfection which God is, giveth perfection to what he doeth." To the same purpose, Dr. Sam. Clarke has said, "Governing according to law and reason, and governing according to will and pleasure, are, on earth, the two most opposite forms of government; while, in heaven, they are nothing but two different names for the same thing." The doctrine, when