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distinction; the opposition of the family to the community, and of the small society to the general welfare of mankind, brings out the relative strength of the contracted and expansive regards.

The feeling of obligation growing up in the smaller societies is very illustrative of the position I am contending for. Professional honour, or etiquette, in the soldier, or the lawyer,— sometimes even conflicting with the general law, as in regard to duelling,—and the sentiments peculiar to special sects, or fraternities, are among the most obvious instances of the acquired nature of the sentiment of obligation. It is purely by means of the discipline exercised in each society over its members, and by the habitual ascription of praise to some actions, and blame to others, that the code of the society is stamped on the individual mind, and gives birth to a conscience corresponding.

There is no difficulty in assigning the natural temperament, and the modifying circumstances, that determine the adhesion to the narrow circle, or the superior range of sentiment that prefers the larger point of view. Strong personal affection, the habit of engrossing the mind with those in immediate contact with ourselves, and the absence of all that cultivation, study, and knowledge which makes humanity at large an object of consideration and regard, are quite enough to contract the sphere of felt obligation; while, on the other hand, a disposition to sympathize with living beings generally, as distinguished from the special attachments, and wide studies directed to the history and destinies of nations and the human family at large, cherish the comprehensive sentiment towards mankind.

24. The Religious conscience is characterized by the presence and predominance of the religious sentiment of mingled love and fear towards the Deity; and owes all its power to this circumstance. The feeling of disapprobation would thus resolve itself into the pain of displeasing an object of intense reverence. Again, when the benevolent impulses are the strongest part of one's being, the feeling of obligation is most

severely ruptured by anything tending to inflict harm. Sometimes the mind inclines with special tenacity to the letter of the precepts of morality, so that a breach of form gives a violent shock of remorse; while others accustom themselves to look at the intention and spirit of the requirement, and feel most acutely any departure from this. If there were in the human mind a faculty of conscience by itself, we should not meet with such wide differences in the stress laid upon particular duties; the disposition rather would be, to obey with nearly equal strength of determination whatever was commanded by any recognised authority.

25. We must next take special cognizance of the selfformed or Independent conscience, or that variety of the moral sentiment that is not influenced either by fear of, or reverence to, any superior power whatsoever. On the supposition that external authority is the genuine type and original of moral authority within, the grand difficulty would lie in explaining the cases where the individual is a law to himself. But there is nothing very formidable in this apparent contradiction. The sentiment, at first formed and cultivated by the relations of actual command and obedience, may come at last to stand upon an independent foundation, just as the student educated by the implicit reception of the scientific notions of his teachers, comes by and bye to believe them, or disbelieve them, on evidence of his own finding. When the young mind, accustomed at the outset to implicitly obeying any set of rules, is sufficiently advanced to appreciate the motives-the utilities or the sentiment that led to their imposition-the character of the conscience is entirely transformed; the motive power issues from a different quarter of the mental framework. Regard is now had to the intent and meaning of the law, and not to the mere fact of its being prescribed by some power. An intelligence of superior energy will occasionally detect some inconsistency between the end professed and the precepts imposed and take a position hostile to the existing authority in consequence.

I shall cite a few instances of the growth of independent,

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judgments in matters of duty, to show how the mind in emancipating itself from the trammels of the derived sentiment of the obligatory, still adheres to the type of outward authority. A common case is the discovery of some supposed or real inconsistency between a rule imbibed in the course of education, and some practice encountered in the world. The contradiction shocks the mind at first, but in the generality of cases is got over by the same implicit acquiescence that received the rule. There are, however, exceptional minds that cannot swallow contradiction in this easy way, and who accordingly take an independent stand, by choosing either to abide by the rule, and repudiate what is opposed to it, or to fall in with the practice and repudiate the rule. Thus, for example, the literal interpretation of the preceptswear not,' has led the Society of Friends to refuse an oath in every form. Again, an individual fancies that a moral rule is not so fully applied as it ought to be, and suggests cases where an extension should take place. For instance, some persons consider that the obligation of monogamy, as a Christian institution, implies that neither party should marry a second time. Having made up their minds to such an inference, they feel constrained to comply with it, in opposition to the common usage, with all the strength of sentiment that they have imbibed from that usage in favour of the original doctrine. They are thus the followers of the prevailing opinions, even in the act of dissenting from them in some single instance.*

