BELIEF IMPLICATES THE ORDER OF THE WORLD. 527

control of the actions, while the subject-matter of it is some. supposed fact, or occurrence, of nature. The intellect must take hold of a certain co-existence, or succession, of phenomena through the senses, or the constructive faculty, and the mind be, as it were, occupied with this as distinct from being occupied with mere feeling, or mere volition. The state in question, then, having its roots in voluntary action, has its branches spreading far and wide into the realms of intelligence and speculation. As the intellectual functions are developed, and become prominent in the mental system, the materials of belief are more and more abundantly reaped from their proper field; nevertheless, we must not depart from their reference to action, and the attainment of ends, otherwise they lose their fundamental character as things credited, and pass into mere fancies, and the sport of thinking, It is true, however, that that enlarging of the sphere of pure intelligence, which we' encounter as we pass to the so-called superior animals and races, leads to the collecting and the storing up of natural coincidences, sequences, and similarities, without any immediate regard to practical ends; as in the vast encyclopædia of ascertained knowledge accumulated to the present time, of which a large amount is possessed by individuals without being turned to any account in the pursuit of pleasure or the banishing of pain; and it has to be shown, that there lurks a tacit appeal to action in the belief entertained respecting all that unapplied knowledge.

4. The beliefs above illustrated, as involved in the pursuits of the inferior creatures, are never separated from the actions and ends where they serve as guides. The stag believes in a connexion between the glistening surface of the brook and the satisfaction of its own thirst, but the intellectual conception has no place except in this one relation. It is only at the moment of thirst that the sequence is produced in the mind; when that has disappeared, the affirmation vanishes, and never recurs until the recurrence of the appetite. The intelligence is awakened solely for the sake of the physical wants and pleasures, and has no detached or independent standing.

Still, in that state of vassalage, there is a genuine display of intellectual power and acquisition. Without those associating forces, and that power of discriminative sensibility, whereby the loftiest flights of reason and imagination are sustained, an animal could not employ the smallest item of mediation in the accomplishment of its ends. But it is possible to restrict the scope of our higher faculty to the exigencies of the physical system. It is also possible to detach those conceptions of sequence, and give them a local habitation out of the routine of practical life. I can suppose a contemplative stag reposing by the brink of a lake, and, without feeling thirst at the moment, recalling to mind past occasions of drinking from the source before him. This would be to entertain a mere reminiscence, or idea, to put forth intelligence without the spur of an end, to view a sequence of nature as pure knowledge. Whether any animal indulges in such disinterested exercises of the intellectual function, it may not be easy to affirm. We should probably be more safe in assigning to such of their conceptions of nature as have no present application, a bearing on the future, as when the same stag chooses his lair with. reference to the proximity of a pool to quench his thirst, whereby he manifests an abiding recollection of the connexion of the two things, although the interest that keeps it alive is still practical. It is, however, in the operations of the human intelligence, that the detaching of natural conjunctions and sequences is carried to the greatest lengths. The intervention of language, the coupling of the 'name' with the 'local habitation' gives a distinct existence to those experiences of terrestrial phenomena, and they become a subject of mental manipulation on their own account. We have thus the extensive machinery of propositions, affirmations, abstractions, deductive reasonings; we have, together with names given to all the characteristic objects of nature, a part of speech devoted to the expression of belief, that is to say, the Verb. All the cognisable universe is laid out into departments, each having a body of affirmations, according to the conjunctions and sequences therein relied upon, or accepted as suffi

THE REALIZING OF FUTURE GOOD.

529 cient for the guidance of such actions as involve them. Sciences, branches of knowledge, theoretical and practical, are the piled-up accumulation of these manifold cognitions of the natural laws; and we attach ourselves to them with no indifferent attitude or empty apprehension, but with a sense of inherent power, a consciousness of the mastery exercised by them over all that we prize in life.

