ed less severely; thirty-eight dead Indians were counted. The next morning the troops found the Prophet's town deserted; they took certain supplies from it and burned the village, after which they rapidly marched back to Vincennes,1

The effect of this victory was far-reaching; it greatly diminished the influence of the two Indian leaders, though it did not prevent a renewal of trouble in the following spring. While the Indians were probably waiting to see if war between the United States and Great Britain would break out, there was evidence that they meant to make war in any case. Captain Rhea wrote in March, 1812, from Fort Wayne: "I have every reason to believe we shall have an Indian war this spring, whether we have a British war or not." In the end, hundreds of them crossed into Canada where they were found fighting under the leadership of Tecumseh in the British armies. The people of the west looked upon the defeat of the Indians as decisive, and gave great praise to Harrison, whose prestige as a leader in frontier warfare, as a result of the campaign, was of just the advantageous sort which a rising and ambitious politician in the west would desire."

1 Dawson, Harrison, 196, 206, 233, 244; Am. State Paps., Indian, I., 776 (Harrison's report); Niles' Register, I., 255; cf. Channing, Jeffersonian System (Am. Nation, XII.), chap. xx. 2 Am. State Paps., Indian, I., 806; Dawson, Harrison, 219.

THE

CHAPTER III

FRENCH DUPLICITY AND ENGLISH

STUBBORNNESS

(1810-1812)

HE question of the Floridas and of the Indians of the frontiers concerned chiefly certain new and remote sections; they were merely perplexities of an administration which was at the same time wrestling as for its life with matters pertaining to the relations of the United States to Great Britain and France, which vitally affected markets, persons, and policies of the nation. These relations reached another acute stage in February, 1811. By the act of May 1, 1810,2 non-intercourse with the two belligerents was given up as a policy, but it was provided that if either France or England would revoke its decrees or orders, and the other should fail to do likewise after three months' notice by the United States, then the president, by proclamation, should re-establish non-intercourse with such other nation. Napoleon succeeded, by Cadore's wily and

'On the general subject of this chapter, cf. Channing, Jeffersonian System (Am. Nation, XII.), chap. xix.

2 U. S. Statutes at Large, II., 543.

VOL. XIII.-5

ingenious note of August 5, 1810, in trapping Madison into the declaration that France had revoked the offensive Berlin and Milan decrees so far as they affected America; and the president gave the prescribed notice to Great Britain, in November, 1810.1

Not since 1807 had the commercial and shipping interests been so contented as in the "open season of 1810; only the French attacked American commerce, and even this danger was minimized by the comfortable custom of asking and receiving protection from the British navy in the Baltic or West Indies. Customs revenue reached $12,757,000 for the year ending December 31, 1810; the registered tonnage amounted to 1,424,000, and the exports of domestic products, $42,366,000, for the year ending December 31, 1810.3 Athwart the pathway of this busy, prosperous, satisfying traffic were thrust Cadore's note and Madison's proclamation of November 2, by which he gave notice that unless Great Britain also repealed the orders in council by February 2, 1811, non - intercourse with that country would revive. February came, but no concession from the British ministry, and the halcyon days of open trading ended. Great Britain stood firmly on the ground that France had not in good faith repealed the Berlin and Milan decrees, and the ministry reiterated the statement that the British government was entirely ready

1 Am. State Paps., Foreign, III., 386.

"Am. State Paps., Commerce, I., 866, 873; ibid., Finance, II.,

to relinquish the system which the policy of France had imposed, whenever neutral commerce should be restored by France to its original status.1

On the other side, the president learned in February, 1811, that Napoleon had decreed that all American vessels arriving in French ports after November 2, 1810, should be, not seized under the Berlin and Milan decrees, but "sequestered" until February, when it might be clear what course the United States would pursue if England failed to yield. In this difficult situation, in spite of the deterrent evidence, Congress came to the rescue of the president, and in the act of March 2, 1811, gave full legal sanction to his course, authorizing him to suspend non-intercourse with Great Britain if that country would revoke the orders in council. Otherwise he was to enforce the revived act of 1809, but all shipments made from England before February 2, 1811, were to be exempt from seizure. One more chance England had to modify or revoke the offending orders."

Of course, the opposition did not lose the opportunity to tell the administration some unpleasant truths about its conduct of foreign relations. The Federalists, led by Quincy, insisted that France was deliberately deceiving the United States with the purpose of drawing us into a war against Great Britain, either directly or indirectly, through an

1 Richardson, Messages and Papers, I., 481, 483; Am. State Paps., Foreign, III., 408. 2 U: S. Statutes at Large, II.,651.

alliance with France. Randolph also appeared with a new plan for settling the difficulty, and was able to muster 40 out of 107 votes for repeal of the act of May, 1810. When Congress adjourned, non-intercourse with England was in full operation, with no prospect of its removal by any concessions from the ministry. The "peaceful war" was to go on indefinitely, so far as any suggestions of policy on the part of the administrations were concerned. Signs, however, were accumulating that the people were ready for more positive action, and would welcome war with Great Britain, as the party against whom the United States had the oldest, most immediate, and most varied grievances.1

During the greater part of 1810 Great Britain was represented at Washington by a diplomatic person of no higher rank than a chargé or secretary, and Madison suspected that it was the deliberate policy to humiliate the United States by leaving the mission thus vacant. William Pinkney, United States minister to England, was discouraged and despairing at the opening of 1811; he had been unable to secure any concessions or arrangements of difficulties, either from the brilliant, irritable, and condescending Canning, or from his more suave successor in the foreign office, the Marquis Wellesley. Neither had he secured the sending of a minister to Washington to settle questions at that capital. Accordingly, he decided on his own re

1 Annals of Cong., 11 Cong., 3 Sess., 863, 895.