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Berkeley's scheme is merely an evolution of the positions--All perception is reducible to sensation, and All sensation is exclusively subjective (He who feels, feels himself).—Ergo, all Perception is merely subjective ("Perceptum percipi: or Dum percipitur, est. The principium cognoscendi is raised into the principium essendi.) Now I should commence my reply to Berkeley by denying both positions— or (what is tantamount), the second. Sensation, I would say, is never merely subjective, but ought to be classed as a minimum or lower degree of Perception. Sensation, I assert, is not exclusively subjective, but of all the known syntheses of Subject + Object it is the least objective; but for that reason still objective-or (to express my position in a somewhat more popular form), Sensation is Perception within the narrowest sphere. But, this admitted, Berkeleyanism falls at once. Now the facts of zoology are all in favor of my position, and the whole class of Protozoa so many instances of its Truth. Nay, as Extremes meet, Sensation, in its first manifestation, is eminently objective. The light, warmth, and surrounding fluid are the brain and nerves of the polyp: even as the true Objective (the corporeal world as it is) exists only subjectively, that is, in the mind of the philosopher, while the true Subjective (that is, the appearances resulting from the position and mechanism of the Percipient) exists for our common consciousness only as independent and pure Object.—S. T. C.

Ib. pp. 15, 16. "But with these two problems we see ourselves entangled in a contradiction. According to B. there is demanded a dominion of Thought (of the Ideal) over the world of sense: but how is such a dominion conceivable, when (according to A.) the representation, in its origin, is the mere slave of the Objective? Conversely, if the real world is something quite independent of us, according to which, as its archetype, our Representation (according to A.) must regulate itself, then it is inconceivable, how on the other hand the real world can regulate itself according to Representations in us. In a word, the practical certainty is lost to us by reason of the theoretical, the theoretical through the practical; it is impossible that there should be at the same time Truth in our Knowledge, and Reality in our will."-Transl.

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Ye Gods, annihilate both Space and Time, and then this paragraph may become cogent logic. But as it is, one might with equal plausibility from the fact of one man's lying on his back deduce the incompossibility of another man's standing on his feet; or from the incom. possibility of both positions in the same man at the same time infer the impossibility of both positions successively. Besides the antitheta are not adequate opposites, much less contraries. A wheel presented to me generates, without apparent materials, the image of the whee

in my mind. Now if the preconception of a wheel in the artist's mind generated in like manner a corporeal wheel in outward space, or even in a mass of timber, then indeed (though even so I can see no contradiction in the two hypotheses) a problem would arise of which the equality or sameness of kind in the two generators might be the most natural solution. Yet even here there is a flaw in the antithesis: for, to make it perfectly correspondent, the mass of wood ought to generate the image, wheel. Where is the inconsistency between the reality (i. e. actual realizing power) of the Will in respect of the relative position of objects, and the reality of the objects themselves independent of the position? Is the marble of a statue less really marble than the marble in the quarry? What after all does the problem amount to more than the fact, that the Will is a vis motrix, and the mind a directive power at one moment and in relation to the Will, and a Re or Per-cipient in relation to objects moving or at rest? Schelling seems at once to deny and yet suppose the objectivity-and on no other grounds than that he commences by giving objectivity to abstractions. A acting he calls Will; the same A acted on he calls Truth; and then, because acting and being acted on, are Antitheses or opposite States, he first turns them into contrary things, and then transfers this contrariety to the subject A. That A acts on B, and is itself acted on by C, is a fact, to the How? respecting which I have no other answer than Nescio: but that my ignorance as to the How? makes any contradiction in the Fact, I can by no means admit, any more than that a mail coach moving ten miles an hour upon the road contradicts the fact of the same standing in a coach house the night following.-S. T. C.

Written at the beginning of the volume.


Pp. 15, 16. C. The remarks on the blank leaves at the end of this volume are, I still think, valid: so far that all Schelling's "contradictions" are reducible to the one difficulty of comprehending the co-existence of the Attributes, Agere et Pati, in the same subject, and that the difficulty is diminished rather than increased by the Facts of human Art, in which the Pati, and the Agere take place in different relations and at different moments. Likewise that Schelling's position of Opposites, viz. Nature and Intelligence as the same with Object and Subject, already supposes Plurality, and this being supposed, the whole hypothesis becomes arbitrary, for the conception of Plurality once admitted, Object and Subject become mere relative terms, and no reason can be assigned why each existent should not be both Object and Subject. But if he begins at the beginning, then the objection applies-viz. that Schelling arbitrarily substantiates attributes. For, in the very act of opposing A to B, he supposes an X common to both, viz. Being, ovoía; but this given, there is no necessary reason,

why Objectivity and Subjectivity should not both be predicable o both-so namely that the Subject B is an Object to the Subject A, and the Subject A an Object to the Subject B; as in the instance of a lover and his mistress gazing at each other. Finally it is a suspicious Logic when no answer can be given to the question, "What do you mean? Give me an instance." The fact is, that every instance, Schelling would have brought, would simply give an object as the base of the Subject; and his bewusste Thätigheit ohne Bewusstseyn I do not understand. At least if he mean the Will, it is a strange way of expressing himself; and at all events he should have previously explained the distinction between primary consciousness, ceasing on the coincidence of O. with S.—and the secondary, or consciousness of having been conscious, which is memory. It would be well to show, how much better Schelling's meaning might have been given in simple common-life words.-S. T. C.

es ist

Ibid. p. 17. This argument grounds itself on the assertion “ allerdings eine productive Thätigheit, welche im Wollen sich äussert,” in the very same sense of the word "productive," in which Nature “im produciren der Welt productiv sey:" only that the one is "mit" the other "ohne Bewusstseyn productiv." Now this is merely asserted. I deny it, and for the reasons above stated.-S. T. C.-i. e. at this monent. A book I value, I reason and quarrel with as with myself when I am reasoning.-S. T. C.

