"If Spain, deaf to the voice of her own interests, and actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States," the time I would then have come for the United States to consider whether Cuba in the possession of Spain seriously endangered our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union'; that, if this question should be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power'; and that we should be 'recreant to our duty -be unworthy of our gallant forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should we permit Cuba to be Africanized and to become a second St. Domingo.

This doctrime was as boldly repudiated, in the following year, by Secretary Marcy. He said in reply to the report:

"I am entirely opposed to getting up a war for the purpose of seizing Cuba; but if the conduct of Spain should be such as to justify a war, I should not hesitate to meet that state of things. The authorities of Cuba act unwisely, but not so much so as is represented. They are more alarmed than they need to be in regard to dangers from this country, though it cannot be said that the filibuster spirit and movements do not furnish just grounds of apprehension. They have a clear right to take measures for defence, but what those measures may be, it is not easy to define. In exercising their own rights they are bound to respect the rights of other nations. This they have not done in all cases. That they have deliberately intended to commit wrong against the United States I do not believe; but that they have done so I do not deny. The conduct of Spain and the Cuban authorities has been exaggerated and even misrepresented in some of our leading

journals. I am not much surprised at the opinion for war, right or wrong: but I venture to assure you that such is not the policy of the Administration. It does not want war, would avoid it, but would not shrink from it, if it becomes necessary in the defence of our just rights.

"The robber doctrine, I abhor. If carried out it would degrade us in our own estimation and disgrace us in the eyes of the civilized world. Should the Administration commit the fatal folly of acting upon it, it could not hope to be sustained by the country, and would leave a tarnished name to all future times.

"Cuba would be a very desirable possession, if it came to us in the right way, but we cannot afford to get it by robbery or theft. I am for getting the island, if it can be acquired fairly and honestly, not otherwise. I do not believe the robber doctrine when calmly considered will be popular or that a party can sustain itself upon it."

GERMS OF WAR.

Looking at the Cuban question from the standpoint of popular sentiment in Spain, it is an incendiary question which, without the greatest caution on the part or Span ish rulers, is liable to break out into consuming flame. When word reached Spain of the action of the American Congress, that country manifested the most violent indignation. The masses in populous towns rallied to war cries against the United States, and necessitated the use of armed troops to protect the person and property of American representatives and citizens. All orders of citizens, outside of those directly responsible for peace, threw themselves into a war frenzy, and ridiculous threats were made of an immediate invasion and conquest of the United States.

While this blood thirsty indignation was slowly spending itself, the action of the Spanish authorities in Cuba served to kindle indignant fires in the United States. A vessel, called the Competitor, was siezed while engaged in trying to land war munitions for the insurgents. Her crew were summarily tried by court-martial and sentenced to pay the death penalty. The trial was a sheer mockery, in that the accused were denied time for preparation and counsel of their own choosing. Among them was an Americancitizen, who was not a part of the crew, but who was seeking to enter the island as a newspaper correspondent. This action of the authorites was so hasty and in such accord with the charges of cruelty to which they had already thrown themselves open, that word of it incensed our people and spurred our Government to the point of inter

vention.

Fortunately the finding of the court-martial had to be certified to the home government for approval before it could be executed. It was met there by an American protest, whose form was not made public.. That one made twenty-three years before in the celebrated Virginius affair, by Secretary Fish, at the instance of President Grant, read thus:

"In case of refusal of satisfactory reparation within twelve days from this date, you will, at the expiration of that time close your legation, and will, together with your secretary, leave madrid, bringing with you the archives of the legation. You may leave the printed documents constituting the library in charge of the legation of some friendly power which you may select, who will take charge of them."

At any rate it served to call Spain to her senses, and to postpone the approval of what would have been the mur.

der of an American citizen. It transpired, amid discussion of the merits of the case, that condemnation of the men on the charge of piracy and treason, and by so savage a court as a court-martial, was clearly illegal. None of the elements of piracy were found in the case of the Competitor. She was engaged in filibustering, or in a military expedition, which is not piracy. Piracy is a crime committed on the high seas. Its object is plunder by attack upon vessels that come in its way. A pirate is an enemy of the human race. International law so adjudges her. But not so an insurgent vessel, carrying arms to friends, with no intent to depredate in the open seas, and without power to do so.

Nor was the crime treason, for that is the crime of a subject against his sovereign. The crew of the Competitor were not Spanish subjects. One was an American.

In the case of Aaron Burr, charged with treason, against our Government, Justice Marshall held that treason was not proven, although Burr had planned a rebellion, organized men, or was about to, and had actually purchased arms and ammunition as well as a ship for his enterprise. Nor did he sink his ship and destroy the arms until he learned that he was to be arrested on the charge of treason. Of course it would be impossible for an American to commit an act of treason against Spain or any other foreign power.

It further transpired that the American on board the Competitor was wrongly tried by court-martial, it being stipulated by the Cushing Treaty of 1821 between Spain and the United States that "No citizen of the United States in Spain, her adjacent islands, or her ultramarine possessions, charged with acts of sedition, treason or conspiracy against the institutions, the public security, the integrity of the

territory, or against the Supreme Government, or any other crime whatsoever, shall be subject to trial by exceptional tribunal, but exclusively by the ordinary jurisdiction, except in the case of being captured with arms in hand."

Now, the purpose of treaties is to define clearly and definitely matters between certain nations. Treaties outrank international law. The latter is strictly a general agreement on general matters between the principal mations of the world. A treaty, however, is made that the understanding between the parties to it may be explicit. Therefore, in the case of the Cushing Treaty there is but one construction to be placed upon the phrase, "captured with arms in hand." The prisoners must have been in actual possession of arms-have had arms in their hands --to come under the provision of the treaty, which permits them to be tried by court-martial.

The third section of the treaty says that "those who may be taken with arms in hand," and who are therefore comprehended in the exception of the first article, shall be tried by ordinary council of war in conformity with the second article of the herein before mentioned law; but even in this case the accused should enjoy for their defense the guarantees in the aforesaid law of April 17, 1821.

Pending the solution of this delicate case of the Competitor, a solution which involved the higher question of peace or war between the two anxious and excited countries, the Cuban problem worked its way largely into the politics of the national campaign of 1896. It brought the Congress nearly to the verge of passing a joint resolution in favor of belligerency, in order to compel President Cleveland to show where he stood by signing or vetoing it. Many State Conventions of both parties passed resolutions of sympathy with the struggling Cubans, and as