if no positive pleasure were imparted through the possession of certainty and assurance in all occasions of emergency, we should still pronounce the condition of belief to be a source of pleasurable elation; but, besides withdrawing the incubus of the opposite condition, we must give it some credit for stimulating the sentiment of power, which is also one of our cheering influences. As there is a certain humiliation in being placed at bay through ignorance and hesitation, so there is apt to arise a flush of elation at the consciousness of being equal to whatever end we have in view. Beyond these two ingredients, I do not know any other marked way wherein the state of faith operates to sustain and elevate the pleasureable tone of the mental consciousness. Quite enough is herein contained to render the condition a great moral power in the human mind, and to account for all those wonderful effects so often attributed to it in the many forms of its manifestation.

7. I have hitherto confined the illustration to the case of coming good as an object of confidence. Let us now advert to the opposite state of things, the case of coming evil, more or less firmly relied on. The line of observations is here very much the same, allowing for the points of difference. When a future evil is believed as certain, we display as much energy in the corresponding course of action as if it were actually present; and we realize all the misery of the actual, in so far as we are capable of conceiving it. The mere idea of pain is apt to be painful, as when I see another person in distress; the more thoroughly we are possessed with that idea, the more are we afflicted or depressed by it. But the affliction and the depression are much deeper, when the evil is one approaching ourselves, and believed to be certain to overtake us. In so far as this conviction is complete, we have already the evil upon us; we act and feel as if it were really come. The greater the belief now, the greater the misery; doubt is less harrowing than conviction. Any loophole of escape, anything that would invalidate the evidence of the approaching pain, is as welcome as, in the opposite case, an addition

BELIEF CAUSING JOY OR DEPRESSION.

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to the evidence would be. The comfortable condition of belief, and the suffering of doubt, suppose good in the distance; substitute evil and all is changed. The man mortally wounded in the prime of life, is not at the maximum of his misery so long as the fatal issue is in anywise doubtful. In one sense, doubt is painful even in the matter of future evil, namely, when it paralyses action. There is sometimes a comfort, as commonly remarked, in knowing the worst; the comfort lying in this, that we then address ourselves to the task of meeting it by active operations, or by a resigned spirit. But, as a general fact, doubt is a less evil than conviction, when the subject-matter is ill-fortune; and a weaker conviction is preferable to a stronger.

8. The idea of Pleasure, in most shapes, diffuses in the mind that state denominated Joy, which is recognised by every one as characteristic, and distinct from the reality of a sensuous gratification. The idea of good approaching, with confidence in its ultimate realization, is the most powerful stimulus of this condition. A wedding, the birth of an heir, the obtaining of an office, are styled joyful events from their reference to pleasures in prospect. Hence, in familiar language, the conjunction of Joy with Faith and Hope. state of Joy is, in itself, one of our happy phases of mind, and is, besides, when produced, an exhilarating atmosphere for other pleasures, and an aid to the maintenance of the conviction of coming good against unfavourable appearances; ministering in turn to the cause of its own existence. The condition is one habitual to some constitutions, through organic and other agencies; and is then identical with the sanguine temper.

The

The idea of a Pain, on the other hand, produces the condition termed Depression, which, and not sorrow, is the true opposite of joy. The more strongly the idea takes hold of the mind, the greater is the influence. But here also, the effect is most decided when it is the idea of pain believed as coming to ourselves. In such circumstances, the mind is apt to be filled with gloom; and is not unlikely to pass one stage farther into the condition of terror. It is possible to stop

short of this final stage; but even courage does not necessarily imply the absence of depression. The strength of the conviction is measured by its power of casting down the mind from the joyful, to the depressed, tone. A less strong belief would be less dispiriting.

When it is said 'the devils believe and tremble,' the subject-matter of the belief is some evil fate, which it would be better to doubt. The belief in our mortality is the reverse of comforting. Ill news operate a shock of depression, if not of alarm; and if the assurance amounts to certainty, so much the worse.

The mind depressed finds it hard to believe in coming good, and easy to be convinced of coming evil. Such is the action and reaction of the two states, of dread and depression, as above remarked of the connexion between the hopeful, or sanguine, and the joyful.

