however broad some of its expressions may be, yet if from such examination it shall clearly appear that they are, and were intended to be limited by other provisions of the same, or other acts on the same subject, it cannot be improper to restrain them accordingly. The first embargo law having required no security against its violation from any other than registered or sea lettered vessels, those licensed for the coasting trade were at liberty to depart from any port, without bond being given to reland their cargo in the United States. This omission was soon perceived, and in the very next month a supplementary act was passed. By the first section of this act, in case of a vessel licensed for the coasting trade, a bond was to be given in double her value and that of her cargo, that she should not proceed to any foreign port, and that the cargo should be relanded in the United States; and the second section provides, that it shall be sufficient in the case of a licensed vessel whose employment has been confined to rivers, bays and sounds, to give a bond in an amount equal to three hundred dollars for each ton, with condition that such vessel shall not be employed in any foreign trade during the terms limited in the condition of the bond. Having thus confined, by heavy penalties, coasting vessels within their legitimate spheres, the provisions of the third section most obviously refer to other vessels, for it can hardly be imagined, that after taking such ample security from river vessels, it would be thought necessary to impose on all sloops, &c., navigating different rivers of the United States, the necessity of taking a permit or clearance every time they sailed; for the permit which might have been obtained at the time of the vessel's being licensed, would not be a compliance with the act. But whatever doubts might be entertained on the construction of the section, it is much diminished, if not entirely removed, by a provision we find in another of the supplementary

embargo laws, which was passed 25th April, 1808, subjecting to forfeiture vessels of the description of the Elizabeth, if they depart from any district of the United States without having previously obtained a clearance. There is no way of accounting for this act, passed by the same legislature and at the same session, than on the supposition that, in their opinion, such vessels were, under the same laws, liable to no penalty whatever for leaving the port without a clearance; for if this interdiction already existed, and that under the heavy penalties of a forfeiture, what use could there be in saying, and that too by way of further sanction, that she should be forfeited by leaving a district, when departing only from a port was already followed with that consequence? This, then, is not deemed a cause of forfeiture.

§ 641. Statutes enacted at the same session of the legislature are to be taken in pari materia, and should receive a construction which will give effect to each if possible. But if each of them cannot have the same entire effect, when taken in connection with the others, that it would have if taken singly, they must be construed so as to give effect to what appears to have been the main intent of the legislature. This rule was laid down and acted upon in the case of The State v. Rackley.(a) In this case, on conviction under an indictment, the jury acquitted the defendant of costs, which were moved for non obstante veredicto. The question arose under the statute of 20th January, 1824; the seventy-second section provided, "Costs of suit shall, in all cases of conviction, be included in the judgment, where the jury do not find otherwise." Holman, J., says, "It is not contended but that this provision, taken in itself, confers on the jury a right, in cases of conviction, to acquit the de

(a) 2 Black. R. 249.

fendant of costs. But it is urged, that this power in the jury is virtually taken away by the act regulating the fees of officers, which was passed at the same session of the legislature, and approved 30th January, 1824. By which statute it is enacted, that the officers therein mentioned shall be entitled to receive for their services the fees thereby allowed. Then follows a list of services for clerk, sheriff, &c., in criminal cases, in which it is stated that the prosecuting attorney's fee for every conviction upon indictment or presentment shall be five dollars. The fees in criminal cases allowed by this act, are the costs for which the judgment is usually given, and what the act, in ordinary acceptation, presupposes that the person convicted shall pay. This is the plain meaning of the act. But this meaning is not expressed in such positive terms as to authorize the court in saying that the act would admit of no other, if we should thereby render ineffective a previous enactment of the same legislature. This act gives the officers a right to the enumerated fees, but does not say in express words, that they shall be paid by the defendant in all cases of conviction; and the legislature having previously authorized the jury to acquit the defendant of costs, we cannot say that the two acts are so contradictory that they cannot stand together. Although by this construction, we find the officers of the court entitled to certain fees in criminal cases, without any legal method of obtaining them, whenever the jury think proper to discharge the defendant from the payment of the costs. There is another act on the subject of fees of the prosecuting attorney, which was also approved on 30th January, 1824, which provides, that in all judgments in criminal prosecutions against any defendant or defendants, the sum of five dollars shall be taxed in the bill of costs in favor of the prosecuting attorney. This act seems to be more repugnant to the dispensing power of the jury with respect to

costs, than the act regulating fees; yet if this act is not altogether inconsistent with that, we should give it that construction which, in our opinion, will give effect to what might have been the intention of the legislature in their several enactments. These acts being passed at the same session of the legislature, are to be taken in pari materia, and to receive a construction which will give effect to each if possible; but as each cannot have the same entire effect, when taken in connection with the others, as it would have if taken singly, we must so construe them as to carry into effect what appears to have been the main intention of the legislature. That intention we conceive to be this:-In criminal cases, the several officers, including the prosecuting attorney, shall be allowed certain fees, which, as a general rule, shall be taxed in the bill of costs against the person convicted, and for which judgment shall be given; provided, nevertheless, that the jury shall have a right to discharge a person convicted from the payment of costs. We conceive that, by this construction, there is less violence done to the intention of the legislature, than there would be in supposing that they, by one act, intended to defeat another that had been enacted at the same session.

§ 642. So statutes dictated by the same policy, and having in view the attainment of the same ends, and relating to the same subject-matter, may both be considered and construed as one statute. As if one statute prohibit the doing of a thing, and another statute be subsequently passed whereby a forfeiture is inflicted upon the person doing that act, both are to be considered and construed as one act.(a) Or when an action founded upon one statute is given by a subsequent statute in a new case, every thing annexed to the action by the first

(a) Stradling v. Morgan, Plow. 206,

statute is likewise given. (a) Or if a thing contained in a subsequent statute be within the reasons of a former statute, it will be taken to be within the meaning of that statute.(b) But this is confined to those cases, and those only, where the latter statute is in the same reason as the former.(c) So too, where one statute is enlarged by another, and a third is passed reciting the first, the second is to be regarded as virtually recited in the last reciting act. For instance, the 13 Eliz. c. 10, concerning leases made by spiritual persons, was enlarged by 14 Eliz. c. 11; the former was only recited in 18 Eliz. c. 11, yet it was holden, that the latter was virtually recited therein.(d) In this case it was said, there is such a connection between all the statutes concerning leases of ecclesiastical persons, that they have been taken into the construction of one another. The statute of the 32d H. 8, is not recited within the one of 13 Eliz., yet a lease is not warranted upon these statutes, unless it hath the qualifications required by the 32 H. 8. And this course is usual in the construction of statutes in pari

materia.

§ 643. Where one statute is continued, and some additional clauses added in another, the latter statute will be construed as if the former had been recited therein. The 22 and 23 Car. 2, c. 10, for better settling intestates' estates, was continued, with some additional clauses, by 1 Jac. 2, c. 17, and it was holden by Lord Hardwicke, that for this reason, the latter statute must be construed as if the former had been therein recited. Whenever it can be gathered from a subsequent statute in pari materia, what meaning the legislature attached

(a) Bro., Waste, pl. 68.

(b) Ld. Raymond, 1028; Sir Wm. More's case.

(c) Ibid. 1048.

(d) 1 Vent. 246, Bayley v. Minin.