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tribution of patronage, and usually took his advice. There were very few disagreements between them on that score. They coöperated in all legislative matters during the session of 1902, and Mr. Hanna's success in securing the favorable consideration of the Panama route made a deep impression on the President. Thereafter their joint interest in the canal constituted another bond between them — Mr. Hanna being the first man outside the Cabinet to be confidentially notified by the President that a good title could be secured to the French property. We have already indicated how closely they were associated during the critical days of the coal strike in October, 1902.

The following incident illustrates the candor of their relations and Mr. Hanna's attitude towards Mr. Roosevelt. In April, 1902, Mr. Charles Emory Smith, formerly PostmasterGeneral, published in the Saturday Evening Post an article in which he said: “But the only man who knows that Mr. Hanna has no aspirations towards the Presidency is President Roosevelt. The two men fully understand each other. There are questions of policy on which they do and will differ, but they differ in a frank and manly way, like two self-centred men accustomed each to think for himself, and it does not affect their good understanding.” Mr. Hanna sent to Mr. Roosevelt the article with the foregoing passage marked and accompanied by the following note:–

4/8/1902. “MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: — “The enclosed article may not come under your eye. Therefore I send it to you, because I think it good, and because a man like Smith can see things outside the area of smoke. “Sincerely yours, “M. A. HANNA.”

And the President returned a reply saying that he was delighted with the article, and thought Smith a very fine fellow. But the smoke and the fire from which it came were not to be dissipated. During the summer very little fuel was provided for its consumption, and there were no flare-ups; but during the campaign in the fall, while Mr. Hanna was stumping the state, he was continually being hailed as the next Republican candidate for the Presidency. The campaign was opened on September 27 at Akron, which was the home town of Chairman Charles Dick of the State Committee, Mr. Hanna's political aide. The speakers, who consisted of Secretary Root and Senator Foraker, as well as Mr. Hanna, were continually being interrupted by cries from the audience: “Hanna in 1904,” “Hanna in 1904.” The newspapers remarked that the crowd was apparently interested in another candidacy besides that of Mr. Hanna. It was plentifully supplied with Dick as well as with Hanna buttons — Dick for Governor in 1903, Hanna for President in 1904. In the speech made at the Akron meeting Mr. Hanna first introduced the phrase “stand-pat” into American politics. He began with the following words: “About a year ago it was my privilege to attend the opening meeting of the Republican campaign, and after thinking over the situation I concluded to give you a piece of good advice – ‘Let well enough alone.’ That was all there was in the campaign of interest to you. Now, I say, ‘Stand-pat!” [Great applause.] You are not on the defensive to-day in Ohio, or anywhere in the United States, or in the Philippines.” He continued to hold this note during his exhortations throughout the campaign; but after a little practice he improved upon the form of the introductory sentence, until it finally became a peculiarly effective example of his colloquial vigorous way of demanding the attention of his audience. Some days later at Steubenville he began as follows: “Two years ago I suggested to the people in view of the prosperous time that they knew their business. They replied that they did. One year ago I suggested that they “leave well enough alone.’ They replied that they would. This year I suggested that they ‘stand-pat,’ and they will reply, ‘You bet.’” The “You Bet” coming after the “Stand-pat” brought down the house — as well it might. This man of action was becoming a maker of phrases. The phrase “stand-pat,” thus auspiciously launched on a long voyage in American politics, has since been adopted as the most popular description of stubborn political and economic conservatism. It is a strong phrase, and its implications have undoubtedly done the conservative cause some little harm. Conservative politicians dodge the word, and resent the idea that they are standing pat or standing still. As originally used by Mr. Hanna it did not necessarily mean any such immovability of purpose or ideas. He intended it to be merely an effective figurative description of the proper attitude of public opinion under the prevailing economic conditions. The sun of Republican prosperity continued to shine. Why not sit tight and enjoy its warmth 7 Any poker player knows that except on rare occasions a man who has a “pat” hand and does not “standpat” is a fool. He has not only nothing to gain by drawing cards, but usually he has everything to lose. That was precisely Mr. Hanna's point. A man who “stands-pat” in poker is in so strong a position that he can play an aggressive game without taking any of the usual chances. No happier characterization could be invented of a policy which was neither defensive nor experimental. To “stand-pat” on a complete hand is the only course to follow. Let your opponents risk the long chance. Senator Hanna used the phrase in order to meet the demand already being heard among the Republicans of the Northwest for tariff revision. The tariff was the question above all others which he was afraid to reopen. He knew that as a matter of practical politics the tariff was the keystone of the whole Republican system. He knew that any revision upward would not be tolerated by public opinion, and any revision downward would tear the party to pieces. The result of a subsequent attempt at revision proved the soundness of his apprehensions. It both split the party and lost it the confidence of the country. The policy of protection upon which the Republican party was nourished for so many years may prove to be its undoing — unless it can gather strength to convert protectionism into a system which makes for national economic efficiency. Shrewd, however, as was Mr. Hanna's attitude towards tariff revision as a matter of practical politics, no party could continue to follow his advice. At any particular moment it might be justified by the nature of its hand in “standing-pat,” but a party which continued year after year to hold a “pat” hand and refused to take the chance of trying for something better, would inevitably be suspected either of bluffing or rigging the cards. “Stand-pattism,” which under peculiar circumstances might be the most available practical policy, is impossible as a permanent course of action. A typical American will never admit that he is a “stand-patter” on anything but a particular question under a particular group of circumstances; and a political party or economic class which consistently held “pat” hands and proclaimed a policy of “standing-pat” would inevitably provoke among their opponents the cry that the deal was not square. How Mr. Hanna would have readjusted his policy to the demand for a square deal, it would be useless to predict. He himself was not a “stand-patter” in respect to the labor question, and the germs of reform, when once implanted in a man's system, have a tendency to ferment and spread. But in 1902 and 1903 he was undoubtedly in danger of being gradually forced, by his fear of raising difficult and dangerous questions, into the position of being a consistent “stand-patter.”

