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HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE.

come, but which, having continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those Divine attributes which the believers in a loving God always ascribe to him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood

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drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, 'The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.'

"With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive to finish the work we are in, to bind up the Nation's wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and a lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations."

XXXI.

HOOD'S TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN.

he seemed to be acting."

Thomas had probably quite as many men under his command as Hood led across the Tennesseecounting all between Knoxville and Memphis, he may have had more. But they were mainly fragments of brigades and regiments, dispersed over a wide region, holding posts which could not well be evacuated, guarding large dépôts of supplies, and watching railroad bridges and trestles which Rebel guerrillas and 'bushwhackers' were lurking to burn, while their loss might involve that of war-wasted Tennessee itself. Nearly everything consumed by our armies in their quarters was now brought by rail from the banks of the Ohio.

GEN. THOMAS had been detached | have changed the orders under which by Gen. Sherman from his main army in Georgia, and sent back to assume chief command in Tennessee, in doubt as to what were Hood's real intentions. It was obvious enough that his eccentric movement to the north and north-west was intended to compel a corresponding movement on our part, and thus deprive us of all the fruits of Sherman's Atlanta campaign; but suppose we refused to be thus tolled out of Georgia, and across the Tennessee, what then? Sherman could not determine; so he gave Thomas the widest discretion. If Hood should push boldly into the heart of Tennessee, he was to be resisted, beaten, and driven out; if he should turn upon Sherman, he was to be followed circumspectly but closely.

Grant, in his camp before Richmond, could hardly realize that Hood was moving on Nashville, "which seemed to me," says he in his report, "to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I the power to command both armies, I should not

Forrest, with a large body of light cavalry, preluded Hood's advance. Crossing the Tennessee near Waterloo, he suddenly presented' himself at Athens, Alabama, held by Col. Campbell, 110th U. S. colored, with 600 men. Investing the town, he opened with a 12-pounder battery on 1Sept. 23, 1864.

the fort; sending in two different | 1,500 infantry, was steaming up the

summonses, which were declined; then soliciting and obtaining a personal interview with Campbell; at which the latter "allowed himself to be convinced" that it was useless to hold out, and ingloriously gave up, just 30 minutes prior to the arrival of the 18th Michigan and 102d Ohio to rëenforce him; compelling them also to succumb, after a sharp contest. Forrest now raided north to Pulaski, destroying the railroad and capturing a fortified post by the way; skirmishing heavily all day' at Pulaski; but Gen. Rousseau was here, and had hastily collected such a force that an assault would have been madness; so Forrest drew off eastward and struck the Chattanooga railroad' near Tullahoma and Decherd, doing it some damage; but Rousseau had moved rapidly around by rail through Nashville, and again confronted him at Tullahoma; while Gen. Steedman, leading 5,000 men, crossed the Tennessee from northern Georgia, and advanced upon him from the south-west; Morgan's division of the 14th corps moving simultaneously from Atlanta to cooperate in enveloping and crushing him.

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Tennessee to join in the hunt; and Lt.-Com'r Forrest, with several gunboats, was patroling that river in Alabama, on the lookout for his reappearance hurrying southward.

Buford tried to carry Athens, Ala.; which was firmly held by Lt.Col. Slade, 73d Indiana, who repulsed him handsomely; when he drew off westward and escaped' over the Tennessee at Brown's ferry.

Forrest had now enemies enough encircling him to have eaten all his horses; but, destroying five miles of the railroad, and paroling his prisoners, he sped south-west through Mount Pleasant and Lawrenceburg, and got safely across the Tennessee at Bainbridge; having inflicted much injury, kept busy many times his number of men, worn out a good many of our shoes, taken at least 1,000 prisoners, and escaped with very little loss.

Hood, who had meantime been operating, and continued for a fortnight longer to operate, on Sherman's line of communications nearly up to Chattanooga, and had thence moved westward, as we have seen, into northern Alabama, next demonstrated in considerable force against Decatur-being the point at which the railroads cross the Tennessee which tend eastward to Chattanooga, westward to Memphis, and northward to Nashville. He found here Gen. Gordon Granger, with a considerable force, which he pressed for several days; establishing a line of rifle-pits within 500 yards of the defenses; intrenching strongly, and threatening an assault; but using no guns, and being roughly handled in Sept. 29. Oct. 5. Oct. 2-3. Oct. 3. *Oct. 26.

