ARTICLE XII.

THE INTELLECTUAL FURNITURE OF AN ORATOR.*

BY M. DE FENELON, ARCHBISHOP OF CAMBRAY.

B. I PERCEIVE clearly enough, that, according to your reasoning, orators ought to be the defenders of the laws, and instructors of the people, to teach them true wisdom and virtue. But among the Romans, the rhetoric of the bar was otherwise employed.

A. That was certainly the end of it. For, when orators had not occasion to represent in their discourses the general wants of the republic, they were obliged to protect innocence and the rights of particular persons. And it was on this account that their profession was so much honoured, and that Tully gives us such a lofty character of a true orator.†

B. Let us hear then how orators ought to speak. I long to know your thoughts on this point, seeing you deny the finical, florid manner of Isocrates, which is so much admired and imitated by others.

A. Instead of giving you my opinion, I shall go on to lay before you the rules that the ancients give us, but I shall only touch upon the chief points; for, I suppose, you do not expect that I should enter into an endless detail of the precepts of rhetoric. There are but too many useless ones; which you must have read in those books where they are copiously explained. It will be enough if we consider the most important rules. Plato in his Phaedrus shows us, that the greatest fault of rhetoricians is, their studying the art of persuasion, before they have learned, (from the principles of true philosophy,) what those things are of which they ought to persuade men. would have orators begin with the study of mankind in general; and then apply themselves to the knowledge of the particular genius and manners of those, whom they may have occasion to instruct and persuade. So that they ought first of all to know the nature of man, his chief end and his true interest, the parts of which he is composed, his mind and his body, and the true way to make him happy. They ought likewise to understand his passions, the disorders they are subject to, and the art of governing them; how they may be usefully

Extracted from Fenelon's Dialogues on Eloquence.

He

† Neque vero mihi quidquam præstabilius videtur, quam posse dicendo tenere hominum cœtus, mentes allicere, voluntates impellere quo velit; unde autem velit, deducere. Haec una res in omni libero populo, maximeque in pacatis tranquillisque civitatibus praecipue semper floruit, semperque dominata est. Quid enim est aut tam admirabile, quam ex infinitâ multitudine hominum existere unum, qui id quod omnibus naturâ sit datum, vel solus, vel cum paucis facere possit?aut tam potens, tamque magnificum, quam populi motus, judicum religiones, senatus gravitatem, unius oratione converti?-Ac ne plura, quae sunt pene innumerabilia, consecter, comprehendam brevi; sic enim statuo, perfecti oratoris moderatione et sapientiâ, non solum ipsius dignitatem, sed et privatorum plurimorum et universæ reipublicæ salutem maxime contineri.-Cic. de. Orat. lib. i. § 8.

raised and employed on what is truly good; and, in fine, the proper rules to make him live in peace and discharge his duties in society. After this general study, comes that which is particular.

Orators ought to know the laws and customs of their country, and how far they are agreeable to the genius and temper of the people, what are the manners of the several ranks and conditions among them, their different ways of education, the common prejudices and separate interests that prevail in the present age, and the most proper way to instruct and reform the people. You see, sir, this knowledge comprehends all the solid parts of philosophy and politics. So that Plato meant to show us that none but a philosopher can be a true orator. And it is in this sense we must understand all he says in his Gorgias, against the rhetoricians; I mean, that set of men who made profession of talking finely and persuading others, without endeavouring to know, from solid philosophy, what one ought to teach them. In short, according to Plato, the true art of oratory consists in understanding those useful truths of which we ought to convince people, and the art of moving their passions, in order to persuasion. Cicero* says almost the very same things. He seems, at first, to think that an orator should know everything, because he may have occasion to speak on all sort of subjects; and (as Socrates observed before him)† a man can never talk well on a point of which he is not entirely master. But afterwards, because of the pressing necessities and shortness of life, Tully insists only upon those parts of knowledge that he thinks the most necessary for an orator. He would have him at least well instructed in all that part of philosophy which relates to the conduct and affairs of social life. But above all things, he would have an orator§ know the frame of man, both with regard to his soul and body, and the natural tendency and force of his passions;

*Ac mea quidem sententia, nemo poterit esse omni laude cumulatus orator, nisi erit omnium rerum magnarum, atque artium scientiam consecutus.-De. Orat. lib. 1. § 6. Oratorem plenum atque perfectum esse eum dicam, qui de omnibus rebus possit varie copioseque dicere?—Ibid. §. 13. Verum enim oratori quae sunt in hominum vita, quandoquidem in ea versatur orator, atque ea est ei subjecta materies, omnia quaesita, audita, lecta, disputata, tractata, agitata esse debent.-Lib. iii. § 14.

