BUTLER SUPERSEDED BY BANKS. 105 speedily filled his camps with crowds | city, there were not a hundred persons in Louisiana outside of our army and fleet who would have dared take the oath, however willing to do so. Toward the end of November, Gen. Butler's spies brought him information from the nearest Rebel camps that he had been superseded in his command, and that Gen. N. P. Banks either was or soon would be on his way to relieve him. Some days before information of the purposed change reached our side, Secessionists in New Orleans were offering to bet a hundred to ten that Gen. Butler would be recalled before New Year's. The fact was known to Jefferson Davis before it was to Gen. Banks-long before it was communicated from Washington to Gen. Butler. It is probable that the French Minister, whose Government had not been pleased with Gen. Butler's management in New Orleans, was the immediate source of Rebel assurance on this point. Gen. Banks's assignment to the Department of the Gulf is dated November 9th, but was not made known to him till some weeks afterward. of men, women, and children, destitute of food, and fearing to go outside of his lines lest they should be reduced again to Slavery. Gen. Butler, after anxious consideration, felt obliged to subject the whole district to sequestration, in order to secure the cutting and grinding of the cane, so as to save the remaining inhabitants from death by famine. Maj. Bell, Lt.-Col. Kinsman, and Capt. Fuller, were appointed a commission, who were to take charge of all personal property, and either apply it to the use of the army or transport it to New Orleans and therẻ sell it to the highest bidders, dispensing to loyal citizens and neutral foreigners their just share of the proceeds, and applying the residue to the uses of the Federal service in this military department. Thus were the negroes employed, paid, and subsisted, the crops saved, and a large sum turned over to the support of our armies, while the number of White loyalists in Lafourche was rapidly and largely increased. Two Congressional districts having thus been recovered, Messrs. Benjamin F. Flanders and Gen. Banks reached New Orleans Michael Hahn were elected" there- Dec. 14th, was received with every from to the Federal House of Repre- honor, and on the 16th formally assentatives: the former receiving 2,370 sumed the high trust to which he votes, to 173 for others, and the lat- had been appointed. On the 23d, ter 2,581, which was 144 more than Gen. Butler took personal leave of were cast against him. The voting his many friends, and next day issued was confined to electors under the his farewell address to the people of laws of Louisiana who had taken New Orleans; leaving for New York, the Federal oath of allegiance since via Havana, by that day's boat. He the repossession of New Orleans; was not then aware that he had been and the aggregate poll in that city honored, the day previous, by a prooutnumbered, it was stated, its total clamation from Jefferson Davis, devote for Secession by about 1,000. claring him a felon, outlaw, and When Gen. Butler first reached that common enemy of mankind, and Early in December. directing any Confederate officer who | which he had faithfully applied to should capture him to hang him without trial immediately; and further directing that all commissioned officers in his command be regarded as robbers and criminals, deserving death; and each of them, whenever captured, reserved for execution." Mr. Richard Yeadon, of Charleston, S. C., backed this proclamation by an offer" of $10,000 reward, payable in Confederate currency, for the capture and delivery of the said Benjamin F. Butler, dead or alive, to any proper Confederate authority. the public service. He had, of course, made himself very unpopular with the wealthy Rebels, whom he had, in proportion to their several volunteer contributions of money in aid of the Rebel cause, assessed for the support of the New Orleans poor, deprived of employment by the war; and he was especially detested by that large body of influential foreigners who, having freely devoted their efforts and their means to the support of the Rebellion, were neither regarded nor treated by him as though they had been honestly neutral in the contest. In his farewell address to the people of New Orleans, he forcibly says: "I saw that this Rebellion was a war of of the rich against the poor; a war of the the aristocrats against the middling men— land-owner against the laborer; that it was a struggle for the retention of power in the found no conclusion to it, save in the subhands of the few against the many; and I Gen. Butler had taken 13,700 soldiers from the North for the capture of New Orleans. He had received no rëenforcements since; and he now turned over to his successor 17,800 drilled and disciplined men, including three regiments and two batteries He sent home to the of negroes. treasury the sum of $345,000; ex-jugation of the few and the disenthrallment pended $525,000 in feeding the poor of New Orleans; and turned over about $200,000 to the Commissary and Quartermaster of his successor. He had collected, by taxation, assessings of the humble and loyal, under the roof ments, fines, forfeitures, and confiscations, an aggregate of $1,088,000, tion in taking the substance of the wealthy, of the