for that statute, even the printed statute book of a sister state would be incompetent to prove the laws of such state, and parol testimony would not be evidence for that purpose; for the written laws of other states cannot be proven by such evidence. (a) Where a statute of a private nature is declared to be a public act, its contents need not be pleaded, nor shown to the court, but the court will take notice of them as they do of all other public statutes.(b)

§ 829. Under the statutes of Michigan, the printed copies of all statutes, acts, and resolves of the state, whether of a public or private nature, which shall be published under the authority of the government, shall be admitted as sufficient evidence thereof in all courts of law, and on all occasions whatsoever.(c) Printed copies of the statute laws of any other of the United States, or of the territories thereof, if purporting to be published under the authority of the respective governments, or if commonly admitted and used as evidence in their courts, shall be admitted in all courts of law, and on all occasions in this state, as prima facie evidence of such facts.(d)

§ 830. In regard to private statutes, resolutions, &c., the only mode of proof known to the common law, is either by means of a copy proved on oath to have been examined by the roll itself, or by an exemplification under the great seal. In those states where the statutes have made provision, that the printed copies of the laws and resolves of the legislature, published by its authority, shall be sufficient prima facie evidence of the statute, as is the case in the states above named; the common

(a) Comparet v. Jernegan, 5 Blackf. R. 375.

(b) 5 Blackf. R. 171; Beaumont v. Mountain, 10 Bing. 404. (c) R. S. 1837-8, 438, sec. 48.

(d) Id. sec. 49.

law rule in this respect seems to have been changed. There seems no good reason why a similar statutory provision should not be made in all the states, as it is the invariable course for the legislatures of the several states, as well as of the United States, to have the laws and resolutions of each session printed by authority. Confidential persons are selected to compare the copies with the original rolls, and superintend the printing. The very object of this provision is to furnish the people with authentic copies; and from their nature, printed copies of this kind, either of public or private laws, are as much to be depended upon as the exemplifications verified by an officer who is to keep the record. (a)

§ 831. In Massachusetts it has been held, that the printed book of the printers to the general court is not evidence of a private act, as it is of public statutes.(b) It is now, however, provided by statute that the printed copies of all statutes, acts, and resolves of the commonwealth, whether public or private, which shall be published under the authority of the government shall be admitted as sufficient evidence thereof in all courts of law, and on all occasions whatever.(c) A similar statutory

provision exists in New Jersey.(d) In Illinois a similar provision exists, including statutes of the state and the United States, and the several states and territories.(e) The public statutes of other states, are not judicially noticed by the courts of other states, but are to be shown in the same manner as private statutes.(f)

(a) Greenl. Ev. sec. 480; 6 Bin. 326.

(6) Kennebeck Purchase v. Call, 1 Mass. R. 483.

(c) R. S. Mass. 1836, p. 577.

(d) R. S. N. J. 1847, p. 714.

(e) R. S. Ill. 1845, p. 232.

(f) Pearsall v. Dwight, 2 Mass. 84; Legg v. Legg, 8 Mass. 99; Walker v. Maxwell, 1 Mass. 104; Beuchamp v. Mudd, Hardin's R. 165; Herring v. Selden, 2 Aik. 12; Elliot v. Ray, 2 Blackf. R. 31; Cone v. Cotton, id. 82;

§ 832. As to the mode of the proof of foreign statutes, there is some diversity in the rule which prevails in the different states. By an act of congress, the acts of the legislatures of the several states (to be evidence) must be authenticated by having the seal of the respective states affixed thereto. A printed pamphlet containing the laws of one state is not evidence in another. Where the law offered in evidence was the insolvent law of the state of Louisiana, printed in a small pamphlet form, in the French and English languages, with no seal affixed; this law was held inadmissible, not being authenticated in the manner required by the act of congress, that is, under the seal of the state of Louisiana. (a) The written or statute laws of sovereign countries, without the United States, must be proved by the laws themselves, (b) if they can be procured; if not, inferior evidence of them may be received, and the unwritten laws by parol evidence.(c) That the laws of a foreign nation, designed only for the direction of its own affairs, are not to be noticed by the courts of other countries, unless proved as facts, cannot be questioned; but the public laws of a foreign nation on a subject of common concern to all nations, promulgated by the governing powers of the country, can be noticed as law by courts of admiralty in this country, if those laws have been promulgated in the United States, by the joint act of that department which is entrusted with foreign intercourse, and of that which is invested with the power of war, on the ground, that they assume a character of notoriety which renders them

Stout v. Wood, 1 id. 71; Canal Co. v. Railroad Co., 4 Gill & John. 1, 63 ; Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. 112, 130; Talbot v. David, 2 Marsh. R. 603, 609; Tarlton v. Briscoe, 4 Bibb, 73, 75; 3 Wend. 267; 7 Wond. 435; 1 Paige R. 226.

(a) Craig v. Brown, Pet. C. C. R. 352.

(b) Robinson v. Clifford, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 1.

(c) Consequa v. Wibling, Pet. C. C. R. 225.

admissible in our courts. (a) An oath is required for the proof of foreign laws, unless they are verified by such other high authority which is equivalent to the oath of an individual. It has been held, that in order to prove the laws of Portugal, the principle that the best testimony shall be required which the nature of the case will admit of, or, in other words, that no testimony should be admitted which presupposes better testimony attainable by the party who offers it, applies to foreign laws as it does to all other facts. The certificate of the consul not sworn to, that the laws are truly copied from the originals, is not evidence.. To give to such a certificate the force of testimony, it will be necessary to show that this is one of those consular functions to which, to use its own language, the laws of this country attach full force and credit. That although consuls are officers known to the law of nations, and entrusted with high powers, they do not appear to be entrusted with the power of authenticating the laws of foreign nations. They are not the keepers of those laws. They can grant no official copies of them. It was urged in the case where this question arose, that to require, respecting laws or other transactions in a foreign country, that species of testimony which their institutions and usages do not admit of, would be unjust and unreasonable. Marshall, Ch. J. said: "The court will never require such testimony. In this, as in all other cases, no testimony will be required which is shown to be unattainable. But no civilized nation will be presumed to refuse those acts of authenticating instruments which are usual, and which are deemed necessary for the purposes of justice. It cannot be presumed that an application to authenticate an edict by the seal of the nation, would be rejected, unless the

(a) Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1.

fact should appear to the court, nor can it be presumed that any difficulty exists in obtaining a copy. Indeed, in this very case the testimony offered would contradict such a presumption. The paper offered to the court is certified to be a copy compared with the original. It is impossible to suppose that this copy might not have been authenticated by the oath of the consul as well as by his certificate."(a)

§ 833. The question as to the mode of the proof of the due enactment of a statute, under a constitutional requirement, has in the state of New York been the subject of much forensic and judicial discussion; and as the subject is an important one, we deem it advisable in this connection to present, somewhat at length, the views and opinions which have been elicited on that subject. In Thomas v. Dakin,(b) the question was raised on demurrer. In that case the plaintiff sued as president of a banking association created under the general law authorizing the business of banking. The objection was taken that the act under which the association was formed did not, as was required by the constitution, receive the assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature. But in this case it was admitted, that upon demurrer it would be presumed that the act had been constitutionally passed. The court did not, therefore, deliberately consider or pass upon this question. Mr. Justice Cowen, at the close of his opinion, said: "But this branch of the argument need not be pursued, for it was agreed on both sides, at the bar, that we must on this record presume the general banking law to have been passed by two-thirds of all the members elected to both houses. We must clearly do so, until

(a) Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 187; 1 Cond. R. 393, 394. (b) 22 Wend. R. 9.