5. As beings, then, that look before and after, the state of belief has in us an extensive footing, and an incessant control over the temper for happiness or misery. In anticipating a want, we forecast at the same time the natural sequence that is to be the medium of supplying it, and in that predicament wherein we are said to have confidence or trust in such a medium, we enjoy a positive satisfaction in the total absence of painful forebodings. So with a pleasure that has taken the form of vehement desire. The fruition is future, but the mind cannot easily assume a present indifference to the subject; we are either disquieted by seeing no prospect of attaining the wished-for good, or elated and comforted by the assurance of its being within reach. In all that regards our future happiness, therefore, and the future of all those interests that engage our sympathy, belief, when the assurance of good in the distance, is the name for a serene, satisfying, and happy tone of mind. Through it, as has been said, we have already the realizing of what we long for. Ideal emotion is consummated in its happiest phase, by this condition being secured. If a man thinks merely of his present, or of the work that is under his hand, the sphere of belief is confined to the narrowest limits, having reference only to the instrumentality of actual operations. In proportion as we dwell in the prospective, we give to the influences that inspire confidence a very large prerogative in relation to our enjoyment.

6. In discussing the emotion of Terror, it was impossible not to be struck with the contrariety, or inverse relationship, between that emotion and the subject of the present chapter; so much so that it was necessary to take both facts together for the elucidation of the one. Speaking logically, or with

regard to the form of the subject-matter, the opposite of belief is disbelief; but as a mental fact these two states are identical. Coming to a place where two roads meet, I believe that the one will conduct me to my home, and disbelieve the same affirmation respecting the other. In either view, my mind is in the condition of certainty, conviction, or faith, and I derive both the means of reaching my dwelling, and the cheering tone that a conviction gives to a person looking forward to a wished-for end. The real opposite of belief as a state of mind is not disbelief, but doubt, uncertainty; and the close alliance between this and the emotion of fear is stamped on every language. Not that doubt and fear are identical facts, but that the situation called uncertainty, ignorance, hesitation, vacillation, is at all times prone to excite the perturbation of fear. Even when stopping short of this effect, owing to the great natural vigour of the mind in retaining its composure, this state is one of discomfort in most cases, and sometimes of the most aggravated human wretchedness. The constituents of it may be to a great extent discriminated by analysis, and we may be able to account for the peculiarity on some of the broad principles already recognised; still, there is in the phenomenon an exceedingly patent and well-marked physiognomy.

In this predicament of Doubt, there is necessarily involved the baulking of some end sought after with more or less earnestness. An uncertainty as to the means is, to say the least of it, tantamount to failing in the end. We may go even farther, and maintain that the failure is accompanied with an aggravation that does not attach to downright impossibility of attainment. When we are assured that some object is altogether out of our reach, we sit down and endeavour to become reconciled to the privation; but when the only obstacle is uncertainty as to the choice of means, we are kept on the tenter-hooks of alternate expedients, encouraged and baffled by turns. Distracted by opposing considerations, keeping up an aim, and yet not making any progress towards it, we suffer all the acute misery so well known to accompany

CONDITION OF DOUBT.

531

such situations of contradicting impulses. The wretchedness can be subdued only by either abandoning the pursuit, or coming to a decision in favour of some one road. Irrespective, therefore, of the additional pains of the state of terror so frequently succeeding to great uncertainty, there is a characteristic form of suffering begotten by the condition of doubt; of which the parallels are the cases, wherever occurring, of being obliged to act while equally poised between opposing solicitations. When fear is excited, the misery is deepened by a new element, and decision still more effectually paralysed. It is hardly necessary to cite particular instances of one of the very commonest of human experiences. Men may be found that can boast of never knowing fear; but who has ever passed through a busy life without knowing what it is to doubt? With all the inequality of characters in respect of constitutional self-confidence and the opportunities of obtaining knowledge, there lives not a human being adequate to the instantaneous solution of every enigma that he encounters in the course of life; and no one can be exempt from moments of painful uncertainty such as now described.

The temper of belief, confidence, or assurance in coming good is, in the first place, the total exclusion of all this misery; in so far the influence is simply preventive or remedial. Assuming the mind to be cheerful and serene, an emergency of doubt would plunge it into acute suffering proportioned to the importance of the crisis. All this is saved, if clear conviction and unhesitating decision as to the course to be pursued are possessed by the mind. The believing and decided temper is ever and anon arresting us on the brink of some abyss of distraction and terror, and thereby conserving in their purity our times of enjoyment, and interfering to save us from new depths of despondency. In this view alone, we derive, from our various sources of confidence as to means, the ends being still supposed desirable, a large addition to the happiness of existence; which would of itself account for the greater buoyancy and serenity of mind belonging to such as are seldom afflicted with uncertainty and doubt. Even