interest, within ten years, and redeem the mortgaged property; a suit institnted before the ten years had elapsed was held to be unsustainable, because prematurely instituted, the mere use of the word "within" not being a sufficient indication of the intention of the parties that the mortgagor might redeem in a less period than ten years.* Parties.-A suit for redemption brought by the assignees of the equity of redemption cannot go on to a due determination until all the mortgagors are made parties.† Second Suit to Redeem.- Where, in a suit for redemption of a mortgage, a decree was passed by consent to the effect that the land was redeemable upon payment of a certain sum on a certain date, but there was no direction in the decree that in default of payment the mortgage be foreclosed, and the decree was not executed, and, after three years, the right, title, and interest of the mortgagors in the land was purchased in execution of a decree by the plaintiff, who thereupon sued the mortgagee to redeem the land, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to redeem.‡ Court-fee. In a suit by the purchaser of the equity of redemption to redeem, the value of the subject matter of the suit, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, is not the market-value of the land, but the amount of the mortgagemoney.§ Repairs. In a redemption-suit a mortgagee is entitled to credit for reasonable costs of repairs, if he renders an account of rents and profits.|| By section 76 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a mortgagee is bound to keep the premises in repair out of the surplus rents, if there be such. Limitation.-In a suit against a mortgagee to redeem, or to recover possession of immoveable property mortgaged, sixty years from the time when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues.¶ * Vadju v. Vadju, I. L. R., 5 Bom. 22. + Ram Baksh Singh v. Mohunt Ram Lall Doss, 21 W. R. 428. ‡ Periandi v. Angappa, I. L. R., 7 Mad. 423. § Kubair Singh v. Atina Ram, I. L. R., 5 All, 332. || Lakshman Bhisaji v. Hari Dinkar Desai, I. L. R., 4 Bom. 584. ¶ Art. 148, Limitation Aot, 1877. CHAPTER V. INJUNCTION. Form No. 331. FOR RESTORATION OF MOVEABLE PROPERTY THREATENED WITH Plaintiff states: 1. That plaintiff is, and at all times hereinafter mentioned was, the owner of a portrait of his grandfather, which was executed by an eminent painter, and of which no duplicate exists (or state any facts showing that the property is of a kind that cannot be replaced by money). he deposited 2. That on the day of 18, at 18, he demanded the same from the defendant, and offered to pay all reasonable charges for the storage of the same. 4. That the defendant refuses to deliver the same to the plaintiff, and threatens to conceal, dispose of, cut, or injure the same if required to deliver it up. 5. That no pecuniary compensation would be an adequate compensation to the plaintiff for the loss of the painting. Wherefore plaintiff plays for decree : 1. That the defendant be restrained by injunction from disposing of, injuring, or concealing the said painting. 2. That he return the same to the plaintiff. When Injunction will be Granted.-The grant of temporary injunctions is regulated by sections 492 and 493 of the Civil Procedure Code, and all that need here be said respecting them is that they will not be granted except in cases where, unless the defendant be at once restrained by an injunction, irreparable injury or inconvenience may result to the plaintiff before the suit can be decided upon its merits. The granting of perpetual injunctions is a matter for the wise discretion of the Court; it is a remedy which should be guarded with extreme caution, and applied only in very clear cases.* 2 Story's Eq. 959. Partnership.-In partnership-suits one partner will be restrained from carrying on the concern for any other purpose than winding up; from damaging the value of the good-will, if it ought to be sold for the benefit of all; from improperly ejecting the representatives of his deceased co-partner; or from misapplying the assets to his own use and their detriment: and they, on the other hand, will be restrained from using property really belonging to the partnership, though standing in the name of the deceased partner." Trusts.—In cases of trusts, it is the duty of a trustee, if a breach of trust is threatened, to prevent it by obtaining an injunction, and if a breach of trust has been already committed, to sue for the restoration of the trust fund, or take other active measures for that end;† where the trustee is about to do an act unauthorized by the true scope of the trust, the beneficiary may obtain an injunction to restrain the trustee therefrom.‡ Trespass.-In cases of trespass, injunction will be granted where pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief, or when it is probable that pecuniary compensation cannot be got ;§ so, where the plaintiffs had purchased, and were in possession of, private family-vaults or graves, in perpetuity, in a private burialground annexed to a chapel, but which was closed from further use, and the trustees were proceeding to level the ground, and remove the tombstones, they were restrained from removing those belonging to the plaintiff.