In the one class of subjects, a man, by informing himself of the usual sequence of events, might predict with certainty what would happen, and act accordingly; as regarded the other class, human study was of no avail, and the only resource was to consult the gods. Here then is a distinct and intelligible negation of an intelligible doctrine; the universal prevalence of law and uniform causation, is met by the counter-affirmation, of that prevalence being only partial. In the theology of modern times, instances might be adduced where a position almost similar is taken up. It is obvious, however, that the dispute here is not the handling of a puzzle, but a matter of fact, experience, or induction. Can it be made out, that there are in human actions any class unpredictable from their very nature, apart from the complication that they involve, or the obscurity that surrounds them? One field expressly excepted by Socrates from the domain of human study, is now the crowning instance of human prediction, namely, the motions of the heavenly bodies. There is a greater certainty, at the present day, in anticipating celestial events than in those very matters quoted by Socrates as so thoroughly within man's own study, that it would have been mere impiety to refer to the gods respecting them.

The doctrine of invariable sequence in human actions might be opposed by various negatives, still shutting out the obnoxious terms 'liberty' and 'necessity.' Considering the law of causation, in the view taken of it by Mr. John Stuart Mill in his Logic, as nothing more than an induction of observed instances of uniformity, with no unequivocal ex

courage, cowardice—a city and a man qualified for citizenship—the government of men, and the character fit to exercise such government-and other similar matters. Persons cognizant of these he accounted good and honourable: persons ignorant of them he affirmed to deserve the appellation of slavish-minded.—(I. 1. 16).

Even in the department which Socrates recogned as human, we see that he pronounced an important fraction of each series of events to be reserved by the gods for themselves, concealed from human research, and discoverable only through supernatural indications.

NECESSITY AN OBJECTIONABLE TERM.

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ception, it might be said, that we never can be sure that an exception shall not arise. Until we have experimentally proved the law throughout all departments of nature, and throughout every corner of each department, we cannot tell whether there may not lurk some nest of irregularity, and therefore we cannot affirm the law of causation as absolutely certain. Granting this, however, it is enough that we have examined a very wide portion of natural phenomena, both in matter and in mind, and that no case of anarchy has ever yet been lighted on. Until an exception has been decidedly made manifest, we are entitled to presume the universality of the rule, according to the maxim of philosophizing laid down by Newton, and accepted in the schools of science.

Still, it is competent for any one to constitute the human will a region of anarchy, provided he thinks there are facts that bear out the conclusion. What I most strongly contend for at present, is the discarding of the old 'drapeau' under which the contest has been so long carried on, being persuaded that the controversy will then assume a very different aspect, and, if not speedily adjusted, will at least be divested of all its paradox, transcendentalism, and incomprehensibility.

5. Necessity.-A similar line of criticism may be pursued with reference to this word. In so far as it expresses the negation of Freedom, it is exposed to the very same objections. Moreover, I very much doubt whether the word ought to be retained in any of the sciences, physical or moral; nothing is ever gained by it. We speak of 'mathematical necessity,' but we might convey the same idea by language equally good, if not better. In common life, the word has a tolerably fixed meaning, suited to ordinary emergencies, and to that sphere we should do well to keep it. I cannot but think that every scientific discussion where people have intruded it, has been perplexed by it. I see nothing but confusion in such questions as 'whether the axioms of Mathematics are necessary,' and 'the necessary connexion of cause and effect;' the disputes on such points would probably be shortened by agreeing to depart from the present form of predication.

Because a term has once got footing in science, it surely does not follow that a vested interest has been created, compelling us to retain that word after we have discovered the unsuitability of it to the purpose in hand; and leading to laborious contortions, with a view to abate in a slight degree the excess of the malapropos! The tenderness that we show to the feelings of living men cannot be requisite towards inanimate instruments. I consider the word 'necessity' as nothing short of an incumbrance in the sciences of the present day.*

6. Choice, Deliberation.-The word 'choice' is one of the modes of designating the supposed liberty of voluntary actions. The real meaning, that is to say, the only real fact that can be pointed at in correspondence with it, is the acting out one of several different promptings. When a person purchases an article out of several submitted to view, the recommendations of that one are said to be greater than of the rest, and nothing more needs really be said in describing the transaction. It may happen that for a moment the opposing attractions are exactly balanced, and decision suspended thereby. The equipoise may even continue for a length of time, but when the decision is actually come to, the fact and the meaning are that some consideration has risen to the mind, giving a superior energy of motive to the side that has preponderated. This is the whole substance of the act of choosing. The designation 'liberty of choice' has no real meaning, except as denying extraneous interference. If

