§ 557. In the case of The United States v. Fisher,(a) the court remarked. "On the influence which the title ought to have in construing the enacting clause, much has been said, and yet it is not easy to discover the points of difference between the opposing counsel in this respect; neither party contends that the title of an act can control plain words in the body of the statute, and neither denies, that taken with other parts, it may assist in removing ambiguities. Where the intent is plain, nothing is left to construction. Where the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seems every thing from which aid can be derived may be resorted to; and in such cases, the title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due share of consideration." It may, in some cases, be a key which opens to the mind the general scope and import of the act, or the inducements which led to the enactment, and thus point to the polar star of construction, that is, the intention of the lawmakers, which has always been held as the only true guide in the construction of all statutes. But as the title is usually drawn without much deliberation, unless it points with great precision to the object and scope of the act, it must always be regarded as a very unsafe and unsatisfactory expositor of a law. It is seldom that it alludes to the subject-matter of the act, and even in cases where it does so, it is in general and sweeping terms, embracing within its scope not more than one or two of the multifarious matters to which the enacting part extends, and it will be found in almost all cases, that the enacting part goes much beyond either the title or preamble, and it must, as has already been remarked, be resorted to only in those cases where there is great stress of doubt as to the intention of the legislature, and is no

(a) 2 Cranch R. 386.

farther to be relied on, than it serves when taken into consideration with the enacting part, to complete the chain by which the mind may be drawn to a conclusion on the great question of the real intent and design of the act.(a)

§ 558. It is said, in a note to the Philadelphia edition of Bacon on Abridgment, "But in the more ancient statutes, which are penned with less precision and detail, the title is often material, as in the statute 4 Edw. 3, c. 7, giving a remedy to executor for certain trespasses, and 7 East R. 132-4, is referred to as an authority on that point." The case referred to, however, is not an adjudication to that effect. However it may be in England, it has been held in this country the title may in some instances claim some degree of notice.

§ 559. In the case of United States v. Palmer,(b) it is said that the title of an act cannot control its words, but may furnish some aid in showing what was in the mind of the legislature; and in that case the title was resorted to by Chief Justice Marshall, in the determination of what crimes were intended to be included in an act of Congress. Other cases have held that the title of an act may be resorted to, to aid in the interpretation. (c) It is now the constant practice, in courts of justice, for both the counsel and the court, in examining a statute of doubtful import and meaning, to refer to the title in aid of a particular construction.

§ 560. The Preamble.-In England, and in some of the states of this Union, it has been and still is the practice to preface statutes with a preamble which was at one time supposed to contain the motive and induce

(a) 1 Kent's Com. 464; 3 East, 165.

(b) 3 Wheat. 610.

(c) State v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey, 334; Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ham. 219.

ments of the legislature in passing the act. This, as well as the title, forms no part of the enacted law, and is meant merely as a declaration of the mischief intended to be remedied, sometimes pointing to the defects in the existing law, and the manner of the remedy.

§ 561. The preamble may be compared with the different clauses of the act, to collect the intention of the legislature, and where the intention is apparent, not to extend the act. The preamble may be used in restraint of the general enacting clause, where it would be inconvenient if not restrained, or it may be resorted to in explanation of the enacting clause, if it be doubtful.(a) In one case in England, the preamble of an act of parliament, reciting that certain outrages had been committed in particular parts of the kingdom, was adjudged by the court of king's bench to be admissible in evidence, for the purpose of proving an introductory averment in an indictment for a libel; that outrages of that description had existed, for the reason that where an act was passed, it was, in contemplation of law, the act of the whole body of the kingdom.(b)

§ 562. Although the preamble has been held to form no part of the statute or enactment, (c) yet in doubtful cases resort has been had to the preamble, as well as the title, for the purpose of discovering the inducement the legislature had to make the law, and the true intent and meaning of the legislature in its enactment. (d) But where the terms of an enacting clause are clear and unambiguous, neither the preamble nor any thing else

(a) Per Buller, J., Crespigny v. Wittenoom, 4 T. R. 793. See also 4 Inst. 330; Rex v. Marks, 3 East R. 165; Harg. & Butler's Notes on Co. Litt. 70, a; Mace v. Cammell, Lofft, 783.

(b) Rex v. Sutton, 4 M. & S. 532.

(c) Mills v. Wilkins, 6 Mod. 62; 3 Scam. 465.

(d) Edwards v. Pope, 3 Scam. 465.

should be resorted to. It is said,(a) “That though the preamble be generally a key to the statute, yet it does not always open all parts of it; but sometimes the legislature, having a particular mischief in view, to prevent which was the first and immediate object of the statute, recite that in the preamble, and then go on in the body of the act to provide a remedy for general mischiefs of the same nature, but of different species, not expressed in the preamble, nor perhaps then in contemplation.

563. Lord Coke considered the preamble of a statute as a key to open the understanding of the statute, and a good means of collecting the intention and showing the mischiefs which the makers of the act intended to remedy, and Lord Bacon has said that it is in general true that the preamble of a statute is a key to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which were intended to be remedied by the statute, and was a maxim of the civilians "cessante leges, proamio cessat est ipsa lex." But it has been very justly said, if the preamble to a statute be a key to its construction, it is to be lamented that it so seldom states the real occasion of the law, and the views of the proposers of it; and every English lawyer is aware how seldom, at least in the older statute, the key unlocks the casket."

§ 564. It is nothing unusual in an act of parliament in England, or a statute in this country, for the enacting part to go beyond the preamble, and the remedy often extends beyond the particular act or mischief which suggested the necessity of the law; and it is not unfrequent that the preamble is merely introductory to the first section of the act, and has no application or reference to other sections or parts of the act.(b)

(a) Mace v. Cammell, Lofft, 782.
(b) Holbrook v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. 251.

§ 565. In the case of The King v. Marks et al.,(a) the defendant was committed under a warrant, charged with felony in aiding and assisting, and being present at and consenting to the administering and taking an oath or engagement to certain persons named, contrary to the statute 37 Geo. 3, c. 123. The preamble to the act only recited certain mischiefs which had arisen from persons attempting to seduce soldiers, sailors and others from their duty and allegiance to the king, and to incite them to mutiny and sedition, to give effect to which, they had imposed pretended oaths upon them. But the body of the act enacted, "That any person or persons who shall in any manner or form whatsoever administer, or cause to be administered, or be aiding or assisting at, or present at, or consenting to the administering or taking of any oath or engagement purporting or intending to bind the person taking the same, to engage in any mutinous or seditious purpose, or to disturb the public peace, or to be of any association, society or confederacy formed for any such purpose, or to obey the order or command of any committee or body of men not lawfully constituted, or of any leader, or commander, or other person not having authority by law for that purpose, or not to inform or give evidence against any associate, confederate or other persons, or not to reveal or discover any illegal oath done or to be done, or not to reveal or discover any engagement which may have been administered or tendered to, or whom by, such person or persons, or to, or by, any other person, or the import of any such oath or engagement, shall, on conviction by due course of law, be adjudged guilty of felony." A motion was made to bail the defendant, on the ground of the insufficiency of the warrant, and it was insisted that the words of the

(a) 3 East R. 165.