3. That the period allowed for loading and demurrage has elapsed, but the defendant has not delivered the said merchandise to the said vessel,

Whereupon the plaintiff demands judgment for Rs. demurrage, and Rs. additional for compensation.

for

Definitions.-A charter-party is a contract whereby the ship-owner, or shipmaster, agrees for the use of the ship by the charterer for some specified period of time, or for a particular voyage or adventure."

Lay-days are the days which by the charter-party are allowed to the charterer to load or unload; and these are, in the absence of a contrary usage, to be taken as consecutive running days.†

Demurrage is the time beyond the lay-days allowed for loading or unloading, for which the charterer pays so much per day. This extra time, as well as the payment for it, are called demurrage. In reckoning demurrage a fraction of a day is reckoned as a day.‡

Measure of Damages.—In a suit for not loading, plaintiff is entitled to recover as damages a sum equivalent to the entire freight agreed to be paid by the defendant for the goods in question, after deducting therefrom a proportionate part of the expenses of carriage which have been saved by reason of the service not having been rendered,§ and any profit which the ship has made by being otherwise employed.|| If the freighter only partially fulfills his contract, the owner may recover for the deadfreight at his contract-price; but the owner is bound to take other freight, if offered, though at a less price, and can recover only the difference in price.

Law Applicable.-When a contract of affreightment does not otherwise provide, as between the parties to the contract, the law of the country to which the ship belongs must be taken to be the law to which they have submitted themselves.¶

Mode of Stowage.-When the charter-party is silent on the subject of stowage, the usage of trade will obtain, and the owner will not be liable for damages resulting therefrom.

Injunctions.-Where a charter-party has been actually completed, the Court will, by injunction, prevent an employment of the ship inconsistent with the terms o the charter-party; but where there is only an agreement for a charter-party, no such injunction will be granted.**

* Addison on Contracts, 7th edition, 718.

Brown v. Johnson, 10 M. & W. 331.

Commercial Steam Ship Co. v. Boulton, L. R., 10 Q. B. 346; 44 L. J., Q. B., 219. § DeAngelis & Co. v. Mayappa Chetty, I. L. R., 5 Cal. 578.

Smith v. Maguire, 3 H. & N. 554; 27 L. J., Ex., 465; Morris v. Levison, 1 C. P, D. 155-58; 45 L. J., C. P., 409.

Lloyd v. Guibert, L. R., 1 Q. B., 115.

** Haji Abdul v. Haji Abdul Bacha, I. L. R., 6 Bom. 5.

When a vessel is chartered to proceed to a safe port, or so near thereunto as she may safely get, and deliver the same always afloat, the master is not bound to sign bills of lading for, or to sail to, a port where the vessel cannot, by reason of her draught of water, lie and discharge, "always afloat," without being lightened, even if the cost of the requisite lightening would, by the charter-party, fall on the charterers.*

Form No. 167.

CHARTERER AGAINST OWNER FOR DEVIATION FROM CONTRACT AND ABANDONMENT OF VOYAGE.

Plaintiff states:

1. That on the

day of

18 at

the plaintiff and defendant agreed by charter-party that the defendant's ship, called the

then at

should sail to

or so near there as she could safely get, with all convenient speed, and there load a full cargo of , or other lawful merchandise from the agepts of the and there deliver the same on

plaintiff, and carry the same to

payment of freight.

2. That the plaintiff duly performed all the conditions of the contract on his part.

speed, sail to or so near thereto as she could safely get; but that the defendant caused the said ship to deviate from her said voyage, and abandon the same,

Measure of Damages.—Where the charterer has procured suitable conveyance for the cargo upon terms as advantageous as those on which he had chartered the ship, he is entitled to recover compensation for the trouble and expense to which he has been put in procuring such other conveyance.†

Where the contract is for the hire of a ship for a specified time from a specified date, and freights being higher than the contract-price the owner breaks his contract, the charterer is entitled to compensation equal to the difference between the contract price and the price for which he could hire a similar ship for the same time from the same date.t

Graham & Co. v. Mervanji, I. L. R., 5 Bom. 539.

+ See ill. b, Contract Act, 1872, s. 73.

