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most reverently true is it that a Being imperfect does feel an awe as in the presence of a holier Self-alter et idem, where the I distin. guishable through imperfection, &c."-S. T. C.
These remarks seem to be made in reference to those of Schelling aimed against unsre Empfindungsphilosophen, "our sensation-philosophers." "To be conscientious," he affirms, "is for a man to act according as he knows, and not contradict in his deeds the light of knowledge. He is not conscientious, who, in any case that occurs, must first hold up to himself the law of duty, in order to decide upon right doing through respect to the same. Religiosity, according to the meaning of the word, leaves no choice between things opposedno equilibrium arbitrii, the bane of all morality, but only the highest decidedness for that which is right, to the utter exclusion of choice."
Ibid. p. 493. "Still the question recurs, does Evil end and how? -has Creation in general a final aim, and if this be so, why is this not reached immediately,-why is not Perfection even from the beginning? To this there is no answer but what is already given: because God is a Life, not merely a Being. But all Life has a destiny, and is subject to suffering and becoming. Even to this then lias God, of his own free will, subjected Himself, when even at first, in order to become personal, He divided the Light world and the world of Darkness."-Transl.
Note. These are hard sayings. Is not the Father from all eternity the Living one? and freywillig sich unterwerfen um persönlich zu werden! (The rest is lost.)-S. T. C.
Ibid. p. 495. "Its state therefore is a state of not-being, a state of the continual becoming-consumed of the activity-(Verzehrtwerdens der Aktivität) or of that in it which strives to become active."Transl.
Note. Then will not the darkness become again what it was before its union with the light, and of course the object of the same process repeated? Surely this has too much the appearance of subjecting the supersensual to the intuitions of the senses, and really looks like pushing in a thing merely to take it out again. And still the question returns-Why not this in the first place? What can the process have effected?
Ibid. p. 502. Note. It seems to me that, this whole work pre-sup. poses Des Cartes' "quod clure concepimus, verum est.”
Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Criticismus Philosoph.
P. 119. Note. I have made repeated efforts, and all in vain, to understand this first Letter on Dogmatism and Criticism. Substitute
the World, die Welt, for a moral God, what do I gain in der reinäs thetischen Seite more than in any other point of view? How can 1 combat or fight up against that which I myself am? Is not the very impulse to contend or to resist one of the links in the chain of necessary causes, which I am supposed to struggle against? If we are told that God is in us both to will and to do, that is, as the sole actual agent, how much more must this apply to the World, or Fate, or whatever other phantom we substitute. I say how much more, because upon the admission of a supersensual being, this may possibly be, and we therefore, from other reasons, do not doubt that it is really compatible with Free Will; but with a World-God this were a blank absurdity. Der Gedanke mich der Welt entgegenzustellen,* not only hat nichts grosses für mich,† but seems mere pot-valiant nonsense, without the idea of a moral Power extrinsic to and above the World, -as much inconceivable by a sane mind, as that a single drop of the Falls of Niagara should fight up against the whole of the Cataract, of which itself is a minim!
How much more sublime, and in other points of view, how infinitely more beautiful, even in respect of Taste or æsthetic judgment, is the Scriptural representation of the World as in enmity with God, and of the continual warfare, which calls forth every energy, both of act and of endurance, from the necessary vividness of worldly impressions, and the sensuous dimness of Faith, in the first struggles! Were the impulses and impresses from the faith in God equally vivid, as the sensuous stimuli, then indeed all combat must cease-and we should have Hallelujahs for Tragedies and Statues.—S. T. C.
Ibid. p. 122. Note. I can not see the force of any of these arguments. By theoretic, as opposed to practical Reason, Kant never meant two Persons or Beings; but only that what we could not prove by one train of argument, we might by another, in proportion to the purposes of knowledge. I can not theoretically demonstrate the existence of God, as a moral Creator and Governor, but I can theoreti cally adduce a multitude of inducements so strong as to be all but absolute demonstration; and I can demonstrate that not a word of sense ever was, or ever can be, brought against it. In this stage of the argument my conscience, with its categorical command, comes in and proves it to be my duty to choose to believe in a God-there being no obstacle to my power so to choose. With what consistency then can Schelling contend, that the same mind, having on these grounds fixed its belief in a God, can then make its former speculative infirmities, as applied to the idea of God, a pretext for turning back to disbelieve it?
* The thought of opposing myself to the world
Ibid. pp. 123-4. "With what law would you reach unto that Will? With the moral law itself? This is just what we ask, how you arrive at the persuasion that the Will of that Being is agreeable to this law? It would be the shortest way to declare that Being himself the author of the Moral Law. But this is contrary to the spirit and letter of your philosophy. Or must the Moral Law exist independently of all Will? Then we are in the domain of Fatalism; for a law, which is not to be explained by any Being that exists independently of it, which rules over the highest power as well as over the least, has no sanction, save that of necessity."-Transl.
Note. Just as well might Schelling have asked concerning the Wisdom or any other attribute of God-and if we answered, they were essential that is God himself-then object, that this was Fatalism. The proper answer is, that God is the originator of the Moral Law; but not per arbitrium (Willkühr), but because he is essentially wise and holy and good-rather, Wisdom, Holiness, and Love.-S. T. C.
Ibid. p. 142. "It is indeed no such uncommon case in human life, that one takes the prospect of a future possession itself."--Transl. Note. Is there not some omission of the press here-that is für den Besitz after Besitz-that we take the look out on a future possession for the possession itself?-S. T. C.