All in vain. Forrest turned on his track, and pushed south-east to Fayetteville; there dividing his forces and sending Buford, with 4,000 men, to summon Huntsville, and then Athens, Ala.; while he, with 3,000, swept north-west to Columbia; threatening that place, but not assaulting it; for by this time Rousseau, with 4,000 mounted men, was coming after him from Nashville; while Gen. C. C. Washburne, with 3,000 cavalry and Gen. Thomas's official report. 'Sept. 27.

4

T

FORREST ASSAILS JOHNSONVILLE,

TENN.

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a sortie,' wherein a part of the garri- | below-was about to follow his vanson gained the rear of the rifle-pits guard across the Tennessee--Gen. on his left; clearing them and taking Thomas directed a concentration of 120 prisoners. On that day, one of the 4th and 23d corps on Pulaski, the batteries on his right was carried with intent to impede rather than and spiked by Col. Morgan's 14th seriously dispute the Rebel advance U. S. colored, with some loss; and on Nashville. Hood's infantry, ache drew off westward next evening. cording to our best advices, now The pressure on Decatur was a exceeded 40,000; his cavalry were feint to cover his crossing farther 12,000, well equipped, in high spirits, west; which was soon effected near under their boldest and most skillful Florence, in spite of resistance by leader; so that, including artillery, Gen. Croxton's brigade of cavalry, the entire Rebel force, well concenthere picketing the river. Mean- trated, was not far from 55,000 men. time, Forrest, moving eastward from Many of these were Tennesseans Corinth, Miss., through Paris, Tenn., and Kentuckians, long exiled, who with 17 regiments of cavalry and 9 had come home to stay, alive or dead. guns, had struck the Tennessee at To oppose these, Thomas had in Johnsonville, an important dépôt hand the 4th corps, Gen. Stanley, connected by railroad with Nashville, 12,000; the 23d, Gen. Schofield, and a chief reliance of that city for 10,000; and 8,000 cavalry, under supplies; defended by Col. C. R. Hatcher, Croxton, and Capron—in all Thompson, 12th U. S. colored, with 30,000 men. He may have had as 1,000 men, aided by Lt. E. M. King many more, scattered over the wide with three gunboats; and several region under his command; but, to days' " sharp fighting ensued; the concentrate these, he must abandon enemy ultimately drawing off, upon such posts as Chattanooga, Stevenson, the approach by rail of Gen. Scho- Huntsville, Decatur, Athens, &c., and field with his 23d corps from Nash-in effect relinquish more to the eneville; but not till-our mariners my than they could hope to win by `having been worsted in a fight with a victory. He knew that time was Forrest's cavalry-our commanders on his side-that, if he fell back to had fired their gunboats and trans- Nashville, showing a firm front that ports, lest they should fall into the would compel Hood to keep his enemy's hands; and the flames had army together, our strength would extended to the stores on the levee be constantly augmenting, while the and the commissary's and quarter- enemy must be steadily weakened. master's dépôts, involving a loss of There was a more brilliant alterna$1,500,000 worth of provisions, &c., tive, but he chose to be safe. just when they could worst be spared. Gen. Thomas reports this destruction needless and unjustifiable.

It being no longer doubtful that Hood-who had been rëenforced by part of Dick Taylor's army from

Oct. 28.

While Sherman remained near Kingston, Ga., menacing his flank and rear, Hood seemed to linger on the Tennessee; possibly deeming the odds against him too great; perhaps not yet fully provided and equipped

10 Oct. 28-Nov. 5.

for his great venture. At length, a | Stanley to follow his trains to Spring dispatch from Sherman" apprised Hill; where he arrived just in time to Thomas that the former had cut save them from Forrest's cavalry, loose from his base and started south- which was close upon them, but ward from Atlanta on his Great which he drove off; being assailed, March; and no sooner had the tid- soon afterward, by a much stronger ings reached Hood, still at Florence, force, including infantry, with which Ala., where he had a pontoon bridge, he fought till dark; barely holding with part of his force on either side the road whereby Schofield must of the river, than the crossing of his make good his retreat. remaining corps commenced;" while his van, already over, moved through Waynesboro' and Lawrenceburg on Nashville."

Hood's army was organized in three corps, under Maj.-Gen. B. F. Cheatham, Lt.-Gens. A. P. Stewart and S. D. Lee, beside his strong cavalry corps under Forrest. Each corps was composed of three divisions: Maj.-Gens. Cleburne, Loring, Bate, E. Johnson, and Buford, being the best known of their commanders. Thomas had but five divisions of infantry at the front; but he had collected several more before the struggle was brought to a final issue.