Etenim ex rerum cognitione efflorescat, et redundet oportet oratio; quae nisi subest res ab oratore percepta et cognita, inanem quandam habet elocutionem et pene puerilem.-De. Orat. lib. i. § 6.

Positum sit igitur in primis-sine philosophia non posse effici, quem quaerimus eloquentem-Nec vero sine philosophorum disciplina, genus et speciem cujusque rei cernere, neque eam definiendo explicare, nec tribuere in partes possumus; nec judicare, quae vera, quae falsa sint; neque cernere consequentia, repugnantia videre, ambigua distinguere. Quid dicam de natura rerum, cujus cognitio magnam orationis suppeditat copiam? De vita, de officiis, de virtute, de moribus?-Orat. § 4.

§ Omnes animorum motus, quos hominum generi rerum natura tribuit, penitus pernoscendi.—De. Orat. lib. i. § 5.-Num admoveri possit oratio ad sensus animorum atque motus vel inflammandos, vel etiam extinguendos (quod unum in oratore dominatur), sine diligentissima pervestigatione earum omnium rationum quae de naturis humani generis ac moribus, a philosophis explicantur.-De. Orat. lib. i. 14. Quare hic locus de vita et moribus, totus est oratori perdiscendus.— Ibid. § 15.

because the great end of eloquence is to move the secret springs of them. He reckons the knowledge of the laws and constitution to be the foundation of all public discourses; but he does not think a thorough insight into all the particular cases and questions in law to be necessary, because upon occasion one may have recourse to experienced lawyers, whose peculiar profession it is to understand and disentangle such intricate points. He thinks, with Plato, that an orator should be a master of reasoning,* and know how to define, and argue, and unravel the most specious sophisms. He says we destroy eloquence, if we should separate it from philosophy, for then, instead of wise orators, we should have only trifling, injudicious declaimers. He further requires not only an exact knowledge of all the principles of ethics, but likewise that the orator be fully acquainted with antiquity.† He recommends the careful perusal of the ancient Greek writers, especially the historians, both for their style, and for the historical facts. they relate. He particularly enjoins the study of the poets, because of the great resemblance there is between the figures of poetry and those of eloquence. In fine, he often declares that an orator ought to furnish his mind with a clear, comprehensive view of things, before he attempt to speak in public. I fancy I could almost repeat some of his words on this subject; so often have I read them, and so strong an impression did they make on my thoughts. You will be surprised to see how much knowledge, and how many§ qualities he requires. "An orator," says he, "ought to have the acuteness of logicians, the knowledge of philosophers, the style almost of the poets, the elocution and

* Nec vero dialecticis modo sit instructus, sed habeat omnes philosophiae notos et tractatos locos. Nihil enim de religione, nihil de morte, nihil de pietate, nihil de caritate patriae, nihil de bonis rebus, aut malis, nihil de virtutibus, aut vitiis—nihil, inquam, sine ea scientia, quam dixi, graviter, ample, copiose dici et explicari potest.-Orat. § 33.

Cognoscat etiam rerum gestarum et memoriæ veteris ordinem, maxime scilicet nostrae civitatis, sed et imperiosorum populorum et regum illustrium-Nescire autem quid antea quam natus sis acciderit, id est semper esse puerum-Commemoratio antem antiquitatis exemplorumque prolatio summa cum delectatione, et auctoritatem orationi affert et fidem.-Orat. § 34. Apud Graecos autem eloquentissimi homines remoti a causis forensibus, cum ad caeteras res illustres, tum ad scribendam historiam maxime se applicaverunt. Namque et Herodotus -Et post illum Thucydides omnes dicendi artificio mea sententia facile vicitDenique etiam a philosophia profectus princeps Xenophon.-De. Orat. lib. ii. § 13,

14.

Legendi etiam poetae, cognoscenda historia, omnium bonarum artium scriptores.-De. Orat. lib.i. § 34. Est enim finitimus oratori poeta, numeris adstrictior paulo, verborum autem licentia liberior; multis vero ornandi generibus socius ac pene par; in hoc quidem certe prope idem, nullis ut terminis circumscribat aut definiat jus suum, quo minus ei liceat eadem illa facultate et copia vagari qua velit.-Ibid. § 16.

§ Non quaeritur mobilitas linguae, non celeritas verborum, non denique ea quae nobis non possumus fingere, facies, vultus, sonus. In oratore autem acumen dialecticorum, sententiae philosophorum, verba prope poetarum, memoria juris consultorum, vox tragoedorum, gestus pene summorum actorum, est requirendus. Quamobrem nihil in hominum genere rarius perfecto oratore inveniri potest; quae enim, singularum rerum artifices, singula si mediocriter adepti sunt, probantur, ea, nisi omnia summa sunt in oratore, probari non possunt.-De. Orat. lib. i. § 28.

gesture of the finest actors.' necessary to attain all this.

