cannot control a clear and express enactment, there are numerous decisions. Thus under the statute of England respecting legacies to subscribing witnesses to wills; the preamble of the statute states a doubt, which applied only to wills of land; who were to be deemed legal witnesses within the statute of frauds, and for the purpose of avoiding that doubt the statute was professedly made. But then, as the enacting part went beyond that object, and applied to witnesses attesting the execution not only of wills of real estate, but also of "any will or codicil," it was held, that as in these words, there was not any ambiguity, they clearly applied to every will and codicil. The preamble, although it might assist the construction of ambiguous words, could not control this clear and express enactment, and that the statute applied to wills of personalty also.(a) The true rule on this subject, deduced from all the authorities, is, that the preamble may be resorted to in restraint of the general words of the enacting clause, when it would be inconvenient when not thus restrained, or when no particular inconvenience would result from having it thus restrained. And the preamble may also be resorted to in explanation of the enacting clause, or as a key to its construction when the intent is doubtful; but it cannot control the enacting clause when expressed in clear and unambiguous terms.

§ 574. The true meaning of a statute is generally and most properly sought for and ascertained from the purview and body of the act;(b) that is in construing the words and collecting from them the intention of the legislature, regard must always be had to the subjectAs illustrative of the application of this rule,

matter.

(a) Lees v. Sammersgill, 17 Ves. 510.

(b) Strode v. The Stafford Justices, 1 Brock. 162.

suppose a statute use the word maintenance, now this word, abstractedly considered, is in itself equivocal; but suppose we find the act in which it is used directed against the encouragement of litigation, and the upholding parties to suits, keeping in mind the purview of the act, we at once perceive what was designed to be prevented, or in other words, discover what was intended by the act. We have in another place stated the civil law rule on this subject, and cited instances illustrative of it. (a) The intent of the legislature is not to be collected from any particular expression in any one clause; but from a general view of the whole of an act; and if the court find in any particular clause an expression not so large and extensive in its import as those used in other parts of the act, and upon a view of the whole act it can collect from the more large and extensive expressions used in other parts the real intention of the legislature, it is their duty to give effect to the larger expressions.(b)

§ 575. Upon all acts of the legislature, such construction should be made as that one clause shall not frustrate and destroy, but on the contrary, shall explain and support another(c)-sound exposition requiring effect to be given to every significant clause, sentence or word in a statute. In one case where the question was whether a provision in an act was general, or related only to assaults on revenue officers, qua officers, Buller J. said: "The intention might be collected from other parts of the act. It is fair to infer that the legislature meant to extend the indemnity in the first section to all those cases in which, by the subsequent clause, they gave the right of changing the venue." In this instance, and in

(a) See secs. 462, 480, 484, 485, 495.

(b) Per Best, J., 4 Bingh. 196; Dwarris, 703, 704. (c) Hard. 344, pl. 1.

many others, prior clauses were allowed to be restrained by subsequent clauses in a statute. But where a clause which is separate and substantive itself creates an offence, the court may give judgment for that offence as a misdemeanor, notwithstanding there may be another section in the same statute giving a specific punishment.(a) This principle is illustrated in another place.

§ 576. In construing a doubtful clause in a statute, it will often be a question whether a clause be a substantive, independent clause, or only a qualification of an antecedent clause. It is difficult to lay down any precise general rule applicable to all such cases. Where, however, a section is by way of proviso, it can only be considered as a clause dependent on a former clause, unless the manifest intention of the legislature require a different construction.(b)

The na

§ 577. A saving must be of a thing in esse. ture of a saving is to preserve a former right, and not to give or create a new one. We have remarked in another place that it may restrain and qualify the purview, but was never allowed to overturn it. (c) When words are at the beginning of a sentence, they may govern the whole as nullus liber homo.(d) When words are at the end of a sentence, they refer to the whole.(e) Thus the words per legem terræ, in c. 29 of Magna Charta, being towards the end of the chapter, have always been held to refer to all the precedent matter.(f) But if words are in the middle of a sentence, and sensibly apply to a particular branch of it, can they be extended to that

(a) Rex v. Harris, 4 T. R. 202. See Rex v. Robinson, 2 Burr. 799. (b) 1 Stev. Elec. L. 23.

(c) 2 Inst. 32.

(d) In Mag. Char.

(e) 2 Inst. 50.

(f) 1 Stev. Elec. L. 21.

which follows? Agreeable to reason, and in grammatical construction, it should seem not; but as statutes are read without breaks and stops, it is not at any time clear that words belong to any particular branch of a sentence; it must be collected from the context to what they relate, and they are often to be read distributively -reddendo singula singulis.(a)

§ 578. A proviso is something engrafted upon a preceding enactment.(6) It was held by all the barons of the exchequer, that where the proviso of an act was directly repugnant to the purview of it, the proviso should stand and be held a repeal of the purview, because it was said it speaks the last intention of the lawgiver. It was compared to a will in which the latter part, if inconsistent with the former, supersedes and revokes it.(c)

§ 579. There is a known distinction in the law between an exception in the purview of an act and a proviso, which should be noted. If there be an exception in the enacting clause of a statute, it must be negatived in pleading; a separate proviso need not. (d) The rule is, that any man who will bring an action for a penalty on an act of parliament, must show himself entitled under the enacting clause; but if there be a subsequent exemption, that is a matter of defence, and the other party must show it to exempt him from the penalty.(e) Buller J. says: "I do not know of any case for a penalty on a statute, where there is an exception in the enacting clause, that the plaintiff must not show that the party whom he sues is not within it.(ƒ) Lord Mansfield has

(a) See Dwarris, 704; 1 Stev. Elec. L. 21.

(b) Rex v. Taunton St. James, 9 B. & C. 835.

(c) The Attorney General v. Governor and Company of Chelsea Water Works, Fitz. 195; Bac. Ab. Tit. Statute.

(d) Dwarris, 661.

(e) Spiers v. Parker, 1 T. R. 141; 8 T. R. 542.

(f) 8 T. R. 542.

said: "What comes by way of proviso in a statute must be insisted on, by way of defence, by the party accused; but where exceptions are in the enacting part of the law, it must appear in the charge that the defendant does not fall within any of them.”(a)

§ 580. Where a statute delegates an authority to a particular person or to a particular class of persons, where it is evident that a personal trust or confidence is reposed in those persons, and especially where the exercise and application of the power is made subject to his or their discretion or judgment, the authority is purely personal, and cannot be delegated to another unless there be a special power of substitution. Such is the rule in relation to powers created by deed or will, a fortiori it is so, where the authority is conferred by an act of the legislature. It has accordingly been held that where authority was conferred upon the canal commissioners to enter upon and take the property of individuals for the construction of a canal, that this power could only be executed by them in person or under their express directions; and that an engineer, or any other subagent, could not lawfully exercise such power but by the express direction of the canal commissioners, or one of them, although such engineer had been entrusted with the superintendence of the construction of the canal in the vicinity.(b)

§ 581. The general rule is, that where a statute gives authority to one person expressly, all others are excluded.(c) This rule seems founded upon the principle that a special power is always to be construed strictly. Thus, where an act of parliament gave power to "two parties finally to hear and determine an offence," it is

(a) Fost. 430; East P. C. 167.

(b) Lyon v. Jerome, 26 Wend. R. 485. See also 11 Rep. 64. (c) 11 Rep. 59, 64.