Apart from conspicuous symptoms of Mr. Hanna's popularity as a Presidential candidate and his new enunciation of “standpattism,” the only other novelty in the campaign of 1902 was the vigorous campaigning of Mr. Tom L. Johnson. Mr. Johnson had been elected Mayor of Cleveland in the spring of 1901 and was beginning his fight against the local traction monoply. His decisive success in the city tempted him to venture out into the state, and during the fall of 1902 he made speeches all over Ohio, carrying a circus tent with him, and enunciating unusually radical doctrines for a Democrat-including absolute free trade, the single tax and a relentless warfare against the trusts. Mr. Johnson's fierce onslaught in 1902 was generally understood to be merely a preliminary skirmish to the more serious battle of the following fall — when the question of Mr. Hanna's own reëlection to the Senate would be contested. For that reason the speeches assumed a personal character. The facts that the two men were both old residents of Cleveland, that they had been rivals in building and operating street railways, and that they stood for diametrically opposite views of public policy, — all these circumstances gave the campaign the appearance of a personal fight between the two men.

On election day Mr. Hanna was completely victorious. The Republican ticket carried the state by the enormous majority of 100,000. So sweeping a victory was unprecedented, particularly in an off year, and it showed conclusively that Mr. Hanna was more than ever popular in Ohio. His political leadership of the state was the issue on which the vote had been cast, and the result indicated a substantial increase of popular confidence in him. On the other hand, Mr. Hanna with all his prestige could not shake Mr. Johnson's hold on the people of Cleveland. The Mayor had the voters with him on the street railway issue. Tom Johnson won in the spring of 1903 relatively as decisive a victory in the municipal election as did the Republicans in the state election of the preceding fall.

The overwhelming character of his victory in the state and Senator Hanna's addition of a labor plank to his own personal political platform served inevitably to increase the conviction of Mr. Hanna's friends and supporters in his availability as a Presidential candidate. They were unable to take any overt action, in view of Mr. Hanna's steady refusal to encourage the enterprise; but beneath the surface the ferment was the more active because it had no regular public outlet. From December, 1902, until the end of January, 1903, Senator Hanna received about 700 letters, urging him to withdraw his refusal, or promising support in case his candidacy became serious. These letters indicate very clearly the strength of the sentiment in favor of Mr. Hanna, the sources of that strength and the varying motives of his supporters.

In the first place those large business interests with which Mr. Hanna had always been closely associated were strongly in favor of his nomination and were as strongly opposed to Mr. Roosevelt. In spite of the latter's caution in urging radical policies during his first administration, they regarded him as “unsafe.” His action in the coal strike, the suit against the Northern Securities Co., and above all the general tone of his public and private utterances confirmed them in this opinion. Their natural preference for Mr. Hanna was intensified by their dread of the only alternative candidate. Indeed, to judge by their letters, they were as much interested in beating the man of their fears as in nominating the man of their choice. But

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