war,

by the loss of that of France. By France taking part in the he knew that he should encounter some difficulties, but at the same time he hoped greater advantages at the conclusion of a peace. Besides, he imagined that Russia would perform her treaties with England; and in her, from a suspected foe, he hoped a powerful friend. Such considerations made it both his interest and inclination to cultivate the friendship of the English; a league which, though it did not happen to turn out entirely to his advantage, will probably, in the end, be more beneficial to him than any other he could have contracted.

The king of Prussia has great forces, large revenues, a genius capable of conducting both, and a moderation that will restrain him from attempts superior to these. He knows perfectly well, that the grandeur of the sovereign must be established upon the welfare of the subject; and this has excited him to show the same regard for the happiness of his people as for the extension of his own power, or rather has induced him to make the latter always subservient to the former. Without a constant resource, he knows his power must be transitory; and this he can have by no other method so much as commerce. He has ever been known to have an inclination to become a maritime power, or which is the same thing in other words, to enable his subjects to increase their wealth by their industry, through the channels of foreign trade. What power, therefore, could so much promote his designs of this kind as England ?-a power which cannot fear him for a rival in greatness; which has no inclination to restrain, and has great abilities to protect, her enterprises of that nature. Whenever the struggles of power, which at present raise all Europe to arms, shall be composed, we have very little room to doubt that his majesty of Prussia will turn his whole views to commerce, since the very important and commodious port of Embden lies open to facilitate his schemes.

There he may form such plans as will

reimburse those expenses he has been at in securing his acquisitions, if not to the present generation, at least to posterity.

CHAPTER IV.-OF GERMANY.

Naturally in the course of our design, we proceed to the empire of Germany, which is to be considered in two lights: first, as a country composed of many different states, in their civil government independent one of another, and under sovereigns absolute within themselves: secondly, as these above-mentioned states, forming one great confederacy under a common head, upon which they have a political dependence, though that very supreme power is under control by the constitution of the empire, and the regulations of its own tribunals.

With respect to the first, it is necessary the uninformed reader should be told, that all things relating to the government of the German empire ought to be regulated according to a writing called the Golden Bull. This was prepared by the Emperor Charles IV. in the year 1356, and received the consent of all the states of the empire. It regulates the election of the emperor, his privileges, his vicars, the rights of electors in general, the privilege of each elector in particular, the prerogative of the princes and states, the Diets, and the sentences of the empire. Notwithstanding the strict adherence to this writing in general, these regulations have sometimes been dispensed with; for though it ordains, that the election of an emperor should be made with the consent of all the electors, yet in 1742, the Emperor Charles VII. was chosen without the suffrage of the elector of Bohemia, who was Queen of Hungary, and would never acknowledge him. Likewise the city of Aix is the place where the emperor ought to be crowned; yet the Emperor Joseph was crowned

at Augsburgh in 1690; Charles VI. at Frankfort-on-the-Main, in 1711; as well as Charles his successor, in 1742. By this Bull, the number of electors were fixed to seven; yet this did not hinder the house of Bavaria from obtaining that dignity in 1623, nor the house of Hanover in 1692. The number of electors at present is nine, viz.-1. Mentz, 2. Treves, 3. Cologne, 4. Bohemia, 5. Bavaria, 6. Saxony, 7. Brandenburgh, 8. Palatine, 9. Brunswick Lunenberg; of this number Mentz, Treves, and Cologne, are archbishops. The emperor has no estates in quality of his prerogative, nor any revenue to support his dignity; and therefore they always choose one who has dominions of his own. The throne may become vacant several ways; as by death, resignation, as was done by Charles V., and by deprivation, which happened to the Emperor Wenceslaus. The power of the emperor consists in appointing a meeting of the Diet, and other imperial assemblies, as well as in dissolving them. He has a right to authorize their determinations, and afterwards to put them in execution in his own name. He can confirm alliances and treaties which his predecessors have made for the good of the empire. He can create and confer high secular dignities; such as King, Prince, Archduke, Duke, Marquis, Landgrave, Count, and Baron. He can require an oath of fidelity from all the electors, princes, and other members of the empire. He has the entire disposal of the states and principalities which devolve to the empire by forfeiture or otherwise, and he can institute and confirm universities and academies. All this may be done from his sole authority; but he must have the consent of the electors when he would alienate or mortgage any thing belonging to the empire, or grant the privilege of coining money, or confiscate the goods and estates of rebels. The consent of all the states of the empire is necessary, when he would regulate any thing relating to religion; declare war in or out of the empire, impose subsidies or general

contributions, raise troops, build new fortresses, put garrisons into old ones, make peace and alliances. But if the case is very urgent, the consent of the elector is sufficient; and he can, by his own authority, agree to a truce, or a suspension of arms. He may issue out admonitions, directions, and prohibitions in writing; but these are not binding unless authorized by the Diet, and then they have the force of a law.

When the emperor is elected, he is obliged to certain restrictions of his power, in consequence of a capitulation made with the electors and states of the empire. It is a sort of contract, which he agrees to before he is declared emperor, and which he ratifies after his election. When there is no emperor, or he is absent, the king of the Romans acts in his stead; but if there is no king of the Romans, it devolves to two vicars, the elector of Saxony, and the elector Palatine. The former exercises his prerogative in upper and lower Saxony; as does the latter on the Rhine, Swabia, and Franconia; for these are the places where the ancient laws of the Franks were established.

The empire of Germany, in its present state, is only a part of those states that were once under the dominion of Charlemagne. This prince was possessed of France by right of succession: he had conquered by force of arms all the countries situated between the Baltic Sea and the Danube. He added to his empire the kingdom of Lombardy, the city of Rome and its territory, together with the exarcharte of Ravenna, which were almost the only possessions that remained in the West to the emperors of Constantinople. Those vast estates were at that time called the Empire of the West, being only a part of what the Roman emperors were formerly in possession of. In succeeding times, and particularly after the extinction of the race of Charlemagne, France was separated from the empire, and the Germans elected Otho the Great for their sovereign; who again made the conquest of Rome

and Italy, and reunited them to his dominions. At length, when the bloody disputes between the priesthood and the empire engaged the government from attending to the conduct of its vassals, several petty and almost independent sovereignties were erected under different pretences; and the emperors being unable to repress their usurpations, were at last contented with a very precarious homage, and confirmed by their authority the possessions of the usurpers. Not contented with this, those who had acted thus wrongfully, had influence enough to get their encroachments continued by an hereditary succession. The emperors, at that time, had no other method of balancing the power of these vassals, which was frequently greater than their own, but by granting several lands to the church, and liberty to several cities. Such is the true original of the power of the states which compose the German empire. However, the emperors have often testified inclinations to revive their ancient rights, and have claimed dominion over Italy and Rome. But scarcely any thing now remains of those possessions, but empty titles without any real jurisdiction.

Several authors have found a great difficulty in determining in what class of government that of the German empire ought to be placed. In fact, if we consider it as having at its head a prince, to whom the estates of the empire are obliged to render homage, to swear fidelity and obedience, and to receive from him the investiture of their fiefs, we shall be induced to regard the empire as a monarchical state. But, on the other hand, the emperor can be regarded only as the representative of the empire, since he has not even the power of making laws; in the same manner, he has no possessions annexed to his dignity; he may grant investiture of fiefs, but he can on no pretence recall this grant once made, without the consent of the empire; besides, in speaking of the states, the emperor always calls them the vassals of us and the empire.

If we consider the power and prerogatives of the states, the