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actual figures the effects of reciprocity on the commerce of the nations interested. Yet very soon figures were obtainable showing an increase of exports to and imports from such countries. Brazil accepted the policy of reciprocity, April 1, 1891. In nine months her imports to the United States showed a total of $79,183,238, as against a total of $52,861,398 for the corresponding nine months of 1890. The exports from this country showed SI 1,555,447 as against $10,081,871, in the months above mentioned.

The reciprocity treaty with Spain which took effect September 1, 1891, was followed in four months by an importation of $14,950,868, as against $11,782,023, for the corresponding four mouths of 1890. In the same four months the exports were $7,063,222, as against $4-816,029, in the corresponding months of 1890.

These indications continued to be supported by statistics, and in cumulative form, till the principle of reciprocity was swept out of our economic system by the passage of the Wilson Tariff Bill of 1894. " That act rendered nugatory all the reciprocity treaties with other nations, and instead of what was known as reciprocal relations, came a system of retaliations, especially on the part o( Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Spain which worked great injury to the agricultuial interests of this country. They excluded our flour, meats, live animals and agricultural implements to an extent that amounted almost to prohibition, so that what bade fair under reciprocity, to become an even balance of trade wan turned into the old channels against us. Thus in 189."), the Republics to the south of us sold us products, admitted practically free of duty, to the extent of $246,000,000 while in the same year we only exported to them goods to the value of $143,000,000, every ounce of which was taxed from five to one hundred per cent, on its value in their custom houses. The balance of trade against us, #103,000,000, was paid for in gold.

The gain from the incorporation of reciprocity into our economy under the tariff act of 1890 was sufficiently manifest to furnish the basis of intelligent argument, when it was swept away by the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894 It is sad to contemplate that a doctrine which promised so much should have beei? so summarily expelled. And the regret over its expulsion is all the deeper from the fact that those who ejected it charged its advocates with taking a step toward free trade, the very doctrine they themselves sought to apply as fully as they could in the Wilson Tariff Bill of 1894.

Aside from party ism and all narrow theory the doctrine of reciprocity is one which deserves the broadest study and, as this country is situated, the fairest of trials. It is a policy really far removed from mere parties and politics, and is a matter of truly national and international import, all of whose features are economic and commercial.

It was thought that its incorporation into our commercial polity was a declaration on the part of the United States that it had reached a place among commercial nations where it was no longer a law into itself, but that in order to compete with the older nations in the markets of the world, it would have to strive as they were doing for legitimate supremacy. Happily for our civilization, the incorporation of reciprocity into our statutes proposed only a peaceful solution of social and economic problems and an amicable assertion of our industrial supremacy and independence.

What Europk Saw And Did. One must contrast this American purpose with that of the nations of Europe, who would not willingly lose their trade with the Republics to the south of us, but would maintain it with every art known to their diplomacy, all the ingenuity and force born of superiority, all the finesse bred by ages of shrewdness and self assertion. England, especially seems to have been deeply impressed with .the magnitude of the new commercial departure on the iiart of the United States, and with her usual astute-, ness earliest foresaw its effects on her markets in Central and South America Countries. Her press became bitter in its denunciations of the new policy, and when the difficulty with Chile arose, the same press made it all too plain that there was concerted effort tin the part of English diplomats to crush out intercourse, commercial and social, with our continental neighbor. The United States could not have gone to war with Chile, except by fightii g England either openly, or under cover of deeply disguised diplomacy. The English idea of reciprocity being that it involves the principle of lex talionie, or law of revenge, "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," it would have been easy for her to find arguments or excuses for frustrating all our efforts toward more intimate trade relations with all South American Countries. Our imbroglio with Chile made the fact almost patent that foreign nations stood ready to challenge our right to entrench on their commercial domains by means of reciprocity, and their anxiety and attitude showed that they were more fully aware of the effects of reciprocity on their trade in these countries than even our wisest statesmen and shrewdest merchants had been. This attitude of foreign nations

was the greatest compliment that could have been paid to reciprocity as an economic principle and commercial force.

England, Fiance, Germany and Italy had fur generations been engaged in a neck and neck race for the markets of Mexico, Central America and South America. They had used every art of diplomacy and all the genius of commerce to head off rivalry and establish supremacy. They manufactured and priced and labelled with specific intent to occupy these markets. The}' established lines of steamers, whose gunge and velocity were best adapted for intercourse. They subsidized ocean transit to secure dispatch. They loaned credit on most dangerous securities. They sent drummers, agents and other interested parties to prospect, represent and persuade. They formed huge syndicates which took possession of immense inland interests, like the Peruvian nitre beds, and worked them with untold profit. The result was that they came to own and control the markets of South America. The productions of these countries, destined for the United States, came to us in the ships of Europe, and by way of European ports, where they paid the rich bounty of ocean freight and the inevitable commissions for handling, that the European merchant has ever been privileged to suck from the world's goods in transit. Two or three steamers a month sufficed to carry to South American countries all the}' cared to take from us in the shape of our products. The bulk of what they sold to us—many times over and over again in value what we sold to them—was paid for in gold, through European houses, with another commission for negotiation.

Europe saw that every bill of goods we could place to our credit in a South American port would be deducted from her account. Hence her nervousness, her hostility Hon. James Z. tlKoiioE.


Born in Monroe co., Ga., Oclober 20, 1826; moved to Mississippi when young; participated in Mexican war; studied law and admitted to practice in Carroll co.; elected Reporter of Appellate Court, 1854 and 1860; reported ten volumes of reports and published a digest of decisions; member of Secession Convention, 1861; Brigadier-General in Confederate army; Chairman of Democratic State Executive Committee, 1875-76; appointed a Judge of State Supreme Court, 1879; elected Chief-Justice; elected to United States Senate, 1881; re-elected 1886 and 1892; member ef the Mississippi Constitutional Convention, 1890; member of Committees on Agriculture, Education and Labor, Judiciary, Transportation, etc.

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