A man may, in the exercise of independent judgment, embrace views of duty widely at variance with what prevails in the society he lives in, and may impose these upon himself, although he cannot induce anybody else to accept them. This is the only case where conscience is a thing entirely detached from the sanction of the community, or some power external to the individual. Even then the notion, sentiment, or form of duty is derived from what society imposes, although the particular matter is quite different. Social obedience develops in the mind originally the feeling and habit of obligation, and this remains when the individual articles are changed. In such self-imposed obligations the person does not fear public censure, but he has so assimilated in his mind the laws of his own coining to the imperative requirements of society, that he reckons them of equal force as duty, and feels

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26. I may next remark upon the sense of duty in the Abstract, under which a man performs all his recognised obligations, without referring to any one of the special motives above adverted to. There may not be present to his mind either the fear of retribution, the respect to the authority commanding, affection or sympathy towards the persons or interests for whose sake the duty is imposed, his own advantage indirectly concerned, his religious feeling, his individual sentiments in accord with the spirit of the precept, the infection of example, or any other operating ingredient prompting to the action, or planting the sting for neglect. Just as in the love of money for its own sake, one may come to form a habit of acting in a particular way, although the special impulses that were the original moving causes no longer recur to the mind. This does not prove that there exists a primitive sentiment of duty in the abstract, any more than the conduct of the miser proves that we are born with the love of gold in the abstract. It is the tendency of association to erect new centres of force, detached from the particulars that originally gave them meaning; which new creations will sometimes assemble round themselves a more powerful body of sentiment, than could be inspired by any one of the constituent realities. Nothing that money could puchase affects the mind of the money-getter so strongly as the arithmetical numeration of his gains. So it is with the habitual sentiment of duty in a certain class of minds, and with the great abstractions of truth, justice, purity, and the like. These cannot be proved to be primordial sentiments; nevertheless, we find them in a very high degree of predominance in particular instances; and persons unaccustomed to mental analysis, are apt to suppose that they must be implanted in our constitution from the first. The comparative rarity of such high-toned sentiments towards

the same sting in falling. The votary of vegetable diet on principle has the same kind of remorse, after being betrayed into a meal of butcher-meat, that would be caused by an outburst of open profanity, or the breach of a solemn engagement.

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abstract morality, if duly reflected on, would satisfy any candid inquirer that they are not provided for in the original scheme of the mind; while the possibility of accounting for their development, wherever they occur, renders it unphilosophical to resort to such an hypothesis.

27. Hitherto, I have supposed the conscience to operate solely on the individual's own self-inciting to act, or punishing for neglect. But the expositition is not complete without referring to our moral judgments respecting the conduct of others, although there is nothing abstruse or difficult to explain in this new case. I must premise, however, in this connexion, that the inquiry should be as to the sentiment, not of moral approbation, but of moral disapprobation. I have said

already, that a moral rule in the strict sense is not an optional thing, but is enforced by the sanction of some penalty. It is true that the looseness of ethical writers has led to the introduction of precepts of human virtue and nobleness, which undoubtedly deserve to be inculcated, but the compliance with those precepts constitutes merit and earns rewards, while the non-compliance does not entail punishment or censure. The question as to the morality of some line of conduct is, does it inspire a feeling of disapprobation, as violating the maxims recognized to be binding? If so, it is to be supposed that the same sense of duty that operates upon one's own self, and stings with remorse and fear in case of disobedience, should come into play when some other person is the guilty agent. The feeling that rises up towards that person is a strong feeling of displeasure or dislike, proportioned to the strength of our regard to the violated duty. There arises a moral resentnent, or a disposition to inflict punishment upon the offender. It is the readiness to punish, that forms the criterion of moral disapprobation, or marks the boundary between a moral sentiment and an allowable difference of opinion. This brings us round again to the first imposition of moral rules. A particular line of conduct is so intensely disliked for some reason, or for none, that we are prepared to resent it and hinder its performance with all our might. A majority of our fellow