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Sympathy, Vanity, Shame, Pride, Indignation, Resentment, Anger, Scorn, &c. The Tendency towards Perfection embraces the consciousness of Power and of Impotence, Emulation, and Envy. The regard to the Moral Law comprehends Respect to others, Self-Respect, Self-Abasement, the Moral Feeling, Conscience, Remorse.

This must be considered a hasty sketch, a mere beginning, which the author never followed up. The weaknesses of the classification are many and obvious. It is characteristic of Hamilton's inversion of what I think the natural order of (1) Feeling, and (2) Knowledge, that Beauty is made to grow out of Imagination, instead of Imagination catering for Beauty.

The prevalence of the Triple division of the Mind in German philosophy, from the end of last century, might be expected to show itself in the scheme of the Emotions. Kant is regarded as the author of the triple division, but he did little to carry out the subdivisions, by which alone we can see what the main heads are intended to imply. In his 'Anthropology,' he divides Pleasure and Pain (that is, Feeling) into SENSUAL and INTELLECTUAL, which does not exactly coincide with Sensations and Emotions. The SENSUAL pleasures (or pains) come either through Sense (Enjoyment) or through Imagination (Taste). The pleasures and pains of Sense include Tedium, Contentment, &c. The INTELLECTUAL pleasures and pains arise in connexion with the Concepts of the Understanding, and with the Ideas of the Reason. This is not unlike Hamilton's method. But it is under the Appetitive Power, CONATION, or we should say the Will, that he includes the ordinary emotions Love, Hatred, &c., thus reproducing, in spite of his more auspicious startingpoint, the vice attaching to our own philosophers, who proceeded on the twofold division of mind. In connexion with the Appetitive or Active Faculty, he distinguishes Affections and Passions. An Affection is a present feeling of pleasure or pain whereby the power of reflection is for the time overcome. It is a sudden coming-on of sensation destructive of the equanimity of the individual. Passion is inclination too strong for the Reason. The passions are natural (Liberty, Sexual passion, &c.), or acquired (Ambition, Avarice).

Herbart and his followers are of more importance than Kant in all that regards Psychology, and especially the analysis and classification of the Feelings. Herbart, in adopting the three-fold division of the mind, does so with the express proviso that the three parts, although scientifically divisible, are mutually involved and inseparable in their workings, being all based on one primary element, or primitive mental form, which is the Objective Presentation, viewed as cognition or knowledge-the Sensation in what we should call its intellectual aspect. The other states, intellectual, emotional, and volitional, are of secondary origin. The Feelings arise amid the mutual reaction of the presentations, above or under the 'threshold' of clear consciousness; the re-action being either Arrest and Obstruction, or Furtherance and Harmony; in other words, Feeling is wholly subjected to the Law of Harmony and Conflict. The definition of Feeling is 'Immediate Perception of Hindrance or Furtherance among the presentations extant at any moment in consciousness'; and, as the presentations express the only active forces of the mind, by which its vital activity can be measured, Feeling may be called

'the immediate consciousness of the momentary rising or sinking of the mental vital activity. The distinction between Sensation and Feeling is variously stated by Herbart's followers. Nahlowsky defines Sensation as the state depending on the mere perception of an organic stimulus; and Feeling as the resultant, not of immediate stimulation of the nerves, but of presentations simultaneously concurring in the consciousness; to this the master could have had no objection. Waitz says that Feelings are produced necessarily in the course of the succession of presentations, but are not mere modified presentations, or reducible to such; which, in spite of his disclaimer, comes very near the recognition of a distinct element of Feeling; the Emotional is grounded without being altogether merged, in the Intellectual. Wundt, who is not a Herbartian, goes still closer to the mark, when he says that Feeling is every state having a purely subjective reference, thereby including the subjective aspect of the Sensation. The great defect of Herbart's views is the common defect of philosophical systems, over-simplicity; while his unity of the mind is a thorough carrying out of the idea (adopted by Hamilton) of basing everything on knowledge or cognition.

The classification of Feelings suggested in part by Herbart, and carried out by Waitz, and others of his disciples, is into FORMAL and QUALITATIVE Feelings. The FORMAL are not bound exclusively to any one mode of subjectmatter, but depend solely on the manner of coming together of the presentations (the mutual hindrance or furtherance). The QUALITATIVE depend on the special characters of the presentations. I quote the various subdivisions, and the complementary heads, as given by Nahlowsky (Das Gefühlsleben pp. 50-1, 214-5.)