|| The Court will also interfere by issuing an injunction in a case of trespass in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits,¶ as in the case where a man sets up an exclusive right, and the alleged trespassers are numerous ; but in such a case, if the plaintiff asks for an injunc tion pendente lite, it will not be granted, unless it is clearly shown that the parties to be restrained will not suffer in the meantime, nor where plaintiff has shown a want of diligence in establishing his exclusive right.†† Light and Air.-Any act by which the control of light and air are taken out of the hands of the person entitled to them, or by which the access of light and air to the window of a dwelling-house is interfered with, is primd facie an injury of a serious character, and no precedent warrants the substitution of damages for * DeTastet v. Bordenare, Jac. 516; Turner v. Major, 3 Giff. 442; Elliot e. Brown, 3 Swan 489n; Hartz v. Shrader, 8 Ves. 317; Alder v. Fouracre, Swan 3489n; Lind, on P. 1005. In re Chertsey Market, 6 Price 279; Lewin on Trusts, ch. xii. Balls v. Strutt, 1 Hare 146; Lewin on Trusts, ch. xxv. § See cls. c and d, s. 54, Specific Relief Act, 1877; Hodgson v. Duce, 2 Jar., N. S., 1014. Morlard v. Richardson, 2 Beav. 596. T See cl. e, s. 54, Specific Relief Act. ** See illus. p, s. 54, Specific Relief Act; Lord Tenham v. Herbert, 2 Atk. 483. ++ Hanson v. Gardiner, 7 Ves, 309, an injunction în such a case against the plaintiff's will. The probability that the defendant will suffer greater loss by obeying the injunction, than the plaintiff, if his claim could be reduced to money, would suffor by being awarded a money-compensation, is no ground for depriving the plaintiff of a mandatory injunction in bis favour, except under special circumstances.t Sea-fishery.-The District Court may, when the defendants reside within its local jurisdiçtion, try a suit for damages, and restrain by injunction an alleged illegal disturbance of the plaintiff's right to fish and use fishing stakes and nets fixed in the sea below low-water mark and within three miles of it.‡ Nuisance-Who are Liable for.-See the notes under this head in the chapter on Nuisances. (Chap. VI., page 214, form 289.) Form No. 332. FOR AN INJUNCTION RESTraining WaSTE, Plaintiff states: 1. That he is the absolute owner of (describe the property). 2. That the defendant is in possession of the same under a lease from the plaintiff. 3. That the defendant has cut down a number of valuable trees, and threatens to cut down many more for the purpose of sale, without the consent of the plaintiff. Wherefore plaintiff prays for decree that the defendant be restrained by injunction from committing or permitting any further waste on the premises, and for the costs of suit. Mortgagors.-A mortgagor becomes liable for commissive waste when the security becomes insufficient.§ Mortgagees.-A mortgagee in possession will be restrained by injunction. from committing waste, if he does not apply the proceeds in sinking the interest and principal of his mortgage.|| Tenants.-A lessee is liable for commissive waste.¶ * Nand Kishor Balgovan v. Bhagubhai Pranvalabhdas, I. L. R., 8 Bom. 95; Jam. nadas Shankarlal v. Vrijbhu Khan Shankarlal, I. I. R., 2 Bom. 133. + Jamnadas Shankarlal v. Vrijbhu Khan Shankarlal, supra. Baban Mayacha v. Nagu Shravucha, I. L. R., 2 Bom. 19. § See 8. 66, Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Farrant v. Lovel, 3 Atk. 723. See cl. o, s. 108, Transfer of Property Act, 1882, F. P.--34 Joint Owners.-An injunction will be granted to restrain a joint owner from committing equitable waste,*.but not legal waste.† Form No. 333. TO RESTRAIN THE USE OF PLAINTIFF'S TRADE-MARK. Plaintiff states: 1. That before, and at the times hereinafter mentioned, at the plaintiff manufactured and sold for profit large quantities of penknives, which he was accustomed to mark with a certain trade-mark, that is, with the words impressed in a bracket upon the blades describe the trade-mark used by thereof (or with a device of the plaintiff according to the fact), in order to denote that they were manufactured by him, and to distinguish them from articles of the same kind manufactured by other persons, and the plaintiff enjoyed great reputation with the public on account of the good quality of the said penkuives, and made large profits by the sale of them.. 2. That the defendant has, at various times since the day of , large 18 and still continues, wrongfully and fraudulently, and without the consent of the plaintiff, to manufacture at quantities of pen-knives, and caused them to be marked with the words impressed in a bracket upon the blades thereof (or, with the device of describe the mark used by the defendant), in imitation of the said trade-mark of the plaintiff, and in order to cause it to be believed that the last-mentioned pen-knives were manufactured by the plaintiff, and wrongfully and fraudulently sold, and continues to sell, the last-mentioned pen-kuives as for pen-knives manufactured by the plaintiff. 3. That by reason of the premises the plaintiff was prevented from selling great quantities of the said pen-knives manufactured by him, and lost the profits, amounting to Rs. which he would otherwise have gained by the sale thereof, and has been injured in his reputation in his said business by reason of the said pen-knives so manufactured and sold by the defendant being inferior in quality to those manufactured by the plaintiff. * See ill. n, s. 54, Specific Relief Act, 1877. + Job r. Patton, L. R., 20 Eq. 84. |