considered as remedial, and are to be liberally and beneficially expounded. This rule has sometimes been thought contradictory to the rule we have been considering, as most of these statutes are, in their consequences, penal. There is an important distinction, however, which should be taken into consideration, that where the statute acts upon the offender and inflicts a penalty, such as imprisonment or fine, it is in this respect penal, and the old authorities were that it must be construed strictly.(a) But where it acts upon the offence, as by setting aside the fraudulent transaction, in this respect it is remedial. The rule that statutes against frauds, when they operate upon the offence, are to be liberally construed, so as to avoid the transaction, is recognized in other cases.(b)

§ 732. Although statutes which are made with the view of providing for divesting one of his estate, are to be construed with the same degree of strictness as are penal statutes, yet it has been held, in construing statutes giving powers which are to be applied to great public objects, depending for their success upon the judgment of the officers entrusted with their execution, and in whom there must of necessity be large discretionary power, the interpretation should be liberal. But this rule has been placed upon the ground that they partake of a remedial character. While, on the one hand, these statutes are to be regarded as remedial acts, intended to carry into execution important equitable provisions in favor of private rights, on the other hand they are not to be so construed as to embarrass or defeat their purpose.(c) Although it is true that statutes in derogation of a common law right, or which abridge the liberty of the subject, are, as

(a) 1 Kent, 465; 1 Burrow, 274.

(b) Dudley, Geo. R. 182.

(c) Tide Water Canal Co. v. Archer, 9 Gill & J. 479.

a general rule, to receive a strict construction, and courts have no right to extend them beyond the plain meaning of the words,(a) yet even in these cases, as in cases of penal statutes, the evident intent of the legislature ought not to be departed from by a too forced or over constrained construction.(b)

§ 733. By penal statutes, strictly speaking, are meant, as we have seen, such as impose a penalty or forfeiture on such as transgress the provisions of them. It by no means follows, however, that every statute wherein a penalty or forfeiture is annexed to an act or an omission to act is a penal act, as a penal statute may be penal in one part and yet be a remedial law in another.(c) Very different rules of construction may prevail when interpretation is to be applied to a statute of this two-fold character, from that which would be applied to one solely of a penal nature. Hence it always becomes a matter of inquiry which particular provision of a statute partakes of the nature of a penal or of a remedial law. The rule generally stated in a previous section obtains that a statute which only gives a remedy to a party aggrieved, by way of increased or aggravated damages, is not to be considered as a penal law. (d)

§ 734. The distinction between a statute wholly penal and one which is partly penal and partly remedial, is important, inasmuch as the same words in the same statute have in some instances been held to bear a different determination, dependent upon the nature of the suit in which the rule of construction was to be applied. Thus, under the statute of the 9th Anne, ch. 14, against gaming, which enacts that if any person shall lose, at any one time or sitting, £10, and shall pay it to the winner,

(a) Vaugh. 179; 4 Bing. 183.

(c) 1 Wils. 126; Day, 702.

(b) 14 Pet. R. 464; 8 Mod. 65.

(d) 1 Wils. part 1, fol. 412.

he may recover it back in three months; and if the loser should not, within that time sue for it, any other person may sue for it and treble value besides; the judges held, in a case where an action was brought by the loser to recover fourteen guineas, which had been won and paid after a continuance at play, except at an intermission during dinner, that the statute was remedial so far as to prevent the effects of gaming without inflicting a penalty, and therefore in this action they would consider it one time or sitting. But if the action had been for the penalty, they would have construed it strictly, and held that the money had been won at two sittings. The same principle has been recognized in this country. Thus, in Barnabus Palmer v. The President, &c. of York Bank,(a) in an action by an individual under a statute which gave to the party injured four times as much damages as is allowed by law for the detention of the debt, although it was penal in its nature, as the damages are given to the party injured, who ought to recover a just debt, to which the incurred damages were made an incident; a suit, therefore, was not to be regarded as properly a penal suit, the statute being a remedial law.(b)

§ 735. Chancellor Kent(c) recognizes this distinction, and says that" statutes against fraud are generally considered as remedial, and are to be liberally and beneficially expounded. The latter rule has sometimes been thought to be contradictory, as most statutes of this character are in their consequences penal. There is an important distinction, however, which should be taken into consideration, that where the statute acts upon the offender, and inflicts a penalty such as imprisonment or fine, it is in this respect penal, and the old authorities were that it

(a) 18 Maine, 166.

(b) 13 Pick. 96.

(c) 1 Kent Com. 465.

must be construed strictly. (a) But where it acts upon the offence, as by setting aside the fraudulent transaction, in this respect it is remedial, and should be construed liberally."

§ 736. A statute which is purely remedial ought always to receive such a construction as to suppress the fraud or mischief, and so as to attain its ends, for such a construction is for the furtherance of justice.(b) It is by no means unusual, in construing such a statute, to extend the enacting words beyond their natural import, in order to include cases in the same mischief. An English author lays down the rule, that whatever doubts may be entertained of the propriety of extending the words of a statute by equitable construction, to embrace cases, conveyances, times, places, persons and things, besides those expressed in the act, there can be no question that the words of a remedial statute are to be construed largely, so as to suppress the mischief and advance the mischief.(c) Professor Dane admits this rule, and assigns, as a reason therefor, that this is necessary to guard against the subtle delays and evasions for private advantage, and to give life and strength to the remedy, according to the true intent and meaning of the makers of the law pro bono publico.(d)

§ 737. Chancellor Walworth, in the case of Cole v. Savage, (e) applied this rule in a case arising under the statute against usury, where the words of the act, in their strict and restrained sense, only applied to the borrower. He held, that there was no reason why the rules which controlled the construction of remedial

(a) 1 Burrow, 274.

(b) Dane Ab. 600; 2 Dwarris, 715; 2 Y. & J. 196.

(c) 1 Stew. El. C. 28.

(d) 6 Dane Ab. 600.

(e) MSS. Dec. March, 1844.

statutes in general should not be applied to the provisions of this act, in carrying out the provisions which the legislature had so explicitly declared. He said: "It was true the word borrower alone is to be found in this section; and if the statute is to be construed literally by restraining the term 'borrower' to the particular individual to whom the loan was actually made, the remedy which the legislature intended to give to a complainant who came into this court for relief against usurious security, will not benefit either the surety of the borrower, or his grantee, or heirs, or devisees, or personal representatives. It was impossible to believe that such could have been the intention of the legislature. He had no doubt the new principle declared by the legislature must be extended to a complainant claiming under and in privity with the original borrower. A remedial act was to be construed liberally to carry into effect the intention of the legislature, and may be extended by construction to other cases within the same mischief, though not within the words of the statute." Numerous cases are to be found in which remedial statutes have been held to extend to other persons or other things than those expressly mentioned in the statute, where the principle of the statute and the mischiefs intended to be remedied was equally applicable to them.(a) The statute of 9th Rich. 2, ch. 3, which gave a writ to the reversioner, upon a recovery against a tenant for life, tenant in dower, tenant by the courtesy, or tenant in tail, after possibility of issue extinct, was held to extend to a remainder-man, although the reversioner alone was mentioned.(6)

(a) Reilway's Rep. 96; 1 Coke R. 256; 1 Plow. Rep. 36; Coke's 2 Inst. 43, 152, 382.

(b) Winchester's case, 3 Coke R. 4.