many. I, therefore, felt no hesitawho had caused the war, to feed the innocent poor, who had suffered by the war. And I shall now leave you with the proud consciousness that I carry with me the bless of the cottage and in the cabin of the slave; and so am quite content to incur the sneers of the salon or the curses of the rich." "Mr. Davis's proclamation recites the hang- ders, and not as free agents; that they, thereing of Mumford; the neglect of our Government fore, be treated, when captured as prisoners of to explain or disavow that act; the imprison- war, with kindness and humanity, and be sent ment of non-combatants; Butler's woman order home on the usual parole that they will in no manner aid or serve the United States in any caaforesaid; his sequestration of estates in west-pacity during the continuance of this war, unless ern Louisiana; and the inciting to insurrection and arming of slaves on our side, as his justifications for proclaiming "First. That all commissioned officers in the command of said Benjamin F. Butler be declared not entitled to be considered as soldiers engaged in honorable warfare, but as robbers and criminals, deserving death; and that they and each of them be, whenever captured, reserved for execution. "Second. That the private soldiers and noncommissioned officers in the army of said Butler be considered as only the instruments used for the commission of crimes perpetrated by his or duly exchanged. "Third. That all negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered over to the executive authorities of the respective States to which they belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of said States. "Fourth. That the like orders be executed in all cases with respect to all commissioned officers of the United States, when found serving in company with said slaves in insurrection against the authorities of the different States of this Confederacy. [Signed and sealed at Richmond, Dec. 23, 1862.] "JEFFERSON DAVIS." 42 Jan. 1, 1863. MOCLELLAN IN WASHINGTON. 107 VI. VIRGINIA-MCCLELLAN'S ADVANCE. parently fatigued by the necessity of framing excuse after excuse for its inaction,' though the most of it re THE rooted inaction of the Army | immediate and especial command of of the Potomac,' with the Baltimore this grand army of 200,000 men, apand Ohio Railroad obstructed and broken up on its right, and the navigation of the Potomac precluded' by Rebel batteries on its left, was stub-mained under tents, exposed to the bornly maintained; in spite of fitful, delusive promises of movement, throughout the Winter of 1861-2. Gen. McClellan, who, from his comfortable house in Washington, issued orders to all the military forces of our country, retained likewise the See Vol. I., p. 627-9. Capt. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, as early as July 1st, 1861, notified the War Department that the Potomac would "soon be closed by the batteries of the Rebels; " and Secretary Welles reiterated the warning on the 20th of August. "In October, 1861, the Navy Department again urged the matter upon the consideration of the War Department. *** representing that the question was simply: Would the Army cooperate with the Navy in securing the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac, or, by withholding that cooperation at that time, permit so important a channel of communication to be closed ?" vicissitudes of a Winter whichthough it had been remarkably dry and fine, with the roads in admirable condition, until Christmas-became stormy and inhospitable soon afterward; so that the since famous Stonewall Jackson, who, for eminent ser (The foregoing note is condensed from the first Report of the Joint Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War.) 'Gen. John G. Barnard, Chief of Engineers to the Army of the Potomac, in a report to Gen. McClellan at the close of the Peninsula campaign, says: "One of the prominent among the causes of ultimate failure was the inaction of eight months, from August, 1861, to April, 1862. More than any other wars, Rebellion demands rapid measures. In November, 1861, the Army of the Potomac, if not fully supplied with all the 'materiel,' was yet about as complete in numbers, discipline, and organization as it ever became. For four months, the great marine avenue to the capital of the nation was blockaded, and that capital kept in a partial state of siege, by a greatly inferior enemy, in face of a movable army of 150,000 men. "In the Winter of 1861 and 1862, Norfolk could and should have been taken. The navy demanded it, the country demanded it, and the means were ample. By its capture, the career of the Merrimac, which proved so disastrous to our subsequent operations, would have been prevented. The preparation of this vessel was McClellan at last agreed to spare 4,000 men for the cooperative measure; but, when Capt. Craven assembled his flotilla at the appointed time and place, the troops were not on hand. The General's excuse was that his engineers were of the opinion that so large a body of troops could not be landed at Matthias Pointthe place agreed upon. Upon Capt. Fox's assurance that the Navy Department would attend to the landing of the troops, he (McClellan) agreed that they should be sent on the follow-known, and the Navy Department was not withing night. Again the