SOURCES of this efficacious

9. I must advert to the attribute of our active nature. Looking at the cases introduced at the commencement of this chapter, in which a certain natural conjunction was relied upon in the employment of an instrumentality suitable to certain wants, we should say that the proper, and indeed the only possible foundation of such a belief, is experience of the various conjunctions so trusted to. Unless it could be shown, that there are some instincts of the nature of antecedent revelations of what we are to meet with when we come into the world, there seems no way of rising to the platform of knowledge and belief, except the actual trial; at least until we become the subjects of instruction and guidance by those that have gone before us, in which case it is merely the substitution of one experience for another. It is, however, a matter of fact that other influences are at work in determining our convictions, and it is our business to survey these also. There are instinctive tendencies partly co-operating, and partly conflicting with the principal monitor; and we have had to recognise, in discussing the emotions, a power belonging to every one of them to mould our received opinions in opposition to the interpreta

tions of experience. Delusion, fallacy, and mental perversion could not have obtained so great a sway over mankind, but for the intervention of agencies operating without any regard to what we find in the world as the result of actual experiment and observation.

10. We may divide the sources of belief into three different classes as follows:-First, the Intuitive or Instinctive; second, Experience, with the reasonings and inferences supplemental thereto; third, the Influence of the Feelings. It is not usual to find cases where these different methods act pure and apart; the greater number of the ordinary convictions of men involve a mixture of the different sorts; and hence a strictly methodical exposition of the three classes is scarcely practicable. Experience is very generally modified by instinctive tendencies, while no mere instinct can constitute a belief in the entire absence of the other. In these circumstances, I will first indicate briefly the manner of deriving convictions from actual contact with the world, and then proceed to a minute consideration of the three sources in the order now given. An animal sees the water that it drinks, and thereby couples in its mind the property of quenching thirst with the visible aspect. After this association has acquired a certain degree of tenacity, the sight of water at a distance suggests the other fact, so that, from the prospect, the animal realizes to some degree the satisfying of that craving. Then it is that water seen by thirsty animals inspires the movements preparatory to actual drinking; the voluntary organs of locomotion are urged by the same energetic spur on the mere distant sight, as the organs of lapping and swallowing under the feeling of relief already commenced. This is the state of mature conviction as to the union of the two natural properties of water. I cannot doubt that an animal attains this crowning belief by a gradual process, and that there are stages, when it is proper to say that a less strong assurance is possessed. The criteria of initial inferiority are always these two circumstances, at bottom substantially one, namely, that the pursuit of the means is less energetically

stimulated than the realizing of the end actually in the grasp; and secondly, that the attainment of the means does not give that strong mental satisfaction that is felt at a higher stage of assurance. When we have reached the highest certainty as to the characteristic appearance of water or food, our preliminary operation, for getting the objects themselves, is hardly to be distinguished from the activity manifested in following up the first tasting; and, moreover, the mental agony is to a great degree done away with by the sight and anticipation. With a glass of water actually in hand, I may be almost said to have terminated the state of suffering due to thirst. All that depression of mind caused by the privation has vanished, through the certainty that relief is now come. This is a sure and striking characteristic of the state of belief, marking it out as a thing of degree, and indicating the highest point in the scale. The young animal, little experienced in the great natural conjunction now cited, follows up the lead of the few observations already impressed on the mind, but does not display the same energy of voluntary pursuit on the mere appearance, or feel the same sense of relief in anticipation, as at a later stage. Repetition, and especially unbroken uniformity, are the obvious causes that bring this conviction to maturity. The adhesive influence of Contiguity is in this respect a moral power, giving rise to a certain proneness to pass from the one thing to the other. Still, it would be a great mistake to lay it down as a rule, that indissoluble association of two ideas constitutes by itself an assurance of their connexion, such as to render the one a sure indication of the other. The second circumstance just mentioned, namely, unbroken uniformity, is a most vital ground of our security in a sequence of events. A single breach of expectation will unhinge all that a long series of repetitions has established. Moreover, as regards indissoluble association, there may exist along with this the temper of disbelief. There is an indissoluble association in most minds educated in the New Testament between 'Diana of the Ephesians' and the epithet 'great,' but without attaching any credit to the proposition