legislature any intention at variance with any of the sound and moral principles of law, or as coming into conflict with any vested rights. In Den v. Robinson,(a) the plaintiff claimed title under the statute de donis conditionalibus, on the decease of his father, who died seised in tail 12th March, 1798. The statute under which his title accrued was on 13th June, 1799, declared by a legislative act to be no longer in force in the state, and it was contended that subsequent to the passage of the latter act, the plaintiff could not come in and make title under the former act. But it was held, that as the estate if it passed at all, passed before the date of the act of 1799, and hence that the repeal of the first act, or the rendering it for the future inoperative, did not destroy an estate already vested under its authority. In another case,(b) the same rule was applied, and it was held, that repealing, or rendering inoperative for the future, an act, would not destroy an estate already vested under it; and that where one statute is repealed by another, acts done in the meantime while it was in force shall endure, stand, and be effectual.

§ 764. Another illustration of this rule is found in a case(c) where an act of congress, providing for the compensation of collectors of duties, gave to the collector three per cent. on all moneys received on account of duties arising on goods imported into the United States within his district. Duties had arose under that act while in force. A supplementary act was passed, the words of which were, "That in lieu of the commissions heretofore allowed by law, there shall from and after the 30th day of June next, (1800) be allowed to certain collectors named, two and a half per centum, on all mo

(a) 2 Southard, 706.

(b) Den ex dem. Jones v. Dubois, 1 Har. 286. (c) The United States v. Heth, 3 Cranch, 399.

neys which shall be collected and received by them. The question in the case was, whether those collectors were restricted to two and a half per cent. on moneys collected on account of bonds taken previous to the passage of the latter act. It was held they were not. On behalf of the United States it was contended, that the rights of the collectors of duties, with regard to their compensation were absolutely submitted to the will of congress; that congress had uniformly increased or diminished that compensation as circumstances suggested the expediency of that measure, without regarding any supposed limitation of their right to do so, imposed by claims of their officers; and it had been the uniform policy of the government to apportion the commission according to the actual receipt of money; and, therefore, whatever may have been the proportion of their labor or responsibility, their right to compensation was not consummated before the actual receipt of the duties and the amount of their commission remained liable to be increased or diminished at the will of congress; and in passing their act of May 10th, 1800, they had a right to give it a retroactive operation, and the latter words of the second section, "arising on goods imported," would bear and ought to receive such a construction. Johnson, J., held, that the rights of the collectors of duties, as to their compensation, were submitted to the justice and honor of the country that employed them, until consummated by the actual receipt of the sums bonded in their respective offices; but where an individual had performed certain services, under the influence of a prospect of a certain emolument, that confidence which it was the interest of government to cherish in the minds of her citizens, a confidence which experience left no room to distrust in our own, would lead to a conclusion, that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to defeat a reasonable expectation of her officers, suggested

by her own laws. Unless, therefore, the words were too imperious to admit of a different construction, it would be gratifying to the court to be able to vindicate the justice of the government, by restricting the words of the law to a future operation. That it was the policy of the United States, in granting compensations to her revenue officers, to limit the consummation of their right to the actual receipts of money, was evident from a view of all her acts on that subject. Upon considering the question, therefore, upon the construction of the act, they were confined to the single inquiry, how far the government had exercised its power in reducing the compensasion to the defendant from three to two and a half per cent.? The words of the act, "arising on goods imported," although in themselves very indefinite in point of time, would receive a precise signification in this respect by supplying the words "heretofore," to give them a past, or "hereafter," to give them a future signification. If it were necessary that the court should make an election between the words, in order to complete the sense, its choice should be immediately determined by recurring to two well known rules of construction, viz., that it ought to be consistent with the suggestion of natural justice, and that the words should be taken most strongly contra proferentem. But there were other considerations which would lead to such a conclusion, without supplying any supposed deficiency in the wording of the sentence. There was nothing, either in the terms made use of, or in the professed object of the law, necessarily retrospective; but the general intention of the act, as well as the signification of the word "arising," both pointed to a future operation. Besides which, where it could be shown that a government had once adopted a certain rule of justice for its conduct, it was fair to infer, that in legislating afterwards upon the same subject, it was

intended to pursue the same rule, unless the contrary should be clearly expressed; and in the act of 3d March, 1797, which varied the compensation of the revenue officers in several particulars, that alteration was expressly restricted to take effect only with regard to future importations. Mr. Justice Patterson held, words in a statute ought not to have a retrospective operation, unless they are so clear, strong, and imperative, that no other meaning could be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature could not be otherwise satisfied. This rule ought especially to be adhered to when such a construction would alter the pre-existing situation of parties, or would affect or interfere with their antecedent rights, services and remunerations, which was so obviously improper, that nothing ought to uphold and vindicate the interpretation, but the unequivocal and inflexible import of terms and the manifest intention of the legislature. The word "arising" referred to the present time, or time to come, but could not, with any propriety, relate to the subject-matter, and the words with which it was associated. Thus the word "arising," coupled with the words "on goods imported," showed that the whole clause had a future bearing and aspect, and would not justly admit of a retroactive construction. According to this view, the commission of two and a half per cent. was to be restricted to moneys received by the collector on account of the duties arising on goods, wares, and merchandise which should be imported after the 30th of June, when the act went into operation. To fortify the foregoing construction, it might be added, that the words of a statute, if dubious, ought, in cases of the present kind, to be taken most strongly against the makers.

§ 765. It has been held, that the repeal of a statute conferring jurisdiction took away all right of proceeding under the repealed statute, even in regard to suits pend

ing at the time of the repeal.(a) This rule has been applied in regard to penal statutes, as we shall have occasion hereafter to show, and the same rule has been held as to the consequences of a repeal against a civil right, so long as it remains inchoate. Such was the case in the case of Miller. (b) In that case the repeal was held to work the same consequences against a civil right. Miller, an imprisoned insolvent, had been compelled to assign his property, and was entitled to be discharged, by an order of the court of quarter sessions, as early as the 26th of September, 1761. But the 2 Geo. 3, ch. 2, had already passed, repealing the compulsory clause— such repeal to take place from and after the 19th of November of that year. The insolvent urged his discharge, but the sessions adjourned from time to time till after the 19th, then refused to grant it, on the ground that the repealing act had taken place. On motion for a mandamus, Lord Mansfield, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the court, and held that no jurisdiction now remained in the sessions. He cited the repealing clause, which to be sure, was very strong, "That from and after, &c., the same is hereby repealed to all intents and purposes whatsoever." But this, according to what was held in Surties v. Ellison, and other cases on the repealing clause in 6 Geo. 4, ch. 16, was no more than a simple repeal. The first section of the 6 Geo. 4, simply repealed all the previous statutes of bankruptcy; but by the last section, the section was not to take effect till the 1st September, 1825. And there being no saving clause as to acts of bankruptcy committed, or any inchoate proceedings under the former acts, it was held that the court had no power to imply a saving clause, although it was plain that by a

(a) Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill R. 324.

(b) 1 Blacks. R. 451.