P.S.-Add to this, one scruple which always attacks my mind when I read Schelling or Fichte. Does Perception imply a greater mystery, or less justify a postulate, than the act of Self-consciousness, that is, Self-perception? Let Perception be demanded as an Act Specific of the mind, and how many of the grounds of Idealism become 0-0!

No! I am wrong. For grant this mysterious Perception, yet ask yourself what you perceive and a contradiction ensues. (Therest lost.— S. C.)-S. T. C.

Transsc. Id. last paragraph of p. 40-1. "How we, in respect of those positions, in which a wholly heterogeneous Objective falls in with a Subjective (and this takes place in every synthetical judgment AB; the Predicate, the conception here always represents the Subjective, the Subject the Objective)-can arrive at certainty, is inconceivable."-Transl.

Note. It seems to me that the Logician proceeds from the princi ples of Identity, Alterity and Multëity or Plurality, as already known: -that the Logical I attributes its own Subjectivity to whatever really is, and takes for granted that a Not-he really is—and that it is a Subject; and this he proceeds to make objective for himself by the

predicate. N. B.-It does not follow, that the Logical Iattributes its Egöity, as well as its Subjectivity, to the not-itself, as far as it is.

In other words, the Logical I seems to me to represent the individual I, which must indeed be this or that or some other, but without determining which it is-individuality, or singularity, in genere, as when we say, every man is an individual.

In the position, "Greeks are handsome," Schelling says, the Subject "Greeks" represents the Object, the Predicate "handsome," the Subjective. Now I would say "Greeks" is a Subject assumed by apposition with myself as a Subject. Now this Subject I render objective for myself by the Predicate. By becoming objective it does not cease to be a Subject.

It follows of course that I look on Logic as essentially empirical in its pre-conditions and postulates, and posterior to Metaphysics; unless you would name these the higher Logic.

N.B. The following remarks apply merely to the Logical form, not to the Substance of Schelling's Philosophy.

Schelling finds the necessity of splitting, not alone Philosophy, but the Philosopher, twy-personal, at two several gates.

This system may be represented by a straight road from B a to Bb,





with a gate at A, the massive door of which is barred on both sides: so that when he arrives at A from B a, he must return back, and go round by C to B b, in order to reach the same point from that direction.

Now I appear to myself to obviate this inconvenience by simply reversing the assumption that Perception is a species, of which Sensation is the genus, or that Perception is only a more finely organized Sensation. With me, Perception is the essentia prima, and Sensation perceptio unius; while Perception so called is perceptio plurium simultanea. Or thus single Intuition is Sensation, comparative and complex Intuition, Perception. The consequences of this position are wide and endless.-S. T. C.

The whole difficulty lies in the co-existence of Agere et Pati as Predicates of the same subject.-S. T. C.

(Written on a blank page before the title page of the Transsc. Id.—

P. 54, and then pp. 59-62. The Spinozism of Schelling's system

first betrays itself; though the very comparison des reinen Ichs zum geometrischen Raume ought, by its inadequacy and only partial fitness, to have rescued him. Im Raume the materia and the limiting power are diverse.-S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 118. (As I fear that these notes on the Transs. Id. will scarcely interest or be intelligible to any but readers of that work, I do not give the long passage to which the following refers.-S. C.)

But why, if there are many Ichheiten, should not No. 1 I act on No. 2 I? If I act on itself, it is acted on, therefore actible on by an I. But to assert that it can be acted on by this and no other incomprehensibly-determined-in-its-comprehensible-determinateness-I, is to In short, the Attributes of the Absolute Synthesis, the I AM in that I AM, are falsely transferred to the I Am in that God is.

assert, and no more.

Aye, replies Schelling, this would be secundum principium essendi; but I speak only secundum principium sciendi.

True, I rejoin, but you assert that the two Principles are one; p. 18. 1. 17-18.* What is this but to admit that the I itself, even in its absolute synthesis, supposes an already perfected Intelligence, as the ground of the possibility of its existing as it does exist? And what is Schelling's Begränztheit überhaupt but the allgemeinerte abstraction from the bestimmten Begränztheiten—a mere ens logicum, like motion, form, color, &c.?-S. T. C.

Note written in Schelling's Sys. des Transs. Id. p. 121, above the section headed-Problem: to explain how the I beholds itself as perceptive.-Transl.

I more and more see the arbitrariness and inconveniences of using the same term, Anschauen, for the productive and the contemplative Acts of the Intelligential Will, which Schelling calls das Ich. If this† were true, the I could never become self-conscious: for the same impossibility for the same reason will recur in the second act-and so in fact it is. We can no more pass without a saltus from mere Sensation to Perception, than from marble to Sensation.

Whether it is better to assume Sensation as a minimum of Perception, or to take them as originally diverse, and to contend, that in all Sensation a minor grade of Perception is comprised, deserves consideration.-S. T. C.

Transsc. Id. pp. 259-60. "Since then Intelligence beholds the evo

The two things taken together, that the defined Limitation can not be defined through the Limitation in general, and yet that it arises at the same time with this, and through one Act, makes that it is the Incomprehensible and Inexplicable of Philosophy.-Transi.

This Intuition (Anschauen) is an Activity, but the I can not at once behold, and be bold itself, as beholding (anschauen, und sich anschauen, als anschauend). lb. p. 121 -Transl.

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