flotilla was in readiness; again the troops were missing. No troops were "Though delay might mature more comprehensive plans and promise greater results, it is then, nor ever, sent down for that purpose; not the first case in which it has been shown only reason elicited from McClellan being that that successful war involves something more he feared it might bring on a general engage- than abstract military principles. The true poliment. Capt. Craven indignantly threw up his cy was to seize the first practicable moment to command on the Potomac, and applied to be satisfy the perhaps unreasonable but natural sent to sea-not wishing to lose his own reputa-fy its lavish confidence, and to take advantage longing of an impatient nation for results to justition, on account of non-cooperation on the part of an undivided command and untrammeled of the army. liberty of action while they were possessed." the out forebodings of the mischief it would do. main army; for he could fall back upon other positions, and fight us again and again, should the condition of his troops permit. If he is in no condition to fight us again out of the range of the intrenchments at Richmond, we would find it a very difficult and tedious matter to follow him up there; for he would destroy his railroad bridges and otherwise impede our progress, through a region where the roads are as bad as they well can be; and we would probably find ourselves forced at last to change the whole theater of war, or to seek a shorter land route to Richmond, with a smaller available force, and at an expenditure of much more time than were we to adopt the short line at once. We would also have forced the enemy to concentrate his forces and perfect his defensive measures, at the very points where it is desirable to strike him when least prepared." On the other hand, Gen. McClellan urged in favor of an advance by the route he preferred, that— "It affords the shortest possible landroute to Richmond, and strikes directly at the heart of the enemy's power in the East. "The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the year. "The country now alluded to is much more favorable for offensive operations than that in front of Washington (which is very unfavorable), much more level, more cleared land, the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, and the Spring some two or three weeks earlier. A movement in force on that line obliges the enemy to abandon his intrenched position at Manassas, in order to hasten to cover Richmond and Norfolk. He must do this; for, should he permit us to occupy Richmond, his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle, in which he must be the assailant. This movement, if successful, gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the Rebels; Norfolk would fall; all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours; all Virginia would be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Carolina. The alternative presented to the enemy would be, to beat us in a position selected by ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath the Caudine Forks. "Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fortress Monroe, with our flanks perfectly covered by the fleet. "During the whole movement, our left flank is covered by the water. Our right is secure, for the reason that the enemy is too distant to reach us in time; he can only oppose us in front; we bring our fleet into full play." He further urged, in favor of a landing at Urbana, that— "This point is easily reached by vessels of heavy draught; it is neither occupied nor observed by the enemy; it is but one march from West Point, the key of that region, and thence but two marches to Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana would probably cut off Magruder in the Peninsula, and enable us to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly reenforced. Should we fail in that, we could, with the cooperation of the navy, cross the James and show ourselves in rear of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy to come out and attack us; for his position would be untenable with us on the southern bank of the river. Should circumstances render it not advisable to land at Urbana, we can use Mob Jack Bay; or, the worst coming to the worst, we can take Fortress Monroe as a base, and operate with complete security-although with less celerity and brilliancy of results-up the Peninsula." The President deferred to these urgent representations, though they involved the necessity of a long delay and a heavy expense in procuring transportation by water for so great an army. The duty of obtaining the requisite vessels was devolved on John Tucker, Assistant-Secretary of War; who, on the 5th of April, reported that he had chartered therefor 113 steamers, 188 schooners, and 88 barges, and that these had-within 37 days from the time he first received the order, and most of it within 30 days-transported from Perryville, Alexandria, and Washington, to Fortress Monroe, 121,500 men, 14,592 animals, 1,150 wagons, 44 batteries, and 74 ambulances, beside pontoon-bridges, telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, &c., required for such an army; with a total loss of 9 barges and 8 mules: the former having been driven ashore in a gale when within a few miles of Fortress Monroe. He |