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Note. But God will not do impossibilities, and how can a Verma yen for moral good exist in a creature, which does not imply a Vero mögen zum Bösen?-S. T. C.



437-8. “Man has, by reason of his arising out of the Ground (being creaturely), an independent principle in himself relatively to God; but by reason that even this principle-without op this account ceasing to be dark in respect of the Ground,-is illumined in Light, there arises in him at the same time a higher one, that is the Spirit.-Now, inasmuch as the soul is the living identity of both principles, it is Spirit, and Spirit is in God. Were the identity of both principles as indissoluble as in God, there would be no distinction, that is to say, God would not be revealed as Spirit. That unity which in God is inseparable, must therefore in man be separable,—and this is the possibility of good and evil.”

Note. But the problem was—how to prove this distinction, Unterschied; and here it is assumed as a ground of proof! How exactly does this seem to resemble Schelling's own objection to Fichte ? “It must be so.”—“Why?”—“Because else my Theory would be false.”—“ Well! and what if it were ?" In truth from p. 429 I find little but Behmenisms, which a reader must have previously understood in order to understand. And in the name of candor and common sense, where does this Zertrennlichkeit differ from the rejected Vermögen zum Bösen, involved in dem freyen Vermögen zum Guten ?S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 438. “The Principle raised up. out of the ground of Nature, through which man is separate from God, is the selfness in him, but which, through its unity with the ideal principle, becomes Spirit."

Note. We will grant for a while, that the principle evolved or lifted up from this mysterious Ground of existence, which is and yet does not exist, is separate (geschieden) from God; yet how is it separate from the Ground itself? How is it individualized ? Already the material phænomenon of partibility seems to have stolen in. And at last I can not see what advantage in reason this representation, this form of symbol, has over the old more reverential distinction of the Divine Will, relatively to the End, from the same Will, relatively to the Means; the latter of which we term his Wisdom, and to the former appropriate the name of the Divine Will κατ' έμφασιν.

Schelling has more than once spoken of the necessity of a thorough study of Logic; and he has admitted that a logical work suited to the present state and necessities of scientific discipline does not exist. Would that he had prefixed to this work a canon of his own Logic, and, if he could, had taught us wherein his forms of thinking differ

from the trans-realization of not Ideas alone, but more often-Abstractions and arbitrary general terms in Proclus -S. T. O.

Ibid. pp. 439–40. Note. It is difficult to conjecture what advantage Schelling proposed to himself in thus allegorizing, and yet so imperfectly. Whatever he might dream as to the hidden identity of darkness with the natural yearning, yet no one can avoid distinguishing daylight from the mere sense of daylight. In short, Light here means something: why not substitute that meaning 2-5. T. C.

Ibid. p. 442. Note. How can I explain Schelling's strange silence respecting Jacob Boehme? The identity of his system was exulted in by the Tiecks at Rome in 1805, to me; and these were Schelling's intimate friends. The coincidence in the expressions, illustrations, and even the mystical obscurities, is too glaring to be solved by mere independent coincidence in thought and intention. Probably prudential motives restrain Schelling for a while ; for I will not think that pride or a dishonest lurking desire to appear not only an original, but the original can have influenced a man of genius like Schelling.-S. T. O.

Ibid. quotation in a note. “An instructive illustration is here given by Fire (as wild, consuming, painful, glowing heat) in opposition to the so-named organic beneficent life-glow, since here Fire and Water enter into a Ground (of growth), or a conjunction, whilst there they go out of one another in discord.”

Note. Water is the great Nurse and Mediatrix of all growth; an instrument of union-a marriage—of the comburent and combustible principles, oxygen and hydrogen. Fire, on the contrary, is the fierce combat of the two. This is better, as more accurate, than Feuer und Wasser in Einem Grunde.-S. T. O.

Ibid. p. 445.“ Leibnitz tries in every way to make it conceivable, how evil may arise out of a natural want or deficiency. The Will, says he, strives after the Good in general, and must desire Perfection, the highest measure of which is in God; but when it abides ensnared in the delights of the senses, with loss of higher goods, this very want of the counter-striving is the Privation, in which evil consists."

Note. The modern English Unitarians contemplate the Deity as mere Mercy, or rather Good-nature, without reference to his Justice and Holiness; and to this Idol, the deification of a human passion, is their whole system confined. The Calvinists do the same with the Omnipotence of God, with as little reference to his Wisdom and his Love.-S. T. C.

Ivid. p. 449. “For the weakness or non-efficiency of the intelligent Principle may certainly be a ground of the want of good and virtuous actions, but not a ground of actions positively bad and contrary to virtue.”

Note. Why not, if the inertia be voluntary? Suppose Heat to be a moral agent and voluntarily to withdraw itself; would not the splitting of the vessel by the frozen water be a positive act? I find a confusion in Schelling of the visible with the conceivable. As well might I say, that when I tossed a child into the air, and wilfully did not catch it again—this, being a mere negation of motion, was no moral act.-S. T. O.

Ibid. p. 452. Note. Schelling puzzles me forever by his man made up of two separable principles; and yet he (as a tertium aliquid), whose and not who these principles are, has the free power of separating them.-S. T. O.

Ibid. pp. 455–6. “But there are in Nature accidental determinations, which are explicable only by an excitement of the irrational or dark principle of the creature that has taken place directly in the first creation-only by a selfness made active (aktivirter Selbstheit). Whence in Nature, beside the performed moral relationships, there are unmistakable foretokens of Evil, although the power thereof bas first been excited through man; whence phænomena, which, irrespectively of their being dangerous to man, excite a general natural abhorrence (Abschen). Note. Thus the close connection, in which the imagination of all people, especially all fables and religions of the East, place the serpent with evil, is certainly not gratuitous or unmeaning."Transl.