I. FEELINGS PROPER.

A. Formal.

a. The general, or more elementary Formal Feelings-Oppression and Relief; Exertion and Ease; Seeking and Finding; Success and Defeat; Harmony and Contrast; Power and Weakness. b. The special, or more complicated Formal Feelings Expectation; Hope, Apprehension, Astonishment; Doubt; Tedium; Entertainment (Diversion, Recreation).

B. Qualitative.

a. The lower feelings, or those of Sense-the pleasures and pains of single colours and sounds. b. The higher or Intellectual Feelings (Truth and Probability); the Esthetic; the Moral; the Religious.

II. COMPLEX EMOTIONAL STATES.

1. Emotional states involving Conation (Desire or Aversion). a. Sympathetic Feeling (properly qualitative, but not classified under B, because of involving both the Sensual and the Ideal element). b. Love, (both Sensual and Ideal, and also complicated with Desire).

2. States essentially resting on an Organic foundation.

a. The Disposition, mood or frame of mind--the collective or general tone, admitting neither the prominence of special feelings, nor a reference to any distinct agency-general hilarity in all degrees, &c.

b. Affections (not in the sense of love), opposed to the foregoing as the

AFFECTIONS CLASSIFIED.

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transitory to the permanent. It was a speciality of Herbart to note under this name the transitory disturbance of the internal equilibrium by some sudden unexpected impression (Fear, Anger, &c.) whereby the organism is sympathetically affected to the loss of calm reflection and free self-determination.

These affections have been variously classified: (1) according as the intellectual activity is heightened or arrested (Drobisch); (2) according as the emotional element is varied—or whether the feeling is one of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, agreeable or disagreeable; (3) according to their influence on action-whether they give rise to desire or aversion (Kant's division into Sthenic and Asthenic); (4) according as the bodily tone is heightened or depressed. From a still different point of view (Nahlowsky's, p. 258), they are arranged in two groups.

The active nature of the affections in the first column announces itself in the general rise, the massive flow, and quicker rhythm, of the Presentations involved; along with a feeling of Power, of Muscular Elasticity, Readiness to act, general increase of Vitality.

From the Affection, finally, the Passion has to be distinguished. As the affection arises out of violent sensations, so does the Passion out of unguarded desires. When any higher feeling is hurt, an affection ensues; when any inclination is thwarted, a passion is excited. Passion is a fixed predominant disposition towards a certain kind of desire that refuses the control of the Reason. This distinction is to me a quibble; it would not exist but for the arbitrary repetition of the very same states under the heading of Desires. Moreover, any one of the so-called affections rising to intensity, in my opinion does everything that characterizes passion.

Wundt, (professor in Heidelberg), in his work, Vorlesungen über die Menschenund Thierseele, Vol. II. (1864), enters elaborately into the nature of Feeling and Emotion. He is at great pains to discriminate the Objective from the

Subjective consciousness, which last is the domain of the Feelings. He recognises the pleasures and pains of sense as at the foundation of all feeling, and avoids the Herbartian resolution of feeling into cognition. The Emotions, he remarks, are described in the very terms applied to sensations-Love burns, Care oppresses, Remorse gnaws. Moreover, the emotions are accompanied with sensible or bodily effects-muscular or visceral-so that they are only another form of corporeal excitation.

The Emotions, like the lower feelings of Sense, fall under the grand division of pleasure and pain. They may also be divided into pleasant and painful Affections and Moods; the Affection being the more transitory state, the Mood the more lasting. The Affections in their intenser moments rise to Passion; which is the transition to Desire.

The other Affections are, all of them, varieties of the two fundamental and least definite states-Sorrow and Joy. Sadness, Trouble, Concern, Grief, Affliction, Melancholy, Distress, Mourning, are all different kinds of Sorrow. Some have a more objective reference, or fasten on a specific cause, as Concern, Trouble, and Affliction; others are more purely subjective, as the Affection of Grief, and the Mood of Melancholy; while Distress and Mourning incline now to one side and now to the other.

