a repeal of the same. (a) In The King v. Cator,(b) it was decided that a former statute, inflicting a penalty of £100 and three months imprisonment, on persons enticing away artificers, was virtually repealed by a subsequent statute inflicting £500 penalty and twelve months imprisonment, for the same offence; and the same principle was adopted in the case of The King v. Davis.(c)

§778. A limited privilege granted to a few individuals, is merged in a more enlarged privilege granted to all the inhabitants of a state by a subsequent general statute. Thus where a statute provided, that the inhabitants of a particular town might separate from a religious society by the performance of certain conditions, a subsequent act gave such power to all the inhabitants of the state, upon the performance of only part of those conditions; and it was held that the one was repugnant to the other, and operated as a repeal of the former statute. The limited privileges secured by the special statute was merged in the more enlarged privileges granted by the latter act. (d)

§ 779. An analogous principle has been applied under a general statute, directing the mode of attachment on mesne process, and selling by execution shares of directors in an incorporated company; and it has been held that such general act operated as a repeal of a different provision for the same object in a prior statute incorporating a particular turnpike company. The incorporating act provided, that the shares in the turnpike should be taken, deemed, and considered as personal estate, to all intents and purposes, and that such shares might be attached and might be sold on execution in the same man

(a) Leighton v. Walker, 9 N. H. R. R. 61.

(b) 4 Burrow, 20, n. c.

(c) 1 Leach Cases, 306.

(d) Gage v. Currier, 4 Pick. 399.

ner as was or might be provided for the sale of property by execution. By the general act, directing the mode of attaching on mesne process, and selling by execution shares of debtors in incorporated companies; particular directions were given as to the course to be pursued when any such shares were attached, and also when they were sold on execution, and by one section it was enacted, that the shares and interest held by any person or persons in any such company, might be attached on mesne process, and taken and sold on execution in the manner provided by that act, any thing in the act incorporating such company to the contrary notwithstanding. The court held the general act must govern the mode of proceeding, on the ground that it was intended to have a retrospective operation, and that the fifth section provided expressly that a sale made in this way only, should be good, notwithstanding a different mode might have been provided in the several acts of incorporation.(a)

§ 780. A different rule has been held to govern in cases where a particular provision is contained in an act of incorporation, passed subsequent to a general statute upon the same subject, and that the provisions of the subsequent act superseded the general provisions of a prior general act. Thus in 1805 a statute was enacted directing the mode of proceeding by attachment on mesne process, and selling by execution shares of debtors in incorporated companies, and by this statute the shares or interest of any person in any turnpike, bridge, canal, or other company, then before incorporated, or which might be incorporated, might be attached, &c., and directed the mode of proceeding, &c. In 1807 a fire insurance company was incorporated, and the property of any member of stock was made liable to attachment, and a

(a) Starkweather v. Howe, 17 Mass. 240.

mode of proceeding varied from the directions of the general statute was prescribed, and a question was made, whether the attachment and levy should have been according to the mode prescribed by the general act, or as prescribed by the subsequent act of incorporation, and it was held the latter must govern. It was made a matter of some doubt by the court, whether the former general statute was intended to apply to corporations so dissimilar in the condition and mangement of their property as turnpikes, &c. were, when compared with banks and insurance companies, and that it might be, the other companies mentioned in the general statute, were other like companies instituted for those definite and permanent establishments, and not monied institutions; which doubt was strengthened by the fact, that the several statutes by which institutions for banks and insurance companies were incorporated, as well before as since the passage of the general act, contained provisions regulating attachments on executions, by which the shares were to be trnsferred. But whether this might be considered as a legislative construction of the term other companies or not, the latter statute must be regarded as settling the rule of proceeding. This particular mode provided for in the incorporating act, might be considered in the nature of a special privilege, and a designed variance from the general rule.(a)

§ 781. In another case this rule was extended to a case, where the general statute was passed subsequent to the incorporating act, so far as it regarded rights acquired by performance of a condition provided for in the first act; and it was held, that even in that case, the former act which contained the grant was to govern, and that the general statute did not supersede the private

(a) Titcomb v. Union Insurance Company, 8 Mass. R. 326.

act.(a) The decision in this case may at first impression seem in conflict with that in the case of Starkweather against Howe, above cited. The distinction which governed in this case, seems to have been the fact, that the act of incorporation giving the right to toll, upon the performance of certain acts specified in the act of creation, which had been complied with, and the right having thus become vested, was not affected by subsequent provisions of a general character.

§ 782. Where a statute does not, in express [terms, annul a right or power given to a corporation by a previous act, but only confers the same rights and powers upon the same corporation under a new name, and with additional powers, such subsequent act does not annul the rights and powers given to the corporation under the former act and under its former name.(b) In another case it has been held, that where, upon the trustees of a local corporation, were conferred by law the powers of certain officers, as defined by a general act of the legislature, and such general act was subsequently revised and re-enacted, though with alterations, repealing the former act, the power of such trustees did not cease; but that, on the contrary thereof, they possessed all the powers conferred, and were subject to all the duties expressed by the revised act, upon the class of officers, in reference to whose powers and duties their own were originally declared and set forth, as the same were applicable to the corporation they represented.(c)

783. Where the provisions of a revising statute are to take effect at a future period, and the statute contains a clause repealing the former statute upon the same subject, the repealing clause does not take effect until the

(a) Nichols v. Bertram, 3 Pick. 344.

(b) The Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. R. 474. (c) Mitchell v. Halsey, 15 Wend. 241.

other provisions. of the repealing act come into operation.(a)

§ 784. Where a statute contains a provision saving from repeal a part of a former statute which had been already repealed, such a provision will be regarded as a nullity, and will not operate as a revivor of the repealed clause thus attempted to be saved. The court, in such a case, will regard the saving clause as improvident, and will presume that the legislature had overlooked the fact that the clause thus attempted to be saved from the ef fect of a repeal, had in fact already been repealed by a previous statute.(b)

§ 785. Where some parts of a revised statute are omitted in the revising act, the parts omitted are not to be deemed as revived by construction, but are to be considered as annulled. Thus, in Bartlett v. King,(c) it was held that a statute of 1754, concerning donations and bequests to pious and charitable uses, was not in force, and that on the gronnd that the legislature had in 1785 legislated upon the same subject, and had omitted to reenact the provision of the former statute. In one case(d) a question arose, whether a parol lease for a year was valid under the statute of 1783, c. 27, sec. 1, which declared that all leases by parol, and not put in writing, and signed by the parties so making the same, should have the force and effect of leases at will only. It was argued that a judicial construction had been put upon an English statute, nearly similar, in which it had been held that parol leases, for an uncertain time, with a reservation of an annual rent, might be good as leases from

(a) Spalding v. Alford, 1 Pick R. 33.

(b) See Ashley, appellant, 4 Pick. R. 21. (c) 12 Mass. 537.

(d) Ellis v. Paige, 1 Pick. 43.