Note. But some have supposed this to be the ape. The ape is the very opposite of the serpent. The eel, the trout, the salınon, these excite no Abschen.

P.S. I doubt the truth of my own remark as to the eel and earthworin.-S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 459. Note. Why not have quoted all this from Boehme, as an extract raisonné ? But does the hypothesis, or hypopoiesis rather, explain the problem of evil? A nature—the ground, the substratum, of God, which is not Er Selbst God himself, but out of which God risen exists, and which yet is begotten by the self-existent, and yet is evil, morally evil—and yet the cause and parent, yea, the very essence of Freedom, without which, as antecedent, das Böse can not be --what is all this? .

P.S. The bookbinder has docked my former notes; but I understand enough to find that my first impressions were the same as my present are, after repeated perusal, and too strong a prepossession. It is a mere day-dream, somnium philosophans !--S. T. C. lbid.

P. 462 Note. But where after all, is the Evil as contra-dissinguished from calamity and imperfection? How does this solve the diversity, the essential difference between regret and remorse? How does it concur even with the idea of Freedom? I own I am disappointed, and that, with respect to the system, I remain in the same state, with the same hurrying dimly and partially light-shotten mists before my eyes, as when I read the same things for the first time in Jacob Boehme.-S. T. O.

Toid. p. 463. " Thence the universal necessity of sir and death, as the real destruction of all particularity (Eigenheit), through which every human will must pass, as through fire, in order to be purified.” -Transl.

Note. But is death to the wicked as to the better mortal ? Shall we say that the redeemed die to the flesh, and therefore from it; but ihat the reprobate die in the flesh and therefore with it ?-S. T. C.


p. 467. “For that is free which acts conformably to the laws of its own proper being, and is determined by nothing else, either within it or without it.”- Transl.

Note. And is not this a confirmation of the old remark, that he who would understand Freedom, instead of knowing it by an act of Freedom (the mystery in the mystery), must either flee to Determinism d priori or ab extra,—or to Fatalism, or the necessity ex essentia propria. In either case how can we explain Remorse and Self-accusation other than as delusions, the necessity of which does not prove the necessity of knowing them to be delusions, and, consequently, renews the civil war between the Reason and the unconquerable Feeling, which it is the whole duty and promise of philosophy to reconcile ?-S. T. C.

Ibid. p. 468. "Man is in the original creation, as has been shown, an undivided being (which may be mythically represented as a state of innocence and original blessedness anterior to this life): himself alone can divide himself. But this severance can not take place in Time; it takes place out of all Time, and thence together with the first creation, although, as I find, distinct from it."Transl.

Note. But this makes it fall in time.”—S. T. O.

Ibid. p. 469. Note. “So Luther in the Treatise De Serro Arbitrio; with justice, although he had not rightly conceived the union of such an unfailing necessity with the Freedom of actions."— Transl.

Note. Far better to have proved the possibility of Freedom, and to Save left the mode untouched. The reality is sufficiently proved by the fact.

Ibid. ibid. Note. I still feel myself dissatisfied with the argument against Freedom derived from the influence of motives, Vorstellungen,



&c. For ata these things—and not rather mere general terms, signify. ing the mind determining itself? For what is a motive but a determining thought ? and what is a thought but the mind acting on itself in some one direction? All that we want is to prove the possibility of Free-Will, or, what is really the same, a Will. Now this Kant had unanswerably proved by showing the distinction between phænomoruz and noumena, and by demonstrating that Time and Space are laws of the former only (αι σύνθεσεις αι πρώται της αισθήσεως ο χρόνος μεν, ή πρώτη καθ' όλον σoνθεσις της αισθήσεως της έσω· ο δε χώρος, της έξω.) and irrelative to the latter, to which class the Will must belong. In all cases of Sense the Reality proves the Possibility; but in this instance (which must be unique if it be at all), the proof of the Possibility only is wanting to effect the establishment of the Reality. Therefore I can not but object to p. 468—sie fällt ausser aller Zeit, und daher mit der erster Schöpfung zusammen. (It takes place out of all Time and thence together with the first creation.) This has at least the appearance of a contradiction.-S. T. C.

Ibid. pp. 469–70. “In the consciousness, so far as it is mere selfcomprehension and ideal only, doubtless that free deed which comes to pass of necessity, can not take place; since it precedes it as existence (the deed precedes consciousness as actually existent)—first makes it; yet is it not therefore no deed of which the human being can ever take cognizance; since he who in some way to excuse an uprighteous action, says, 'Thus I am unalterably,' is yet very well awarə that he is thus through his own fault, however true it may be that it has been impossible for him to do otherwise.”—Trarisi.

Note. I have long believed this; but surely it is no explanation beyond the simple idea of Free Will itself.--S. T. C. (The remainder of this note is unfortunately lost.)


Ibid. p. 472. “And it is worthy of notice how Kant, who had not raised himself in theory to a transcendental fact determinant of al: numan existence, was led, in his later inquiries, through mere true observation of the phenomena of the moral judgment, to a recognition of a subjective, as he expresses it, ground of human actions, preceding every deed that occurs to the senses, which yet itself again must be an act of freedom."-Transl.

Note. But why this asserted superiority over Kant? Where is the proof,—where the probability, that by mero faithful observation he could arrive—(he alone of all other philosophers)—at this awful conclusion? Lastly, what has Schelling added to Kant's notion ?-S.T.O.

Ibid. p. 478. Here also is a note of Mr. C.'s partly obliterated, is which he exclaims, “How unfair is this, to attribute to Kant a slow. motive making process, separate by intervals of time. Most true,

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