TION. INTRODUC- partial and extravagant caprices of his taste, which he has so abundantly displayed in the productions of his own art and labour. As far, however, as he has been able, he has done it most profusely. At one time he crops the tail and ears of his dogs and horses; and, at another, forces them to grow in forms and directions, which Nature never intended: his trees and shrubs are planted in fantastic lines, or shorn into the shapes of animals or implements; and all for the sake of beauty. Happily for the poor animals, it has never appeared possible to shear or twist them into the shapes of plants, or it would, without doubt, have been attempted; and we should have been as much delighted at seeing a stag terminating in a yew tree, as ever we were at seeing a yew tree terminating in a stag. These metamorphoses of plants are not now, indeed, in fashion: but it is merely fashion that has exploded them; and as both fashions have had their respective admirers, not only among the vulgar, but among the most discerning and enlightened of mankind *, it may rea Quid enim illo quincunce speciosius est, qui in quamcunque partem spectaveris, rectus est. Quinctil. lib. viii. c. iii. See also Montesquieu, Fragm. sur le Gout. Addison, Spectator, No. 414; where he states, as a general position, that, sonably be doubted, whether either of them be INTRODUCat all consonant to the real principles of beauty, if 6. The word Beauty is a general term of approbation, of the most vague and extensive meaning, applied indiscriminately to almost every thing that is pleasing, either to the sense, the imagination, or the understanding; whatever the nature of it be, whether a material substance, a moral excellence, or an intellectual theorem. We do not, indeed, so often speak of beautiful smells, or flavours, as of beautiful forms, colours, and sounds; but, nevertheless, we apply the epithet to a problem, a syllogism, or a period, as fami " though there are several wild scenes, that are more delightful than any artificial shows, yet we find the works of Nature still more pleasant, the more they resemble those of art," which he endeavours to account for philosophically. His natural feelings, however, soon rise up against his acquired opinions; and, towards the close of the same paper, he adds, "I do not know whether I am singular in my opinion; but, for my own part, I would rather look upon a tree, in all its luxuriancy and diffusion of boughs and branches, than when it is thus cut and trimmed into a mathematical figure; and cannot but fancy that an orchard in flower looks infinitely more delightful than all the little Jabyrinths of the most finished parterre." This was bold scepticism for so cautious a writer in that age. TION. TION. INTRODUC- liarly, and (as far as we can judge from autho, rity) as correctly as to a rose, a landscape, or a woman. We speak also, and, I believe, with equal propriety, not only of the beauties of symmetry and arrangement, but of those of virtue, charity, holiness, &c. The illustrious author, indeed, of the Inquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful, chooses to consider such expressions as improper, and to confine beauty to the sensible qualities of things *. But, as an ancient grammarian observed, even Cæsar, though he could command the lives and fortunes of men, could not command words, nor alter, in a single instance, the customary idiom of speech; and in this instance customary idiom has established these expressions, not only in the English, but in all the other polished languages of Europe, both ancient and modern; xaños in the Greek, pulcher in the Latin, bello in the Italian, and beau in the French, being constantly applied to moral and intellectual, as well as to physical or material qualities. It is in vain, therefore, for individuals to dispute about their propriety or impropriety; for, after all, the ultimate criterion must be common use Quem penes arbitrium est, et jus, et norma loquendi, * Part III. s. i. and ix. and from which he, who chooses to depart, only INTRODUCmakes his meaning less intelligible. 7. It may be said, perhaps, that the epithet is used in a plain sense, when applied to objects of sensation; and in a figurative one, when applied to objects of intellect: but no such distinction exists in fact; for, when applied to objects of sight or hearing, it is, in most instances, applied to qualities purely intellectual; such as composition, proportion, expression, fitness, &c., which perpetually distinguish the beautiful from the ugly in the same species; though often totally changed when applied to another species, and sometimes, when applied to a different class in the same species; of both which instances. will be given in the sequel. It is true that all epithets, employed to distinguish qualities perceivable only by intellect, were originally applied to objects of sense: for as such objects are the primary subjects of thought and observation, the primary words in all languages belong to them; and are therefore applied transitively, though not always figuratively, to objects of intellect or imagination. That expression only is properly figurative which employs the image or idea of one thing to illustrate another: but when we speak of the beauty of virtue, we mean the pleasing result of well-balanced and duly proportioned TION. TION. INTRODUC affections; and, when we speak of the beauty of the human form, we mean the pleasing result of well-balanced and duly proportioned limbs and features. In both instances the word is equally applied to the results of proportion, without reference to any other image; and though, in the one, the general subject be mental, and in the other corporeal, the particular object, in both, is an abstract idea, and, consequently, purely intellectual; nor is the expression more figurative in the one than in the other. If we speak, indeed, of any individual human form, the idea is not abstract; but then it is complex and of the ideas that compose it, those of colour only are immediately derived from the sense of sight; the others being entirely the results of mental operation, employing the evidence of other senses; as has been abundantly shewn by Locke, Reid, and other metaphysical writers; and as will be further explained in the course of this inquiry. 8. I admit, however, that the word Beauty entirely changes its meaning with every complete or generic change of its application: that is, accordingly as it is applied to objects of the senses, the imagination, or the understanding for, though these faculties are so mixed and compounded in their operations, in the complicated |