Gen. Schofield, at Pulaski, now fell back, by order, on Columbia; where his corps was concentrated," as was most of Stanley's; while Gen. Granger withdrew the garrisons from Athens (Ala.), Decatur, and Huntsville, retiring on Stevenson.

The

force left at Johnsonville now evacuated that post, withdrawing to Clarksville.

Schofield, with Ruger's division, had been kept awake all day by the enemy's efforts to cross Duck river at Columbia; repulsing, with heavy loss to them, their repeated attempts to do so. When night fell, he resumed his movement; brushing aside the Rebel cavalry who infested the road, and finding at Spring Hill the enemy bivouacking within half a mile of his line of retreat. He did not choose to have any difficulty with them just then; but pushed on with his entire command; and, after fighting all day and marching 25 miles during the following night, he got into position at FRANKLIN early on the 30th. His cavalry moving on the Lewisburg pike, several miles eastward, had encountered no enemy. Time being absolutely required to save our trains, which choked the road for many miles, Schofield halted on the southern verge of the village, threw up a slight breast work, and proposed to stop, while his train should be got over the Harpeth and fairly on its way to Nashville.

When the enemy appeared before Columbia, declining to assault, but evincing a purpose to cross Duck Franklin is situated in a bend of river above or below, Gen. Schofield the Harpeth, which here rudely dewithdrew across that stream; and scribes the north and east sides of a on learning that the Rebels had cross-square, which was completed by our ed six miles above, directed Gen. lines of defense.

15

"Dated Cartersville, Ga., Nov. 12.

12 Nov. 17.

These were held

advance a week or ten days longer, I would have been ready to meet him at some point south

"Thomas says: "Had the enemy delayed his of Duck river." 14 Nov. 24. 15 Nov. 27-8.

19 Div. 4TRA.C

20

HOOD ATTACKS SCHOFIELD

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DIV 220 A.C.

4.30 PM.

PONTOON BRIDGE

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SCHOFIELD 30 Div. 23 A.C.

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by two divisions of his own and all three of the 4th (Stanley's) corps-the whole reported at 17,000, and certainly not much exceeding that number. As the ground rises from the stream, the position was of little worth, save as its flanks were protected by the river."

Hood's army, arriving later, was not ready for the onset till 4 P. M.; when, at the word of command, the charging lines swept on.

Hood had delayed the attack till all his forces could be brought up; intending to crush in our front at the first onset by the sheer weight of his assault. Stewart's corps was on his right, next the Harpeth; Cheatham's

Gen. Hood, in a personal reminiscence of this conflict, fairly said:

"The works of the enemy were so hastily constructed that, while he had a slight abatis in front of a part of his line, there was none on his extreme right."

Yet, slight as they were, these defenses were of incalculable value. A veteran who fought

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on his left, reaching westward to the angle of our defenses; Lee in reserve behind them; though Johnson's division of Lee's corps was thrown to the left during the engagement; the cavalry was on both flanks; Forrest, with most of it, on the right. "Break those lines," shouted Hood to his men, "and there is nothing more to withstand you this side of the Ohio river!" Many Tennesseeans were now for the first time in weary months within sight of their homes; one General (Carter) fell mortally wounded within a few rods of his own house. Gen. Schofield watched the progress of the battle from Fort Granger, across the Harpeth.

Though Schofield's command numbered nearly if not quite 20,000 men, a good part of it was already across the river, guarding the trains and our left flank, while two divisions held the lines guarding our right; so that all the force directly confronting the Rebel advance hardly numbered 10,000. Of these, two brigades of the 2d (Wagner's) division of the 4th (Stanley's) corps were thrown out in our front, holding some slight works a few hundred yards in advance of our general line; the key of which was Carter's hill, a gentle eminence, across which ran the Columbia pike through Franklin to Nashville. Behind that hill stood the 1st (Opdycke's) brigade of Wood's 2d division in reserve.

The Rebel charge was so imbehind them said, "Such a line at the Chickamauga would have given us a victory." "Tis sad that, after all we have spent on West Point, we should have had to learn this simple lesson at a cost of 200,000 lives and Two Billions of money. The Turks had mastered it when they last defended Silistria against the Russians, years ago.

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