other information as he may acquire concerning the operation of the common school system. He also tries and determines appeals from inferior officers upon questions of school law, and perform 3 duties pertaining to the distribution of the State school funds.

He ought also to recommend such changes in the law or such additional legislation as he may deem beneficial to the system of public education.'

The duties of this officer and the law governing his actions are usually made explicit by statute.

3. COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT.

In most of the States there is in each county an officer known by the title of County Superinten

1 The Bureau of Education was established by Congress because of the numerous inquiries by foreign educators and others for statistics and information concerning public education in the United States. The reports of that bureau are now exchanged and sent to the various foreign nations, and their fulness and accuracy depend much on the readiness with which State superintendents co-operate with the bureau. If the State superintendent's reports are not full his State will be imperfectly represented. This is a matter demanding likewise the especial attention of the city supeintendents. Secondary or high-school education has heretofore been very poorly represented in the reports of the bureau, and it is doubtless owing to a lack of authentic information from city superintendents, or from them through the medium of the State superintendeuts.

dent, or some similar title, who serves as the organ of communication between the State Superintendent and the township or district authorities. His duties vary in the different States, but it is usually his duty to gather statistics as to the number of youth of school age in the county, and in each school district therein, and the number taught, and such other information as is necessary

to exhibit the true condition of the schools under his charge. This is embodied in a report to the State Superintendent. It is also generally his duty to examine applicants for teachers' certificates, and to grant certificates to such as possess the necessary qualifications, and to exercise such supervision of the schools in his county as will advance the public interests in the matter of education.

In some of the States, particularly the New England States, there is no such county officer, but the reports from the towns are made directly to the State Superintendent.

The County Superintendent is not entitled to an injunction to restrain one from teaching on the ground that he is teaching without a certificate of qualifications.1

Where the statute vests a discretionary power in a County Superintendent in granting licenses to teach, the judgment of the court will not be sub

1 Perkins v. Wolf et al., 17 Iowa, 228.

stituted for that of the officer, and mandamus will not lie to compel him to issue a license, but where he wholly fails to act on an application he may be compelled by mandamus to take action thereon.'

It is a general principle lying at the base of the law of mandamus that the courts will not interfere with nor attempt to control the judgment or discretion of any officer whose official duties call for the exercise of some degree of judgment or discretion. Where such an officer wholly refuses to act mandamus will lie to compel action, but not to control such action, nor to substitute the discretion or judgment of the court for that of the officer.'

An officer whose duties are judicial or quasijudicial is not liable for errors of judgment or discretion in the discharge of those duties unless he acts from corrupt or malicious motives.

In an action on the case against the Superintendent of Schools of a county for illegally revoking a teacher's certificate, the plaintiff, in order to show malice, is not compelled to prove personal hatred or ill-will; but if the defendant acted rash

1 Bailey v. Ewart, Sup. Court of Iowa, October 23, 1879. Reported, "Northwestern Reporter," vol. ii. N. S. No. 11, p. 1009.

2 High's "Extraordinary Legal Remedies," Secs. 24, 34, 42.

ly, wickedly, and wantonly in revoking the certificate, the jury may infer malice.'

4. DIRECTORS, TRUSTEES, ETC.

A. Their Powers and Duties. A board of school directors, though a corporation, is possessed of certain specially defined powers, and can exercise no others, except such as result from fair implication.'

In Iowa it is held that the duties of school directors respecting the discharge of teachers, imposed by Section 1734 of the Code of 1873, are of a judicial character.3

The officers charged with the control and management of the schools have a right to dismiss a teacher employed in said schools upon breach of the contract, either by reason of failure to teach or because of incompetency, and such officers are not liable in damages if they honestly err in the discharge of this duty."

1 Love v. Moore, 45 Ill., 12.

2 Peers v. Board of Education, 72 Ill., 508.

3 Smith v. The District Township of Knox, 42 Ia., 522.

4 Crawfordsville v. Hays, 42 Ind., 200.

5 Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me., 164; Burton v. Fulton, 49 Pa. St., 151; Morrison v. McFarland, 51 Ind., 206; Bays v. The State, 6 Neb., 167. But see contra, McCutchen v. Windsor, 55 Mo., 149, where the court held that a statute making it

If they act wantonly and maliciously, it gives a cause of action against them personally,' but malice and injury must be affirmatively shown to have been the impelling motives, even though no reason was assigned for the removal of the teacher."

A letter from an inhabitant of a school district to the school committee, complaining of a school teacher, is privileged, if written with an honest purpose and for the public good.'

Where a suit is instituted in the individual names of school directors in reference to a matter in which they are only interested in their corporate capacity, it is proper to amend the title of the cause by striking out the individual names of the

"the duty of the directors to manage and control its local interests and affairs," and giving them "power to hire legally qualified teachers," gives the directors no authority to dismiss a teacher, unless for good and sufficient cause shown, which, in his action against them for discharging him would be wholly a question for the jury.

1 Clinton School District's Appeal, 56 Pa. St., 315.

2 Burton v. Fulton, 49 Pa. St., 151.

8" Townshend on Slander and Libel," 385 and 399; Budwell v. Osgood, 3 Pick., 379. It is actionable to call a schoolmistress a dirty slut, or to charge her with being insane, or to charge, by writing, a school-teacher with making a false report to the school visitors, and with general untruthfulness or with a want of chastity. Starkie on Slander," * 126; "Townshend on Slander and Libel," 272.