Soe ill. g, Contract Act, 1872, s. 73.

and defendant agreed by charter-party that the plaintiff's ship called should, with all convenient speed, sail to

, and that the

and there

defendant should there load her with a full cargo of
lawful merchandise, to be carried to
payment by the defendant to the plaintiff of freight at
per ton.

delivered on

Rs,

aforesaid, and

; and the

2. That the said ship accordingly sailed to was there loaded by the defendant with a full cargo of plaintiff carried the said cargo in said ship to there delivered the same to the defendant, and otherwise performed all the conditions of said contract on his part.

aforesaid, and

3. That said freight amounted in the whole to the sum of Rs.

4. That defendant has not paid the same,

Who may Sue for Freight.-Either the master or the owner may sue for freight.

Who are Liable for Freight.-In ordinary cases, where the cargo is deli-verable to the charterer or his assigns, he or they paying freight as per charter-party, the liability of the indorsee of a bill of lading, or consignee, arises, not from the original contract of affreightment, but from a new contract, the consideration for which is the delivery of the goods; and if the bill of lading refers to the charter-party, he is liable as the charterer would have been.† By Act IX. of 1856 the indorsee of a bill of lading, to whom the property in the goods therein mentioned shall pass, shall be subject to the same liabilities in respect of such goods as if the contract contained in the bill of lading had been made with himself.

*Shields v. Davis, 6 Taunt 65.

+ Lee's Shipping and Insurance, 9th edition, 322-25.

CHAPTER IV.

ON CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT.

Plaintiff states:

Form No. 169.

WRONGFUL DISMISSAL.

day of

18 at

the plaintiff

1. That on the and defendant mutually agreed that the plaintiff should serve the defendant as an (accountant), and that the defendant should employ the plaintiff as such, for the term of (one year, or as the case may be), and pay him for his services Rs.

2. That on the day of

monthly (or as the case may be). 18, the plaintiff entered upon

the service of the defendant as aforesaid, and has ever since been, and still is, ready and willing to continue in such service during the remainder of the said year, whereof the defendant always had notice. 3. That on the day of 18, the defendant wrongfully discharged the plaintiff, and refused to permit him; to serve as aforesaid, or to pay him for his services.

Indefinite Term is a Hiring for a Year.-A contract of employment for an indefinite time is generally, though not always, considered a hiring for a year.

Measure of Damages.-The measure of damages is not the entire contract price, but a just recompense for the actual injury which the party has sustained; the employé is bound to seek for other employment, and any wages which have been, or might have been, gained by such employment, must be deducted from the sum to which he is entitled as compensation.†

Form No. 170.

THE SAME--WHERE THE EMPLOYMENT NEVER TOOK EFFECT.

offered to enter upon the service of the defendant, and has ever since been ready and willing so to do.

Beeston v. Collyer, 4 Bing. 303; Fawcett v. Cash, 5 B & Ad. 904; Baxter v. Nurse, 6 M. & G. 935; Fairman v. Oakford, 5 H. & N. 635; 29 L. J., Ex., 459; Creen v. Wright, 1 C. P. D. 591-94.

+ Hochster v. DeLaTour, 22 L. J., Q. B., 458; and see explanation to section 73, Con. tract Act, 1872.

3. That the defendant refused to permit the plaintiff to enter upon such service, or to pay him for his services, to the damage of the plaintiff Rs.

When Right to Sue Commences.-Where the plaintiff had agreed to act as servant to the defendant from an appointed future day, and before that day the defendant refused to employ him, it was held that the plaintiff, immediately upon the refusal, was entitled to consider the contract as at an end.*

and that the

and defendant mutually agreed that the plaintiff should employ the defendant at a monthly compensation of Rs. defendant should serve the plaintiff as (an artist) for the term of (one year).

2. That the plaintiff has always been ready and willing to per

form his part of the said agreement (and on the

day of

3. That the defendant refused to serve the plaintiff as aforesaid (or that the defendant entered upon the service of the plaintiff on the above mentioned day, but afterwards on the

day of

18

he refused to serve the plaintiff as aforesaid) to the plaintiff's damage Rs.

Form No. 172.

BY THE MASTER AGAINST THE FATHER OR GUARDIAN OF AN

entered into an agreement, under his hand and seal, a copy of which is hereto annexed (or state the tenor of the contract).

2. That after the making of the said agreement the plaintiff received the said (apprentice) into his service as such apprentice for the

* Hochster v. DeLaTour, 22 L. J., Q. B., 458; and see section 39, Contract Act, 1872.