CHAPTER XIII. Morbid Phenomena of Memory. THIS section will embody an analysis of, 1. Acute Disorders of Memory. 2. Chronic (Modified) Affections of Memory. 4. Exaltation of Memory. 6. Psychology and Pathology of Memory. The memory may, as the effect of natural decay, acci dent, or disease, be, a. Disordered. B. Weakened. 7. Lost. S. Perverted. e. Exalted. I propose to consider in this section, somewhat in detail, not only the impairment and aberration of memory which may properly be considered symptomatic of acute disease of the brain and disorder of the mind, but those singularly obscure, and inexplicable cases of total and modified paralysis of the faculty, consequent upon injuries inflicted on the delicate nerve vesicle, either by inflammation resulting in adventitious depositions in the substance, or on the surface of the brain and its membranes, mechanical violence to the head, or by atheromatous changes in the structure of the cerebral vessels (fatty degeneration), disordered states of the cranial circulation, and conditions of mal-nerve nutrition. This division of the subject will involve a consideration of, 1. Acute Disorders of the Memory. 2. Chronic(modified) Affections of the Memory. What is memory? How are we enabled by an effort of volition to reproduce previous mental conceptions, revive past states of consciousness, and recal to the mind a long and complex train of apparently obliterated and forgotten thought? Are the ideas carefully housed, registered, and classified in hidden and mysterious cells, vesicles, or chambers of the brain? If so, what is, to adopt the language of Cicero, the nature of this "thesaurus omnium rerum ;' where the situation of the vesicular mental repository and cerebral treasure-house destined to garner, preserve, and protect from injury the myriads of ideas that obtain an entrance into the mind through the media of the senses? Is memory a distinct sovereign power, exercising independent autocratic authority, or, is it one of the results of a combined or complex operation of several of the mental faculties? The facts to be detailed, and principles enunciated in the subsequent pages will, I hope (to a limited extent), satisfactorily answer the important preceding interrogatories in relation to the metaphysics, or psychology of memory. When speaking of this faculty we should fully recognise the philosophical distinction between what is termed, the automatic operations of the mind Before analysing in detail the morbid phenomena of memory, as illustrating the incipient symptoms of obscure diseases of the brain and mind, it will be necessary to consider the natural order in which various classes of ideas stand in relation to each other, not only as to the priority of their admission into the mind, but durability of their impression on the sensorium. Metaphysicians agree in the opinion, that qualities of objects and events, are more easily retained in the mind than dates and names; in other words, that the intellect takes a more tenacious grasp of adjectives, than of substantives. Gratiolet considers that the ideas of things are more or less allied to the notions we have of ourselves, and that they are effaced the more easily the less they are thus associated and identified. General ideas disappear from the mind only after those that are particular and contingent. An object, he affirms, has two names; one generic and the other specific. The former is more easily retained than the latter. When a man is seen for the first time, a certain distinct idea is formed of him, from his aspect and qualities, before his name is known. He is a particular man, great or little, blond or dark, before he becomes to the observer, John, Peter, or Thomas. The relation of names to things is often accidental and arbitrary. There is not in this respect a general order, it is a fortuitous association of a sign and involved in the spontaneous and involuntary reproduction to the consciousness of former mental impressions, and that condition of the intellect connected with the revival of ideas by an act of volition, the former state being properly termed memory, and the latter recollection. "Memory," says an able logician, “is not an original power or faculty. It is made up of two ingredients, the thing remembered and the idea of having seen it. The last ingredient, however, consists of three component parts, our present remembering self, our past remembering self, and these being united by certain trains of consciousness, unite the two selfs, which form a compound, called by metaphysicians personal identity."-(James Mill.) of a thing. That alone remains readily in the memory which is conceived according to a natural order. If the memory becomes enfeebled, it is with regard to proper names that this enfeeblement is first apparent. There are in this respect many differences among men, according to the degree of importance with which words are appreciated. One man investigates particularly facts, from whence results a spontaneous definition of things, and the name of objects or persons will be but of accessory importance. Another will touch slightly on the fact, and pre-occupy himself with the name. This is witnessed constantly among naturalists.* Some are best acquainted with objects, others with names. If (according to the same authority) the memory becomes enfeebled in two men of this character, he who has the most vivid image of facts, will lose the memory of words before that of things, whilst the other, contented with the sign, will forget everything in losing the "I cannot help," says an eminent metaphysical philosopher, "taking this opportunity of expressing a wish that medical writers would be at more pains than they have been at hitherto, to ascertain the various effects which are produced on the memory by disease and old age. These effects are widely diversified in different cases. In some it would seem that the memory is impaired in consequence of a diminution of the power of attention; in others, that the power of recollection is disturbed in consequence of a derangement of that part of the constitution on which the association of ideas depends. The decay of memory, which is the common effect of age, seems to arise from the former of these causes. It is probable that as we advance in years the capacity of attention is weakened by some physical change in the constitution ; but it is also reasonable to think that it loses its vigour partly from the effect which the decay of our sensibility and the extinction of our passions have in diminishing the interest which we feel in the common occurrences of life. That no derangement takes place in ordinary cases in that part of the constitution on which the association of ideas depends is clear from the distinct and circumstantial recollection which old men retain of the transactions of their youth. In some diseases this part of the constitution is evidently affected. A stroke of palsy has been known, while it did not destroy the power of speech, to render the patient incapable of recollecting the names of the most familiar objects. What is still more remarkable, the name of an object has been known to suggest the idea of it as formerly, although the sight of the object ceased to suggest the name."-Dugald Stewart's "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind." memory of names. But in both the one and the other the first result of an enfeeblement of the memory will be a species of dissociation between the ideas of things in themselves and of the arbitrary names which designate them. “A distinguished savant," says Gratiolet, "connected with one of the continental academies, is unable to designate his confrères by their names, and he characterizes them by their works. If he speaks of one of them, he expresses himself thus, 'My confrère who has written such a book; who has made such a discovery.' He designates him, in short, not by his name, but by a quality. Things are first known to us by a certain number of qualities which affect us, the ideas of qualities being generators of the ideas which we have of things considered as substances. In the order of acquisition of ideas, the substance predominates over the accident, and the accident predominates over the foundation. Thus the general idea of being, united to the particular idea of a certain number of properties, suffices for a definition, and in practice these spontaneous definitions precede the names. What is this called?' we say every day. What is the name of this round object-of this green object?' The arbitrary name comes but afterwards, the name is then secondary and added, it is then less essential, and ought to be lost first in this process of interior dislocation in which the ideas separate themselves with greater or less difficulty, the one from the other, on account of the degree of their reciprocal affinities." This theory, Gratiolet affirms, enables us to understand why proper names disappear first, then substantives, which are the proper names of things. Adjectives or qualificatives disappear last, and everything disappears with them, because we cannot have an idea of a thing |