necessarily supposed that they shall be together, or, which is the same thing, that they shall hold a special session for that purpose. And the same construction obtains where they are to do any other judicial act, as to make an order of bastardy, or adjudge the settlement of a poor person. For it is unknown to the laws of England that two persons shall act as judges in the same cause, when at the same time one of them is in one part of the country and the other in another. (a)

§ 582. In this connection, we shall proceed to consider the construction which has been given to particular words, when used in a statute. First, we shall consider the rule that obtains under laws imposing duties on goods, or, in other words, revenue laws. As these acts are intended for practical use and application by men engaged in commerce, the language adopted by the legislature will be interpreted according to the commercial understanding of the terms used. Revenue and duty acts, it should be remarked, are not, in the sense of the law, penal acts, and are not therefore to be construed strictly, nor are they, on the other hand, acts in favor of private rights and liberty, and therefore to be construed with extraordinary liberality. They are to be construed according to the true import and meaning of their terms -and when the legislative intention is ascertained, that and that only is to guide in interpreting such laws. They are not to be strained to reach cases not within their terms, even if it should be conjectured that public pol icy might have reached certain cases; nor on the other hand are their terms to be strained so as to exclude cases clearly within them, simply because public feeling might dictate such an exclusion. In Elliot v. Swarthout, (b) a question arose under the act of 1832, which,

(a) Burn's Justice Introduc. 24.

(b) 10 Pet. R. 150.

after imposing a specific duty on a number of enumerated articles, the section under which the question arose concluded in these words: "And upon all merino shawls made of wool, or all other manufactures of wool, or of which wool is a component part, and on ready made clothing, fifty per centum ad valorem." A question was made whether worsted shawls with cotton borders, and worsted suspenders with cotton ends or straps, were manufactured of wool, or of which wool was a component part. It was admitted as a fact, that worsted was made out of wool by combing, but that it became thereby a distinct article, well known in commerce under the denomination of worsted. The court held, that laws imposing duties on importations of goods were intended for practical use and application by men engaged in commerce, and hence it had become a settled rule, in the interpretation of statutes of this description, to construe the language adopted by the legislature, and particularly in the denomination of articles, according to the commercial understanding of the terms used. That it being admitted in this case that worsted was a distinct article, well known in commerce under that denomination, they must understand Congress as using the term in that commercial sense, and as contradistinguished from wool and woolen goods, another well known denomination of goods. That the classification of the article in this section, showed that Congress had in view a class of goods known as worsted goods, as contradistinguished from wool, and upon which a different duty was laid; and they held that the shawls and suspenders were not a manufacture of wool, or of which wool was a component part.

§ 583. In the case of two hundred chest of tea,(a) it was held that the term "tea" was used in the duty act

(a) 9 Wheat. 430.

in its known commercial sense, and that bohea tea of commerce was not usually a distinct and simple substance, but was a compound made up in China; it came within the duty act under the general word "teas." The court in that case say: "The object of the duty law is to raise revenue, and for this purpose to class substances according to the general usage and denomination of trade. Whether a particular article was designated by one name or another in the country of its origin, or whether it were a simple or mixed substance, was of no importance in the view of the legislature. It applied its attention to the description of articles as they derived their appellation in our own markets, in our domestic as well as our foreign traffic; and it would have been as dangerous as useless to attempt any other classification than that derived from the actual business of human life.

§ 584. Under the revenue act of 1816, a duty is laid on "loaf sugar." In one case, (a) it was held that the words "loaf sugar" must be understood according to their general meaning in trade and commerce, and buying and selling. Mr. Justice Story, in that case, says, "That after all, acts of this nature are to be interpreted, not according to the abstract propriety of language, but according to the known usage of trade at home and abroad. If an article has one appellation abroad, and another at home, not with one class of citizens merely, whether merchants, or grocers, or manufacturers, but with the community at large, who are buyers and sellers, doubtless our laws are to be interpreted according to that domestic sense. But where a foreign name was well known here, and no different appellation exists in domestic use, we must presume that in a commercial law the legislature used the word in the foreign sense. I

(a) United States v. Breed et al. 1 Sumner, 159.

say nothing as to what rule ought to prevail where an article is known by one name among merchants, and by another among manufacturers, or the community at large, in interpreting the legislative meaning in a tariff act. Congress, under such circumstances, may, perhaps, be fairly presumed to use it in the more general or more usual sense, rather than in that which belongs to a single class of citizens. What then is meant by "loaf sugar" in a commercial sense, by which I mean not merely among merchants, but among buyers and sellers generally in the domestic trade? Has it any generally received uniform meaning? If it has, then that must be presumed to be the meaning adopted by the legislature. I agree to the law as laid down in the case of the two hundred chests of tea. (a) That case was fully considered, and as deliberately weighed as any which ever came before the court. It was there laid down, that in construing revenue laws, we were to consider the words not as used in their scientific or technical sense, where things were classified according to their scientific characters and properties, but as used in their known and common commercial sense in the foreign and domestic trade. Laws of this kind tax things by their common and usual denomination among the people, and not according to their denomination among naturalists, or botanists, or men of science."

§ 585. It has also been held, that it is a well settled rule of interpretation of laws of this sort, that articles grouped together are to be deemed to be of a kindred nature and of kindred materials, unless there is something in the context which repels that inference. That noscitur a sociis is a well founded maxim, applicable to revenue as well as penal laws. (b) That laws impo

(a) 9 Wheat. 430.

(b) Adams v. Bancroft, 3 Sum. 386.

sing duties are never construed beyond the natural import of the language, and duties are never imposed upon the citizen upon doubtful interpretation; and as every duty imposes a burthen on the public at large, and is construed strictly, and must be made out in a clear and determinate manner from the language used. (a)

§ 586. In the case of The Schooner Nymph,(b) a question arose as to the meaning of the word "trade" under the license law, respecting the carrying on business by vessels in certain trades. The vessel in question had been licensed to carry on the cod fishery, and the question was whether the trade of mackerel fishery could be carried on under such a license, the act having declared that the vessel should be forfeited in the event that any vessel should be employed in any other trade than that for which she was licensed. It was contended, on the part of the claimant, that the word "trade" was here used in its most restricted sense, and was equivalent to traffic in goods, or buying and selling in commerce or exchange. But it was held, that such was not the true sense. The word "trade" was often used, and indeed generally used in a trade sense, and as equivalent to occupation, employment or business, whether manual or mercantile. That whenever any occupation, employment or business was carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts, or in the learned professions, it is constantly called a trade. It was used in this sense when we speak of the art, mystery or trade of various mechanics whose trade was carried on without buying or selling goods. The words of this section showed that "trade" must mean something more than mere traffic in goods, or commercial buying and selling. The very language implied

(a) Adams v. Bancroft, 3 Sum. 387.

(b) 1 Sumner, 516.