* It is not meant that the term should be wholly excluded from speech and composition. What I contend for is, that as a principal term in scientific affirmations, it ought to be dropped as being incurably inappropriate. There are names whose meaning is adapted to the phenomena of the world, as explained scientifically at the present day; I may quote as examples, ' uniform,' 'conditional,' 'unconditional,' 'sequence,' 'antecedent,' consequent,' all which have a precision of meaning, and an absence of confusing associations. If terms of this class are employed in the leading propositions, it matters less that vaguer words are occasionally introduced in connexions that show the exact sense intended. The rhetorical conditions imposed, even upon scientific exposition, do not allow that the one appropriate word shall be repeated on every occasion.

DELIBERATION AN INTELLIGIBLE FACT.

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I am interfered with by another person compelling me to act in one way, then it may be said, intelligibly enough, that I have not liberty of choice; the child may be taken to the shop where a dress is to be purchased, but some one else makes the selection. But, as between the different motives of my own mind, there is no meaning in the 'liberty of choice.' Various motives-present or prospective pleasures and pains -concur in urging me to act; the result of the conflict shows that one group is stronger than another, and that is the whole case. Any person watching me at that moment, and knowing exactly the different prompting considerations, would take a lesson as to my character from the trial, and would have some guidance as to what might be expected from me on similar occasions. He would never think of either liberty or necessity, unless in the exceptional case of my being so overpowered by compulsion from without, that my own likings or dislikings had nothing to do with the conclusion. Even then 'necessity' would be a bad title to employ; it would be more correct to say that my will was completely suspended in the matter, that I was no party in the decision. The question really is, in such circumstances, not whether my will is free, but whether the action is mine at all, or whether it belongs to some other person, using me as an executive instrument. The expression, in common speech, that such a one has no will in the matter' is correct and intelligible, on the supposition of an irresistible power from without. When a strong motive is brought to bear, in the shape of command or dictation under penalties, and when that command is resisted, we can only pronounce that the counter-motives are stronger than the deterring prospect of punishment. So that, in whatever predicament a man or an animal may be placed, there is a simple and strictly apposite mode of expressing the conflict of motives and the issuing decision. In very few circumstances are the terms liberty and necessity in any way suitable, and in none are they the best; while in the great mass they serve only to breed confusion. Nothing could have been more fatal than to clothe the most general and fundamental fact of

volition, so often set forth in the foregoing chapters, in such a phraseology. The following up of pleasure, and the recoil from pain, are the ultimate facts, and most comprehensive types, or representations of volition; but I am unable to see how they can be brought under any description involving those names. I can fancy an equal appropriateness in styling the mind's proceeding circular or oval, wet or dry, up-stairs or down-stairs. In truth, the terms in question have weighed like a nightmare upon the investigation of the active region of the mind. It is a fact that the progress made in explaining the will bears no proportion to what has been achieved in the other departments-the senses, the understanding, the affections, the emotions of taste, &c.—and my only explanation is, that the authors that have contributed to enlighten us in the human mind have had their strength wasted, and their pages usurped, by a problem in great part spurious.*

As regards the phrase 'deliberation,' I have already explained at length what is comprised under it (Chap. VII.). There is no exception to the general theory, when the mind deliberates for a certain time before acting. If the opposing ends are equally balanced, there is a state of indecision, until such time as new motives gather round one or other of the two sides. This suspense, under equal and opposing pressures, is one form of deliberating, the occasion when additional time for the occurrence of motive considerations is essentially called for. It generally happens that the course of the thoughts continuing upon the question, brings up something

* Locke, after stating his view of the nature of Free-will (summed up in the remark that Voluntary is opposed, not to Necessary, but to Involuntary), goes on to say:-'I leave it to be considered, whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and I think, unreasonable, because unintelligible question, viz., Whether Man's Will be free or no? For if I mistake not, it follows from what I have said, that the Question is altogether improper : and it is as insignificant to ask, whether Man's Will be free, as to ask whether his Sleep be swift, or his Virtue square; Liberty being as little applicable to the Will, as Swiftness of Motion is to Sleep, or Squareness to Virtue.'-(Essay on the Understanding, Book II., Chap. 21.