followed the desertion of that celeftial influence, by the introduction of riches. Does it not appear abfolutely certain, that this finifter influence of wealth, creating one univerfal depravation in the minds of those who elect the representatives, who should govern in a nation, has deprived every ruined republic of the ufe of thofe virtues and perfections of humanity, which would have preserved it.

It is not because there are not at prefent men of abilities, probity, and understanding, in England, that the miniftry is fuppofed to be com pofed of a different kind of men; but from this reason, as thofe fuperior qualities are rarely joined with wealth or ambition, these flide into corners, or are not able to win authority thro' want of that baftard power of riches, which has ufurped the throne of the legal heirs of it, the exalted attributes of mental nature.

METHINKS it was this pernicious power of riches, which ruined the Carthaginian ftate; in commercial nations, a rich and selfish merchant overbears the man of small property, vast integrity, and found intellects; the nation's welL 3 fare

fare in his interefted eyes, is the fuccefs of his own private bufinefs; hogsheads of tobacco," barrels of rice, tuns of fugar, and bales of cotten, make, in the opinion of the feparate traders in thefe commodities, the nation's whole concern; circumfcribed in knowledge, and hood-winked by lucre, they would prefs all mankind to their private advantage, and fpread yet farther the thirst of money, and the fatal effects which attend it,

TELL me whether thefe men are right in their practice, or I in the judgment of what I have fent you.

LETTER XLIV.

To the Reverend Father VINCENZO

SPINELLO, at Rome..

5. ú...

- Dear Sir,

AM much pleafed with your approving of what I have faid on the influence of money, in republican and mix'd governments; and not a little flatter'd with your request of seeing my reafons for what I have afferted in relation to monarchic ftates being able to bear a greater degree of riches, than those which I have already mention'd.

IN ftates where any part of the legislative or governing power is elective, the people, after they are once become venal, can pay no regard but to money; this purchases their felf-love, in oppofition to the love of their country: the heart of man in money loving kingdoms, is not proof against the feduction of felf-intereft

!

L

oh, fand

and it inevitably happens that the public benefit, grown old and, infirm, is ftrangled by the hands of private advantage in full vigour.

Too many people of great riches, in a free nation, create an equality which is detrimental to the whole; nobility is but little worth, where a man of the meaneft birth, and bafest education, can make part of the legislative power: in this kingdom a taylor with three hundred a year, may be a member of parliament and cut out laws as he did garments; and if he has ten thousand a year, he may make his quietus with a borough; tho' not with a bare bodkin, as Hamlet fays, yet with a large fum of money, and be prefer'd to the defcendant of a Howard.

*

"

HENCE you may fee, that money, banishing all other excellencies, becomes the fole envied object; it gives power and fuperiority, and happily fupplies to the ignorant what they want in worth and understanding. A nobleman, tho' he makes part of the legislature, is more on a level with a commoner in this kingIdom, than in any other upon earth.

FOR this reafon it happens that the inhabitants, poftponing every other confideration, lay their whole ftrefs on getting rich, and neglect making themselves wife, as a matter lefs demanding attention.

Is it then abfurd to reftrain this rage of money, and fubduing every human qualification of fuperior excellence to that pernicious power, especially in this conftitution, where the increasing defire of it has already been almost the ruin of the kingdom?

IN a monarchic ftate, all honors proceeding from the crown, the power of riches is much inferior to what it is in a mixt or republican; tho' money is not without influence, in fuch nations it has much less than in others, and tho' it may poffibly purchase the ruling power of a minifter, it cannot long preferve and protect him in that place, without acquitting himfelf with addrefs,

WHEREAS a minister of England, once elected by faction, or intereft, may be sustain❜d by

his