confift. Compound Substances are made up of Compound. two or more fimple ones, and fuch are all that are perceptible by our Senfes in the material World. AGAIN; Substances are faid to be (1.) Pure, Pure. when they confift of only one Sort of Substance; as a Guinea is pure Gold, if it has nothing but Gold and no Alloy of other Metal in it. (2.) Mix'd; Mix'd. fuch as confift of two or more heterogeneous Subftances. (3.) Animate are those which have Life Animate. and Senfe, as Animals, Beafts, Fish, Men, &c. (4.) Inanimate; those which have no Life or Inanimate. Senfe, as Stones, Earth, Water, &c. (5.) Vege- Vegetable. table; fuch as are poffefs'd with a Power of Growth, Increase, and Production, but without proper Life and Senfe, as Plants, Herbs, and Trees. (6.) Rational; fuch as are endow'd with Rational. the Faculty of Reafon and Intelligence, as Angels and Men, and even Brutes too, in fome Degree: All others are call'd Irrational, or devoid of Reafon. Property. OF Modes, which are also call'd the Qualities, Of Modes: Attributes, and Accidents of Being or Subftance, Effential; as there are reckoned the following Kinds. (1.) Difference and Effential; that which belongs to the very Effence or Nature of the Substance or Subject in which it is; and this is either primary, as Roundness in a Globe; or fecondary, which is confequent upon the other, as Volubility or Aptness to roll: The first is call'd the Difference, the latter the Property of the Body or Globe. (2.) Accidental; that Accidental ; which is not necessary to the Being of the Thing, properly call'd but may be wanting, and yet the Nature of the Accidents. Subject remain the fame; as Smoothness or Roughnefs, Largeness or Smallness, this or that Colour, Motion or Reft, in a Globe or Bowl: Thefe Modes are properly call'd Accidents of Bodies. Modes are farther divided into (3.) Abfolute Abfolute. Modes; an abfolute Mode is that which belongs Relative. Intrinfic. Extrinfic. to its Subject without refpect to any other Being whatfoever, as Size, Motion, &c. in a Globe. (4.) Relative Modes are deriv'd from Comparison of one Being with others; and these are the Affections of the abfolute Modes, as Greatness and Smallness of Size, and Swiftnefs and Slowness of Motion; which are only fo in Respect or Comparison of the Size or Motion of other Things. (5.) Intrinfic Modes are fuch as are inherent in the Subject itself, as Roundness, Size, Motion, Reft, &c. in a Globe. But (6.) Extrinfic Modes are fuch as derive their Being from other Beings without the Subject, as Vicinity or Nearness, or Distance, Affinity, or Relation, &c. (7.) Some reckon Action, and (8.) Paffion, or fuffering the Action, among the Modes of Existence, as they doubtless are. Natural or (9.) Natural or Phyfical Modes are fuch as are Phyfical. deriv'd from Nature, as the Shape and Senfes of Supernatural. Animals. But (10.) Supernatural Modes are fuch as refult from fomething above the Power of Nature, as Inspiration, &c. (11.) There are not only Modes of Substances, but of Modes alfo themfelves: For when I fay, A Man walks gracefully, 'tis plain Motion is his Mode at that Time; but Walking is a particular Mode or Manner of his Motion, and gracefully is ftill a farther Mode of Walking. Action. Paffion. Modes of Of the Five Genus. Species. Difference. THE Ancients, and from them the Schools of fome later Ages, have made a great Noife about their Predicables, and Predicaments or Categories. By Predicables they mean fuch common Words or Qualities as might be predicated or afferted of divers Things or Subjects, as Animal may be predicated of Man, Beast, Fowl, &c. Of these Predicables they reckon'd five Kinds, viz. (1.) Genus or Kind. (2.) Species, or Particulars of each Kind. (3.) Difference, or that Quality which makes one Thing of a different Nature from another. (4.) Property. Accident. By Predicament they understood an orderly Se- Of the ten ries of Words, which exprefs'd fimple Ideas or Predicaments. Things; of thefe Predicaments they number'd ten, viz. Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Action, What they be. Paffion, Where, When, Situation and Cloathing. But this ten-fold Divifion of Things the Modern Rejected by the Logicians reject, as loofe, injudicious, and even Moderns. ridiculous. HAVING thus view'd Being or Subftance Of Non-entity, both abfolutely and variously modified, we fhall or Not-being. juft reflect on the Nature of Not-being or Non entity. This is of a two-fold Confideration, as it Is two-fold. may be in refpect both of Mode and Subftance. For (1.) There may be a Non-entity of Subftance of Substances, (and confequently of the Modes) and this is call'd as Nibility or pure Nibility, or meer Nothing; and this in a Vacuum. Phyfical Senfe is call'd a Vacuum alfo. (2.) There may be a Non-entity of Modes only; and that Or of Modes either of fuch as naturally belong to the Subject; only. as of the Sight, Hearing, &c. in a blind and deaf Man, and this is call'd Privation: Or it is of Privation. Modes not effential to the Subject; as Learning, Riches, &c. in a Mechanic, and this is call'd Ne- Negation. gation. Now 'tis plain a great Number of our Notions will fall under the Clafs of Non-entities, as Sin, Darkness, &c. and fome have caft hither all the Relative Modes, or Relations, and all others which they call meer Creatures of the Mind. But how juftly, let better Judges deter mine. Being, Not-being, and the Modes thereof be- of Ideas. ing confidered, we are naturally led to a Contemplation of the Ideas of thofe Things in our Minds. And in doing this, we fhall confider their various Kinds according to (1.) their Original; (2.) their Nature; (3.) their Objects; and (4.) their Qualities. O 3 Ideas divided with respect to their Original. Senfible or Corporeal Ideas. Mental, or Ideas. Abftracted Ideas. Qualities. For this four-fold Divifion will eafily comprise them all. WITH refpect to the Original of Ideas, they will be (1.) Senfible or corporeal Ideas, as being derived originally from Bodies by the Senfes; fuch are all the Ideas of Colours, Sounds, Tafies, Figures, Shapes, Motions, and all we call fenfible Qualities. (2.) Mental or Intellectual Ideas; fuch as we gain by Reflection on the Actions of our Minds, and obferving all that paffeth there. Such are the Ideas of Thought, Afent, Diffent, Judging, Reason, Knowledge, Mind, Will, Love, Fear, Hope, &c. (3.) Abstracted Ideas; these are acquired by that Faculty of the Mind, call'd Abftraction. Such are Caufe, Effect, Likeness, Unlikeness, Subject, Object, Identity, Contrariety, and Terms of Arts and Sciences. But thefe Abstracted Ideas are too much implied in the other two of Senfible and Intellectual, to make a Distinction of Originals. With respect to Ideas, with refpect to their Natures, are Simtheir Nature. ple and Complex, Compound and Collective Ideas. Simple Ideas. (1.) A Simple Idea is one uniform and indivisible Idea, which the Mind cannot diftinguish into two or more: As the Ideas of fweet, bitter, Cold, Heat, white, red, bard, foft, Thought, Will, Wish, Complex Ideas. &c. Compound (2.) A Complex Idea is made by joining two or more fimple ones together; as a Square, Triangle, Cube, Pen, a Table, Reading, Body, a Man, an Angel, a fwift Horfe, &c. and every Thing that can be divided by the Mind into two or more Ideas. (3.) A Compound Idea is fuch as contains feveral diftinct and fimple Ideas of a different Kind. Thus Man is a Compound of Body and Spirit; Mithridate is a Medicine compounded of many different Ingredients; Harmony of different Sounds united, &c. Which yet are look'd upon often as diflint and fingle Beings. (4.) A Collective Collective Idea is when a Number of Ideas of the Collective to their Ob jects. cial. Ideas according to their Objects may be divided Ideas divided into Particular and Univerfal, Real or Imaginary, with respect (1.) Particular Ideas reprefent fingle Objects either in a vague and indeterminate manner, as fome Man, 'Particular one Time, fome one City, any Horfe, &c. thefe the Ideas. Schools call the Vague Individual Ideas: Or elfe in a determinate Manner; as Cicero the Orator, Peter the Apostle, this Book, that River, the New-Foreft, the City of London, &c. (2.) An Univerfal Univerfal Idea is that which represents a Common Ideas are General or SpeNature, agreeing to feveral particular Things, as a Man, a Horfe, a Book. These are alfo diftinguifhed into General and Special; the General Ideas are of the Genus or primary common Kind, Genus, what. which includes other common Natures; as Animal is a Genus, because inclufive of all the common Natures of Animals. The Special Ideas are thofe Species, what. of the Species, which is a common Nature agreeing to feveral Individual Beings; thus Horfe agrees to Trot, Dobbin, &c. Man to Peter, Paul, John, &c. City to London, Paris, &c. Whence 'tis easy to obferve the fame Idea may be fometimes a Genus, and at others a Species. (3.) Real Ideas. Real Ideas are of Objects which do really exist in Nature; but (4.) Imaginary Ideas are of thofe Imaginary things which do not exist in that particular Man- Ideas. ner as we conceive them in the Idea; as a Caftle in the Air, a Centaur, Chimæra, Satyr, Sea of Fire, &c. THE laft Divifion of Ideas is that with re- The Divifion fpect to their Qualities; wherein they are faid to of Ideas with 04 (1.) A their Quali |