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the mind. To go elsewhere in search of conjecture, in order to restrain or limit an act, would be but to elude its force, and it will be perceived that such a course would be dangerous in the extreme; for if such a rule should be once established, the brighest light might shine on every letter and sentence of a law; it might be expressed in terms the most clear and determined, yet all this would be useless, were courts to search for foreign reasons to maintain what was not to be found in the sense it naturally presented to the mind. (a) Thus, in Crocker v. Crane,(b) it was held, where the meaning of a statute is plain, all technical rules as to the force or construction of particular terms must yield to the clear expression of the paramount will of the legislature; or where the meaning is manifest, the intention of the legislature should be carried into effect, even though apt words are not used in the act. A writer on American law says: "Where the intention of the legislature is found, there can no question arise, but that must be the rule and guide, for when perceived by judges, a deviation from it must be intentional, and so wholly unjustifiable. As judges may as well make a new statute of their own, and decide the case by it, as designedly to depart from the understood meaning and intention of the legislature. When the meaning is satisfactorily perceived and understood, there is no room for a liberal, or strict, or equitable, or large, or narrow, or other construction, than according to the meaning. (c) The Supreme Court of the United States have held, that where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the legislature must be intended to mean what it has plainly expressed, and con

(a) Vattel, b. 2, c. 17, sec. 263. (c) 6 Dane Ab. 600.

(b) 21 Wendell, 211.

sequently no room is left for construction. (a) Mr. Dwarris lays down the rule thus: "But though the judges, in interpreting the law, are to explore the intentions of the legislature, yet the construction to be put upon an act of parliament must be such as is warranted by, or at least not repugnant to, the words of the act. Where the object of the legislature is plain and unequivocal, courts ought to adopt such a construction as will best effectuate the intentions of the lawgiver. But they must not, in order to give effect to what they may suppose to be the intention of the legislature, put upon the provisions of a statute a construction not supported by the words, though the consequence should be to defeat the object of the act.(b) Where the legislature has used words of a plain and definite import, it would be very dangerous to put upon them a construction which would amount to holding that the legislature did not mean what it has expressed. The fittest course in all cases where the intention of the legislature is brought into question, is to adhere to the words of the statute, construing them according to their nature and import, in the order in which they stand in the act of parliament. (c) The most enlightened and experienced judges have for some time lamented the too frequent departure from the plain and obvious meaning of the words of the act of parliament by which a case is governed, and themselves hold it much the safer course to adhere to the words of the statute construed in their ordinary import, than to enter into inquiry as to the supposed intention of the parties who framed the act. (d) They are not (as the most learned members of a learned body best know) to

(a) 7 Cranch R. 52.

(b) Rex v. Stoke Demerel, 7 B. & C. 569.

(c) Rex v. Ramsgate, 6 B. & C. 712.

(d) Rex v. Inhabitants of Great Bentley, 10 B. & C. 520,

presume the intentions of the legislature, but to collect them from the words of the act of parliament; and they have nothing to do with the policy of the law. This is the true sense in which it is so often impressively repeated, that judges are not to be encouraged to direct their conduct "by the crooked cord of discretion, but by the golden metwand of the law;" i. e. not to construe statutes by equity, but to collect the sense of the legislature by a sound interpretation of its language, according to reason and grammatical correctness."(a)

§ 546. The rule we have been considering necessarily arises from what we have already seen, that it is only when there is some ambiguity or doubt arising from other sources, that interpretation has its proper office, and that it is only to be resorted to when there is obscurity as to the meaning, either from the doubtful character of the words, or from other clauses in the same statute, or from an incongruity or repugnancy between the words and the apparent intention derived from the whole structure of the law or its avowed object. As words are the common signs which mankind make use of to declare their intention, one to another, if those signs are definite, distinct and clear, there can be no need to have an interpreter of them. But as the legislature are but men, the language used by them is liable to all that uncertainty and imperfection that pertains to all that is of human origin or that emanates from finite minds. There will from necessity be more or less obscurity in the words used, and they will often be more or less obscure: sometimes they will express the meaning so imperfectly, as to either fall short or else exceed the intention, and express more than is designed, and then it is that the words themselves are to be interpreted. Great care should be

(a) 1 Dwarris on Statutes, 702, 703.

observed that we do not, in all such cases, confound interpretation with criticism. The end of the latter is, to find out what are the words of the law maker, and whether the same is genuine or forged-whether any part or material parts have been foisted in or omitted, or erased or altered. The end of the former is, to find what was the intent and meaning, and to clear up that meaning when obscure-to ascertain the sense of ambiguous words to determine the design when imperfectly expressed.

§ 547. A remedial act should be so construed as most effectually to meet the beneficial end in view, and to prevent a failure of the remedy, and as a general rule a remedial statute ought to be construed liberally. Receiving an equitable, or rather a benignant interpretation, the letter of the act will be sometimes enlarged, sometimes restrained, and sometimes it has been said the construction made is contrary to the letter. (a) This rule will be illustrated in a subsequent chapter, when we come to consider the doctrine of equitable construction. It is proper, however, that we should here remark, that although it is true as a general rule that where the object of a statute is remedial, it is to be construed liberally, so that it may carry out the purposes for which it was designed. The rule has its qualifications, and we should keep distinctly in view a distinction which exists between the remedy merely and proceedings in the attainment of the remedy. In the former case, courts, when looking at the remedy, will take care that the statute shall be so construed as to make it effectual, if possible, in the manner intended; but in the latter case, courts, when scanning the proceedings in attaining that remedy, especially if it be summary in its nature, will be

(a) Dwarris, 718.

strict and rigid in exacting a strict compliance with all the requisites of the statute.(a)

§ 548. We next proceed to consider how far consequences are to be regarded. As a general rule, courts, in the construction of statutes, are not to regard the consequences. This rule, however, is subject to some qualifications and limitations. Where the intent is doubtful, the consequences, resulting from a particular construction, may be regarded. This qualification must always be applied with great caution, and the influence it should have upon the construction must depend on the nature of each particular case to which it is to be applied, especially so in those cases where rights are to be infringed. But where fundamental principles are overthrown,where the general system of the law is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness, to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such an object; and in such a case, courts will regard the consequences of a particular construction. Where, however, a mere political regulation is made, which is inconvenient, if the intention of the legislature is expressed, in terms which are sufficiently intelligible to leave no doubt on the mind; where the words are taken in their ordinary sense, it has been held, that it would be going too far to hold that a constrained interpretation should be put upon the statute to avoid any inconvenience. The reason for this is, that it is but reasonable to presume that the legislature contemplated such an inconvenience, as being probably overbalanced by the particular advantage the act was calculated to produce. The rule may, perhaps, be laid down, that where the construction of a particular statute is doubtful, an argument from inconvenience will have some

(a) Smith v. Moffatt, 1 Barber Sup. Court Rep. 65.

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