their operation a case, also fully within the mischiefs which the legislature designed to remedy. In reference to the doctrine that penal statutes are to be construed strictly, the same learned judge, in another case, said, "I agree to this rule in its true and sober sense, and that is, that penal statutes are not to be enlarged by implication, or extended to cases not obviously within their words or purport. But where the words are general, and include various classes of persons, I know of no authority which would justify the court in restricting them to one class, or in giving them the narrowest interpretation, where the mischief which is to be redressed by the statute is equally applicable to all of them. And where a word is used in a statute, which has various known significations, I know of no rule that requires the court to adopt one in preference to another, simply because it is more restrained, if the objects of the statute equally apply to the largest and broadest sense of the word. In short, it appears to me, that the proper course in all these cases is, to search out and follow the true intent of the legislature, and to adopt that sense of the words, which harmonizes best with the context, and promotes in the fullest manner, the apparent policy and objects of the legislature. The most restricted sense, then, is not, as a matter of course, to be adopted as the true sense of the statute, unless it best harmonizes with the context, and stands best with the words and with the mischief to be remedied by the enactment.(a)

§ 729. The case last cited, arose under an indictment against the master of a ship for having from malice, and without justifiable cause, on the high seas, beaten and imprisoned one J. B., one of the crew, against the statute 3d March, 1835, c. 40, sec. 5. The third section

(a) The United States v. Winn, 3 Sumner, 211.

of the statute provided, "That if any master or other officer of any American ship or vessel on the high seas, or within any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, shall from malice, hatred, or revenge, and without any justifiable cause, beat, wound or imprison, any one or more of the crew of such ship or vessel, or withhold from them suitable food and nourishment, or inflict upon them any cruel or unusual punishment, every such person so offending shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine not exceeding, &c., or by imprisonment not exceeding, &c., or by both according to the nature and aggravation of the offence." The question presented for the consideration of the court was, whether the offence when committed by the master upon the chief or other officer of the ship, was an offence within the purview or intent of the statute. In other words, whether the word "crew," in the section, was used in contradistinction to other officers of the ship, and so including the common seamen or mariners only, or whether the word "crew," in the sense of the statute, embraced all the officers except the master, as well as the common mariners. It was held that it did include all except the master. Mr. Justice Story, after laying down the rule in the language above quoted, says: "Now the word 'crew' has several well known significations. In its general and popular sense it is equivalent to company. He then proceeded to cite several authorities to show that such was its popular meaning. He then adds:-The general sense of the word crew' being then, as I think, equivalent to ship's company, which, it can scarcely be doubted, embraces all the officers as well as the common seamen; that sense ought not to be displaced unless it is manifest that the legislature have used the word 'crew' in a more restrictive sense; and this must be ascertained, either from the context, or from the object to be accomplished by

the enactment. Now in examining our laws upon maritime subjects, it will be found, that the word crew' is used sometimes in the general sense above stated, and sometimes in other senses more limited and restrained. It is sometimes used to comprehend all persons composing the ship's company, including the master; sometimes to comprehend the officers and common seamen, excluding the master; and sometimes to comprehend the common seamen only, excluding the master and officers. But in these two last clauses, I think upon close examination it will be found, that the context always contains language which explains and limits the general to the particular sense." After referring to other provisions of the statute, for the purpose of ascertaining the true sense of the word as intended by the legislature, he says:"Upon the whole, after much deliberation upon the subject, I adhere to the construction which was stated to the jury at the trial. I think the word 'crew' was intended to include the officers as well as the common seamen; and that the section uses the word as equivalent to ship's company. In this view it is used in the same sense as it is in the first and second sections of the act; and for purposes equally important to the due protection of all engaged in the maritime service, and equally necessary for the safety and security of the voyage."

§ 730. It has been held, that courts are not to narrow the construction of penal statutes, but are to give effect as near as may be, to the plain meaning of words, and where they are doubtful they are to adopt the sense that best harmonizes with the context, and the apparent policy and object of the legislature.(a) In the case of Rex v. The Inhabitants of Hodnett,(b) it was held, that bas

(a) Pike v. Jenkins, 12 N. H. R. 256.

(b) 1 D. & E. 96.

tards were within the meaning of the marriage act, 26 Geo. 2, c. 33, which required the consent of the father, guardian, or mother, to the marriage of persons under age, who are not married by banns; and that there was no reason to except illegitimate children, for they were within the mischiefs intended to be remedied by the act. Buller, Justice, in that case said: "It is not true that the court, in the exposition of penal statutes, are to narrow the construction. We are to look to the words in the first instance, and, where they are plain, we are to decide on them. If they be doubtful, we are then to have recourse to the subject-matter; but at all events it is only a secondary rule. Now these words are very general. The act speaks of all persons, except under particular circumstances. Then does this come within any of the exceptions? If it do not, it falls under the general regulations established by the act. Besides, the rule that a bastard is nullius filius, applies only to the case of inheritances; it was so considered by Lord Coke." Mr. Justice Woodbury, in commenting upon the rule that penal statutes are to be construed strictly, says; "But this rule of construction, if we recur to the principles upon which it is founded, appears often to have been misapplied to statutes, and should generally be confined to the declarations on penal statutes, and to the evidence adduced in support of the declarations." In a subsequent part of the same decision he adds: "A statute, if of public utility, as is the uniform presumption, should be so construed as to effectuate the intention of its makers. This intention, to be sure, must be gathered from the language and subject-matter of the statute. But when once so gathered, it is no less important to society, and no more severe upon the offender to enforce it in penal statutes than in remedial ones. Indeed so

ciety at large have often more interest in a liberal extension of some penal statutes, and in those merely

penal, not including such as inflict corporeal punishment, the offender has often less at stake. Without such a construction too, this class of statutes become almost a dead letter, prosecutions are a mockery, and malefactors encouraged."(a) In Powlter's case,(b) Lord Coke observes: "It is frequent in our books, that penal statutes have been taken by intendment, to the end they should not be illusory, but should take effect according to the express intention of the makers of the act;" and in Plowden,(c) "it was the opinion of all the justices that though things which do not come within the words 'of penal statutes,' shall not be taken by equity, 'yet' the words of them may be construed beneficially, according to the intent of the makers thereof. It is also said the rule that penal statutes are to be construed strictly, when they act upon the offender and inflict a penalty, admit of some qualifications. In construction of statutes of this description, it has been often held, that the plain and manifest intention of the legislature, ought to be regarded; a statute which is penal to some persons, provided it is beneficial generally, may be equitably construed; even in cases of felony courts have regarded the intention of the legislature."(d)

§ 731. It has also been held that revenue laws for the prevention of fraud, for the suppression of a public wrong, or to effect a public good, are not, in a strict sense, penal acts, although they impose a penalty, but ought to be so construed as most effectually to accomplish the intention of the legislature in passing them, instead of being construed strictly in favor of the defendant. (e) So, too, statute against frauds are generally

(a) Fairbanks v. The Town of Antrim, 2 N. H. R. 105.

(b) 11 Co. 34.

(c) Page 86.

(d) Sickles v. Sharp, 13 J. R. 198.

(e) Taylor et al. v. The United States, 3 How. R. 197.