plain and clear, they are to understood according to their genuine and natural signification and import, unless, by such exposition, a contradiction or inconsistency would arise in the statute by reason of some subsequent clause -from whence it might be inferred that the intent of the legislature was otherwise.(a) And where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed; and in such case there is no room for construction. But if from a view of the whole law, the evident intention is different from the literal import of the terms employed to express it in a particular part of the law, that intention should prevail; for that, in fact, is the will of the legislature.(b)

§ 651. In the construction of a statute, by a consideration of all its parts, great difficulty not unfrequently arises from the fact that there may be, in some parts of the act, general words inconsistent with the import of particular words in other parts of the same act. It is said (c) that general words in an act of parliament may be qualified by subsequent sentences or clauses in the same statute. In Andree et al. v. Fletcher, (d) the question arose whether an insurance in England on a foreign ship was void within the statute 19 Geo. 2, c. 37, which declared "that it should not be lawful to make re-assurance, unless the insurer shall be insolvent, become a bankrupt, or die." It was contended, that because a prior part of the statute which restrained insurances, interest or no interest, had been held not to extend to foreigners, this clause should also be confined to insurances on English

(a) Parker, 233; Hob. 93, 97; United States v. Bright, C. C. U. S., Pa. Pamph. 188; Bac. Ab. Stat. I.

(b) United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 386, 399.

(c) 8 Modern, 8; Rex v. Archbishop of Armagh et al.

(d) 1 T. R. 161.

ships. Buller, J. said: "It has been argued, because one clause of this statute does not extend to foreign ships, the others shall not. But if, in the same act of parliament, there be one clause which applies to a particular case, and another which is conceived in general terms, the former shall not restrain the signification of the latter. But it rather operates the other way, for it shows that the legislature had both cases in their view at the time of passing the statute, and when they meant to confine the prohibition to British ships, they have done so ; but where they did not intend to confine it, they have omitted the restriction."

§ 652. It would seem, on reading the rules laid down in the two cases last cited, that they are directly in conflict with each other; and yet, such apparent conflict evidently arises from the unqualified and unguarded manner in which, the proposition is laid down in 8 Modern. The true rule in reference to that proposition is that laid down by Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of Adams v. Wood, (a) which is this-that the general expressions of a statute may be restrained by subsequent particular words, which show that in the intention of the legislature, those general expressions were used in a particular SENSE." That is, where from the whole act it is manifest that the legislature intended to use the general words in the restricted sense of subsequent particular words, in such case, as the intent is to be followed when apparent, the general words are to be controlled and restricted so as to meet the provision of the act expressed in the particular language, used in subsequent parts of the same act. This rule is based upon the ground that where a general intention is expressed, and the act also expresses a particular intention which is incompatible

(a) 2 Cranch, 336.

with the general intention, the particular intention is to be considered in the nature of an exception. (a)

§ 653. Where a particular thing is given or limited in the preceding part of a statute, this shall not be taken away or altered by any subsequent general words of the same statute.(b) This rule may perhaps be illustrated by the following example. The law of Virginia, December 15, 1776, usually termed the penitentiary act,(c) in the first section enacts that "no crime whatsoever committed by any free person against the commonwealth, except murder of the first degree, shall be punished with death. In all the subsequent sections, the word free is omitted, and no words of reference are used so as to connect them with the first section. Yet it has been uniformly held, that all the provisions of that law relate to free persons only, and that the subsequent sections, although the words are general, shall be restricted by the first, and the general intention of the legislature indicated in that section.

§ 654. It is not unfrequently the case that a statute in its general provisions embraces cases which are intended by the legislature not to be included within it. Such cases are usually taken out of the statute by a saving clause or a proviso. A saving clause in a statute is only an exception of a specific thing out of the general thing mentioned in the statute.(d) There are instances in which the saving clause is repugnant to the purview of the act, and in such cases it is said that the saving clause is void. (e) This rule proceeds upon the same principle that prevails in reference to deeds, that a reservation of

(a) 5 Bing. 180 and 492, 3 ; Ibid. 68.

(b) Standen v. The University of Oxford, 1 Jon. 26; 1 Step. El. L. 6. (c) Rand Abr. 359.

(d) 1 Kent, 462; Co. Litt. 381.

(e) 1 Rep. 47; Alton Wood's case, Plow. 564.

the thing granted being repugnant to the grant itself, so that both cannot consistently stand; and as the deed is to be taken most strongly against the grantor, as something was evidently intended to be granted, the reservation is void on the ground of such repugnancy.

§ 655. The following instances are illustrations of the rule above stated. I. S. was tenant in fee simple of the manor of Dale, or tenant in tail thereof, the reversion to the king. An act of parliament was passed, giving this manor, in express words, to the king, saving the right, title and interest of all persons; and it was held, that the saving clause did not save the estate of I. S., for the reason that the saving as to the owner of the land was repugnant, inasmuch as the manor is, by express name, given to the king; and if the general saving should be extended to the owner of the land, then the act would be made in vain. So, too, if it be recited in an act of parliament, that whereas I. S. is seised of certain land in fee, and the land by the act is given to the king in fee, saving the estates and rights of all persons, the estate of I. S. is not saved; for that would be repugnant to the grant, and make the express gift void. Numerous instances of this character are stated in the case of Alton Wood.(a) It is there said, "And it appeareth in our books, that a saving in an act of parliament which is repugnant to the body of the act is void, as in Plowden Com. 563, b. where the supposed attainder of the Duke of Norfolk was, by an act of parliament, declared to be null and void ab initio, saving the estate and leases made by King Edward VI., that saving was void; for when the attainder was declared to be void, the said saving was against the body of the act, and therefore void."(b)

(a) 1 Co. 47.

(b) See also Riddle v. White, 4 Cwill. 1394;' Ward v. Cecil, 2 Vern. 711; 5 Cru. Dig. 23; Viner's Ab. Stat. E. 8, pl. 5.

§ 656. When it is said, that where the saving is repugnant to the purview of the act, it is void; by the purview of the act is to be understood, the enacting part, or body of the act, in contradistinction to the preamble. (a) Although it is true that the rule above laid down is well establised, it is equally true, that the purview of a statute may be restrained by a saving in the statute, and such saving will be effectual for that purpose in all cases, where it is not repugnant to the body of the act; that is where the saving clause may prevail, and yet not quite overthrow the entire body of the act, or render it completely nugatory; (b) as in the case of a deed, the language of the grant may include an entire estate, and there may be in the same deed a reservation or exception of part of the thing granted, which will be good; although a reservation of all that was granted would be void, on the ground of repugnancy to the grant. In the former case both may stand, and yet the deed have some effect as a grant, whereas in the latter, both cannot stand without rendering the grant entirely nugatory. The rule itself, as well as the reasons for it, apply with equal force in the construction of a statute as of a deed. The reason for the rule, and the principle upon which it is based in all cases, sheds light upon the question as to whether a saving is void or not, and if kept distinctly in view will enable any one readily to determine questions arising under this rule.

§ 657. We have seen that a saving clause is only an exception of a specific thing out of the general thing mentioned in the statute. The object of a proviso to a statute is, to either except something from the enacting clause, or to qualify or restrain its generality, or to ex

(a) Paynes v. Canner, 3 Bibb, 181

(b) Thornly and Fleetwood v. Duchess of Hamilton, 10 Mod. 115.