Joy has its different forms, but language does not supply the same range of designations, as for sorrow. As a lasting mood, it is called Joyfulness. It is, the author remarks, a characteristic circumstance that there is no word to express a distinction of objective and subjective joyful affections: joy is, on the whole, he thinks, more purely subjective than sorrow. When either state is a direct result of an impression of some outward thing, it gives birth to the objective reference expressed by Liking or Dislike. We have an affection, as well as a sensation, of Disgust, which last of course implies objectivity.

Wundt, like the others, takes notice that the Affections and Moods differ from the Sensations in requiring a plurality of intellectual presentations; sorrow for the death of a friend is the complicated result of many thoughts and recollections. An emotion may be excited on a single presentation, but the force and character of it depend on the ideas awakened.

We may pass beyond the simple Affections and Moods to other complications of Sensation and Idea. We have a class depending not on the matter of the presentations, as the foregoing are, but on the mode of their interconnection, viz., as harmonious or discordant. We are very differently affected, according as the flow of the thoughts is smooth, free, and uninterrupted, or as it is laborious or broken. We have thus the two classes-(1) Feeling of free flow of thought-the feeling of pleasure joined to thought unrestrained and yet not too swift; (2) the opposite Feeling of the restrained flow, which includes also the too violent or rapid flow. Under these we have a variety of special forms:- Feelings of Exertion and Ease, as regards both bodily and mental operations, corresponding to the feelings of sense in laborious or easy muscular motion, with which indeed, in a weak form, they are accompanied even when most purely mental. Feelings of Diversion and Tedium, which specially involve the sense of time; in Tedium, there is a sort of indeterminate expectation. Feelings of Success and Failure; Seeking and Finding;

WUNDT'S CLASSIFICATION OF THE FEELINGS.

611 Agreement and Contradiction on the comparison of two sets of ideas; there may be also in the same connexion the middle states of Doubt and Indecision; Harmony and Discord, in their æsthetic bearings, are applied in the first instance to the sense of sound, but thence extended to other senses and feelings. Harmony (in sound) is expressed by Wundt as a number of sounds falling together into a permanent union; Discord arises when the simultaneous tones give rise to fluctuating accompaniments, which we endeavour in vain to bring to unity; both affections in the heightened forms have an affinity with Dizziness, which is a regular feeling of sense, being an excessive stimulation of the brain by an object of sense. Expectation is the hurrying forward of the thoughts into the future; another form of it is Lying-in-wait (Plot-interest). When the result arrives and is favourable, we have Satisfaction, in the opposite case, Disappointment. When something ensues differing from Expectation, then we feel Surprise, which according to the circumstances is pleasurable, painful, or indifferent; when there is a difficulty in reconciling the mind to what has happened, the state is called Astonishment, and this continued is Amazement. Allied to Harmony is Rhythm, definable as "the feeling wherein Expectation and Satisfaction always coincide;" there is a jar of Disappointment when the rhythm is destroyed. Hope and Fear are special forms of Expectation, containing an element of the indeterminate; Hope is the expectation of a wished-for event, Fear the expectation of one not wishedfor. Anxiety is the fear of a great evil immediately to follow: to it Fright stands related as Surprise to Expectation. Consternation and Terror are more intense forms; Care is continued Fear.

Wundt, while recognising the existence of affections that arise on occasion of the free or restrained flow of the ideas, controverts Herbart's position that all feelings whatsoever are grounded on this circumstance. He maintains that not only the first-named Affections, and still more the feelings of Sense, depend absolutely on the matter or contents of the presentations whereby they are occasioned, but that the last-mentioned Affections-Hope, Fear, &c., are also more than merely formal, being in reality compounds of both qualitative and formal affections. His exposition of the Feelings is completed by a review of the still more involved emotional states, known as the Æsthetic, the Moral, and the Intellectual feelings.

I refrain from occupying space with a minute criticism of these various arrangements of the Feelings; their points of agreement and of difference with the scheme in the text will be obvious to the attentive reader. In all of them, I should have to remark, more or less, on the redundancy of the designations, the same phenomenon being often expressed under different heads. I have more than once noticed the repetition of an identical state under the form of Desire; besides which, the mode of introducing the element of Belief (Hope and Fear) is, I conceive, hostile to a correct analysis of the emotions.

C.-Distinction of Reflex and Voluntary Acts.—p. 317.

The drawing the line between the Reflex and the Voluntary is one of the most delicate considerations in the theory of the Will. Mr. Herbert Spencer,