Ibid. p. 152. (In a note.) "It is remarkable enough that language has distinguished so precisely between the Real-dem Wirklichen (that which is present in the sensation or perception, which acts on me and whereon I react), the actually Existing, dem Daseyenden (which, in general, is there present in Space and Time), and Being, dem Seyenden, which is, through itself, quite independently of all conditions of Time."-Transl.
Note. But how can we know that any thing is, except so far as it works on or in us; and what is that but Existence? Answer:-the means, by which we arrive at the consciousness of an idea, are not the idea itself.-S. T. C.
Ibid. p. 175. Note. It is clear to me that both Schelling and Fichte impose upon themselves the scheme of an expanding surface, and call it Freedom. I should say where absolute Freedom is, there must be absolute Power, and therefore the Freedom and the Power are mutually intuitive. Strange that Fichte and Schelling both hold that the very object, which is the condition of Self-consciousness, is nothing but the Self itself by an act of Free Self-limitation.
P.S.-The above I wrote a year ago: but the more I reflect, the more convinced am I of the gross materialism, which lies under the whole system. It all arises from the duplicity of human nature, or
rather perhaps the triplicity. Homo animal triplex. The facts stated are mere sensations, the corpus mortuum of the volatilized memory.— S. T. C.
Ibid. pp. 177. "Perhaps I should remind them of Lessing's confes... sion, that with the idea of an infinite Existence he connected a representation of an infinitely tedious duration of Time, which was to him torment and misery; or even of that blasphemous exclamation: 'I would not for all the world be (eternally) blessed." "— Transl.
Note. Surely this is childish-a mere confusion of Space with Intensity, of Time with Eternity. I can not think that by the word “adequate" Spinoza meant “commensurate," but simply "immediate."
Abhandlungen zur Erlauterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre. Philosoph. Schrift.
P. 219. "I have sometimes heard the question asked, how it was possible, that so absurd a system, as that of the so-named Critical Philosopher should-not merely enter any human being's head-but take up its abode there."-Transl.
Note. I can not see the mystery. The man who is persuaded of the being of himself, seines Ichs, as a thing in itself, and that the bodily symbols of it are phænomena, Erscheinungen, by which it manifests its being to itself and others, easily, however unreasonably, conceives all other phænomena as manifestations of other consciousnesses—as unseen, yet actually separate, powers, or Ichs, or monads.-S. T. C.
Ibid. p. 221. "It is evident, that not only the possibility of a representation of outward things in us, but the necessity of the same must be explained. Further, not only, how we become conscious of a representation, but also why on this very account we are under the necessity of referring it to an outward object.". t."-Transl.
Note. I can not comprehend how it should be more difficult to assume a faculty of perception than of sensation, that is of self-perception.
Ibid. p. 224. "Now that which is an object (originally) is, as such, necessarily finite. As then the spirit is not originally an object, it can not according to its nature be originally finite."--Transl.
Note. That the Spirit is, in the modified sense here stated, infinite, may be proved by other reasons; but this is surely a strange twist of logic. If all Finites were necessarily objects, then indeed the Spirit, as far as it is no object, might be infinite. But that it is therefore infinite, by no means follows. The finite may be the common predicate of both--of the one essentially, of the other by the will of the Cre ator.-S. T. C.
Ibid. pp. 228-9. "We can not abstract from the product of the intuition without acting freely, that is, without freely repeating the original mode of action (of the Spirit) in the intuition, &c. &c. Now first through our abstracting the product of our action becomes an object."-Transl.
Note. In spite of Schelling's contempt of psychology, the fact of outness is more clearly stated in psychology, as dependent on vividness. In a fever, yet retaining our understanding, we see objects as outward, yet well know that they are not real.-S. T. C.
Ibid. p. 237. "In the first place, the whole hypothesis (for more it is not), will explain nothing, for this reason, that, putting it at the highest, it does but make an impression on our receptivity conceivable, but not that we behold a real object. But no man will deny, that we not merely perceive (have a feeling of—empfinden), the outward object, but that we have an intuition of it. According to this hypothesis, we should never get further than the impression: for, though it be said that the impression is first referred to the outward object (as its cause), and that thereby arises the representation of the latter, it is not recollected that on occasion of the intuition, we are conscious of no such act, no such going forth from ourselves, no such opposition and relationship; also that the certainty of the presence of an object (which yet must be something distinct from the impression), can not rest on so uncertain a conclusion. In any case, therefore, the intuition must at least be considered as a free act, even though one that is occasioned by the impression.”—Transl.
Note. This is, methinks, all very weak. The Realist may surely affirm that an impression of a given force is what we call an object, as Schelling affirms, that the mere self-excitation of our own selfdirected operations are what we mean by objects.
I always thought one of the difficulties attending the notion of cause was its co-instanteity with the effect. The heat and the fire for instance. In all things, the effect is the presence of some other thing than the cause.-S. T. C.
Ibid. p. 239. "In fine between the cause and its effect, continuity holds good, not only according to Time, but according to Space also."-Transl.
Kant, justifying the logical possibility of attraction, as a cause acting at a distance, has shown the sophistry of this assertion in his Vermischte Schriften, and Schelling himself adopts and confirms the argument of Kant in his System des Transscendentalen Idealismus.S. T. C.
Notes written in Schelling's System des Transsc. Id. on or before the title page.