3. CHARACTER OF THE CONTRACT.

The contract is, in many of the States, required by law to be reduced to writing. Where this is the case, questions arise as to the ratification of a parol contract, and its effect.

In Kansas it is said that one teaching in a school without a written contract is entitled to receive the reasonable value of the services performed.1

In Iowa, where a teacher had made a parol contract with the directors of a school district to teach nine months, and had taught seven, receiving pay therefor, after which he was discharged, it was held, that although the contract did not comply with the statute requiring such engagements to be in writing, nevertheless the acceptance of part-performance was a ratification, rendering the district liable on the contract. Where the law requires the contract to be in writing, and there is a written contract between the teacher and the district, it will be conclusively presumed, in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, that

1 Jones v. School District, 8 Kan., 362.

2 Cook v.

Independent District of North McGregor, 40 Iowa, 444; Athearn v. The Independent School District of Millersburg, 33 Iowa, 105.

it contains the entire agreement of the parties as to the subject-matter covered by it.'

4. CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT.

The contract of the teacher is to teach his pupils what he has undertaken, and to have a special care of their morals.2

The contract is for the personal services of the teacher, and such teacher cannot substitute a proxy, however competent. If a teacher leaves his place and fails to resume it, and when requested to return insists that it is sufficient that he has left a competent substitute, this is cause enough for dismissal.3

The law does not require the highest order of talents or qualifications in a teacher. It only requires average qualifications and ability, and the usual application to the discharge of his duties to fulfil his contract.1

The contract is necessarily subject to any conditions imposed by the law from which the power to contract is derived. Thus where a statute empowers the board of directors to employ teachers and remove

1 Mann v. The Independent School District, etc., Supreme Court of Iowa, October, 1879. Reported in Northwestern Reporter, vol. ii. (N. S.), No. 11, p. 1005.

21 Starkie, 421.

3 School Directors, etc., v. Hudson, 88 Ill., 563. 4 Neville v. School Directors, 36 Ill., 71.

them at pleasure, the statute enters as part of any contract made under it, and the teacher employed by contract under it may be discharged, notwithstanding the terms of his employment.'

It sometimes becomes a question whether the statute under which the contract is made gives the right to dismiss a teacher at pleasure. It does not, unless clearly so expressed in the statute. Thus Wagn. (Mo.) Stat. 1243, sec. 7, making it "the duty of the directors to manage and control its local interests and affairs," and giving them power to hire legally qualified teachers, gives them no authority to dismiss a teacher unless for good and sufficient cause shown.'

In case of their wantonly obstructing him in the discharge of his duties, or dispossessing him of the school-house, they would be individually liable in damages for tort."

A clause in a contract between a school district board and a teacher, reserving the right to discharge the teacher whenever he fails to give satisfaction, is valid, under a statute which provides that the county superintendent may dismiss 'for incompetency, cruelty, or immorality.

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1 Jones v. Nebraska City, 1 Neb., 176; Wood v. Inhabitants of Medfield, 123 Mass., 545; Knowles v. Boston, 12 Gray (Mass.), 339.

2 McCutchen v. Windsor, 55 Mo., 149.

4 School District v. Colvin, 10 Kan., 283.

3 Id.

Where the contract between a teacher and the school district contained a stipulation that she would leave if the school was not satisfactory, it was held that dissatisfaction with her school, and not personal unpopularity in the district, would be a reason for dismissal under this provision.'

When a teacher has been irregularly dismissed, his subsequent continuance in the school, with the assent of a majority of the trustees, is a waiver of such dismissal, and a satisfaction of the original employment."

Unless such power is conferred by statute, the trustees of a school district have no right to dismiss a teacher holding the proper certificate, without cause, and against his consent, before the expiration of his contract.'

Where the teacher of a public school contracted to "faithfully and impartially govern and instruct the to strictly conform to the rules

children,
established by the board of directors,

perform all the duties required of her by part 8, sec. 41, of the school laws," and it was provided in the contract that if she should be dismissed by the subdirector for a violation of any of the stipulations therein, that she would not be entitled to compensation after such dismissal, it was held that the subdirector had a right to dismiss her for a failure to

1 Richardson v. School District, 38 Vt., 602. Finch v. Cleveland, 10 Barb. (N. Y.), 290.

3 Id.

control the school, even if she was not unfaithful in the discharge of her duties.'

Where the word "month" in school contracts is not defined by statute, careful officers and teachers avoid any question by making their contracts for a certain number of weeks.

The word month has various meanings, there being calendar months, solar months, and several kinds of lunar months.

In law the word month" means either a calendar or lunar month. The civil or calendar months are the months as adjusted in the common or Gregorian calendar, and known as January, February, etc. A lunar month, the period of one synodical revolution of the moon, is, in mean length, 29 days, 12 hours, 44 minutes, and 2.87 seconds, but in popular usage four weeks are called a lunar month.

Under the old English common law the word "month," whenever it occurred, was construed to mean a lunar month of four weeks, except in mercantile contracts, in which it was construed to mean a calendar month.

In some of the States it is provided by statute that the word "month" used in contracts, instruments, and statutes shall be taken to mean calendar months.

The tendency of the courts of this country is to 1 Eastman v. Rapids, 21 Iowa, 590.