NOTE R. p. 353.

Dr. Reid, who is considered by many to have been, as the Biographie Universelle describes him, the founder of a new ara in the history of Modern Philosophy, was born in 1710, at Strachan in Kincardineshire. In 1763 he succeeded Adam Smith in the chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow University; died in October, 1796. He produced many works, the principal of which is Essays on the powers of the human mind: Lond. 1803, three vols. in 8vo.; and perhaps the most popular, Inquiry into the human mind on the principle of common sense, 8vo. which appeared in 1763: it came into a sixth edit. in 1804. He also wrote Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man: Edinb. 1786, in 4to.

Sir James Mackintosh, with his usual anxiety to give all men as well as all arguments their due, and to put down hasty and unjust depreciation, defends Dr. Reid from the charge of shallowness and popularity, and maintains his right to "a commendation more descriptive of a philosopher than that bestowed by Professor Cousin of having made a vigorous protest against skepticism on behalf of common sense.' He alleges that this philosopher's "observations on suggestion, on natural signs, on the connection between what he calls sensation and perception, though perhaps occasioned by Berkeley, whose idealism Reid had once adopted, are marked by the genuine spirit of original observation." Sir James, however, admits that "Dr. Brown very justly considered the claims of Reid to the merit of detecting the universal delusion which had betrayed philosophers into the belief that ideas, which were the sole objects of knowledge, had a separate existence, as a proof of his having mistaken their illustrative language for a metaphysical opinion."* Whether a man who utterly misunderstands the language of preceding philosophers on a cardinal point can himself be a "deep thinker," is a question which I do not pretend to solve; I only think it is a question, and without offering a philosophical opinion I must say that Dr. Reid's literal way of understanding his predecessors in the matter of ideas, and his representing them accordingly as a set of cloud-weavers and phantasts, has always reminded me of certain amusing remarks in Lamb's Essay entitled "Imperfect Sympathies." His bantering style too is more popular than philosophic, and scarcely evinces that patience and modesty for which Sir James, I doubt not on sufficient grounds, upon a review of his whole works, gives him credit. I should say, if it were worth while to record my impression-(I do not call it a judgment)—that Cousin's summary of his merits is as clear-sighted and clever as his summaries usually are, and that a certain vigor in commanding and * In this misapprehensiu Professor Stewart has followed him, as is evident from Ele ments, chap. iv. section ii.

presenting a limited view of the subject of external perception, is the best characteristic of Dr. Reid's Inquiry. And was it not this mistaken part of his teaching more than his intelligent remarks in extension of that of Berkeley, which installed him in his high reputation of "the founder of a new æra?" Dr. Reid's great merit, even according to Stewart, consisted in his having "had courage to lay aside all the hypothetical language of his predecessors concerning perception, and to exhibit the difficulty in all its magnitude by a plain statement of the fact."* But if he misunderstood that language, and combated, as Sir James affirms (p. 164) “imaginary antagonists,” where was his victory? Was not this combat and seeming triumph the very pith and marrow of his book, and that which gave it great part of its savor to the public? Did he really advance the science of metaphysics materially beyond the point at which it had arrived in the days of Berkeley? The answer to Berkeley from the first had been: "Nevertheless we do perceive an external world, and what presents itself within us, which we instinctively refer to things without us, does really tell us that there are things without us, and what they are in reference to us; and that we feel as sure of this as of our existence, and are incapable, by the constitution of our minds, from thinking otherwise, is a sufficient proof that it is true. Does Reid's explanation amount to more than what has just been expressed! But so much as this Berkelcy himself anticipated. He stated the objection to his theory contained in the fact of universal original belief of the contrary, and tried to push it aside-it was the only obstacle that did not yield to his victorious hand.t

That Dr. Reid's philosophy was received with applause in Paris, when taught there by M. Royer Collard, favors the supposition that it was clear rather than deep; smart, rather than characterized by the grave energy, which slowly and laboriously grasps a something more of truth,—a real and substantial something. Hume's compliment to Dr. Reid's profundity may have been mere gentlemanly courtesy to a gentlemanly antagonist. He would perhaps have been as polite to Dr. Beattie, if he had not "indulged himself in the personalities and invectives of a popular pamphleteer," and so departed from fairness and, what he undertook to defend, “common sense.”

Dugald Stewart, the accomplished disciple of Reid, and improver of his philosophy, was born in the College of Edinborough in 1753, became Professor of Moral Philosophy there in 1785, died in June, 1828. He published Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind in 1792, Philosophical Essays in 1810, Outlines of Moral Phi losophy, Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, and

* Elements, p. 69.

Principles of Human Knowledge, s. 54-5-6-7.

other works. Sir James Mackintosh has given his character, as a man and an author, in his interesting Dissertation, p. 145, edit. 1830. -S. O.

NOTE S. p. 357

* * *

I take this opportunity of mentioning that the solution of the paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise brought forward in The Friend (II. p. 399), and in Tait's Mag. of 1834, is distinctly given by Leibnitz in his Letters to Mr. Foucher, Sur quelques axiomes philosophiques, in which he says, "Ne craignez point, Monsieur, la tortuë que les Pirrhoniens faisoient aller aussi vite qu'Achille. Un espace divisible sans fin se passe dans un tems aussi divisible sans fin. Je ne conçois point d'indivisibles physiques sans miracle, et je crois que la nature peut réduire les corps à la petitesse que la Géométrie peut considérer.” In his rejoinder to Foucher's reply he says that P. Gregoire de St. Vincent has shown, by means of geometry, the exact place where Achilles must have caught the tortoise. Opp. ed. Erdmann, i. pp.

115-118.

Aristotle, in his brief way, had given the solution long before, when he said that Time does not consist of indivisible nows or now-existents —ÉK TÔV VÕV ÖVTwv ůdiαipétwv—any more than any other magnitude. See the editor's note upon the passage of The Friend referred to above.

S. C.

END OF VOL. II.