Consider now how much application is

C. I have observed, indeed, on several occasions, that some orators, though they have good natural parts, want a fund of solid knowledge. Their heads seem unfurnished, and one cannot but perceive they labour hard for matter to fill up their discourses. They do not seem to speak from the abundance of their hearts, as if they were full of useful truths; but they talk as if they were at a loss for the very next thing they are to say.

A. Cicero takes notice of this kind of people; who live always, as it were, from hand to mouth, without laying up any stock of provision. But the discourses of such declaimers appear always thin and half-starved, whatever pains they take about them. Though these men could afford three months for studying a public harangue, such particular preparations, however troublesome, must needs be very imperfect, and any judicious hearer will easily discern their defects. They ought to have employed several years in laying up a plentiful store of solid notions; and then after such a general preparation, their particular discourses would cost them but little pains. Whereas, if a man, without this preparatory study, lay out all his application upon particular subjects, he is forced to put off his hearers with florid expressions, gaudy metaphors, and jingling antitheses. He delivers nothing but indeterminate common-place notions; and patches together shreds of learning and rhetoric, which any one may see were not made one for another. He never goes to the bottom of things, but stops in superficial remarks, and ofttimes in false ones. He is not able to show truths in their proper light and full extent, because all general truths are necessarily connected among themselves, so that one must understand almost all of them, before he can treat judiciously of any one.

C. However, many of our public speakers get repute by those slight attainments you so much despise.

A. It is true, they are applauded by women and the undiscerning multitude, who are easily dazzled and imposed on; but this repute is very precarious, and could not subsist long, if it were not supported by a cabal of acquaintance, and the zeal or humour of a party. They who know the true end and rules of eloquence cannot hear such empty vain harangues, without satiety, disgust, and contempt.

C. It seems then you would have a man wait several years before he attempt to speak in public; for the flower of his age must be spent in attaining that vast fund of knowledge, which you reckon necessary to an orator, and then he must be so far advanced in years, that he will have but little time to exert his talents.

A. I would have him begin to exert them betimes, for I know very well how great the power of action is. But under the pretence of exercising his parts, I would not have him immediately engage himself in any kind of employment that will take off his mind from his studies. A youth may try his skill from time to time; but for seve

ral years, a careful perusal of the best authors ought to be his main business.

C. Your judicious observation puts me in mind of a preacher I am acquainted with, who lives, as you say, from hand to mouth, and never thinks of any subject till he be obliged to treat of it; and then he shuts himself up in his closet, turns over his concordance, combefix, and polyanthea, his collections of sermons, and common-place book of separate sentences and book quotations that he has gathered together.

A. You cannot but perceive, sir, that this method will never make him an able, judicious preacher. In such cases, a man cannot talk with strength and clearness; he is not sure of anything he says, nor doth anything flow easily from him. His whole discourse has a borrowed air, and looks like an awkward piece of patchwork. Certainly those are much to be blamed, who are so impatiently fond of showing their parts.

B. Before you leave us, sir, pray tell us what you reckon the chief effect of eloquence.

A. Plato says an orator is so far eloquent as it affects the hearer's mind. By this rule you may judge certainly of any discourse you hear; if an harangue leave you cold and languid, and only amuses your mind instead of enlightening it, if it does not move your heart and passions, however florid and pompous it may be, it is not truly eloquent. Tully approves of Plato's sentiments on this point; and tells us that the whole drift and force of a discourse should tend to move those secret springs of action that nature has placed in the hearts of men. Would you then consult your own mind to know whether those you hear be truly eloquent? If they make a lively impression upon you, and gain your attention and assent to what they say; if they move and animate your passions, so as to raise you above yourself, you may be assured they are true orators. But if instead of affecting you thus, they only please or divert you, and make you admire the brightness of their thoughts, or the beauty and propriety of their language, you may freely pronounce them to be mere declaimers.

ARTICLE XIII.

THE PARSON PREACHING AND CATECHISING.‡

BY GEORGE HERBERT.

THE PARSON PREACHING.

THE Country Parson preacheth constantly. The pulpit is his joy and his throne. If he at any time intermit, it is either for want of health; or against some festival, that he may the better celebrate it; or for the variety of the hearers, that he may be heard at his return †See Longinus, & vii.

* Lib. i. 5; lib. ii. 2 82.

From George Herbert's "Country Parson," 1632.