tended in the statute the college buildings, it was not well laid out; but if the legislature, by " Bowdoin College," intended not any particular building, but the land holden by the trustees, on which to erect suitable buildings to accommodate the students, their instructors and governors, then a different construction ought to be given to the powers vested in the sessions: that the latter was the intent of the legislature was evident, as the word "college" is more naturally applied to the place where a collection of students is contemplated, than to the hall or other buildings intended for their accommodation.

§ 525. We find another instance of the application of this rule. In Gibson v. Tenney, (a) under chap. 100 of L. 1805, one swine was exempt from attachment for debts, and the question in that case was, whether a swine which had been butchered, but not cut up, the debtor at the time having no other swine, was exempt from attachment. Ch. J. Parker said: "The question presented was more curious than difficult. For if they were to be governed at all, by the manifest intention of the legislature, in making the exemption of a swine from liability to attachment or execution, they must give the exemption effect in that case. For what could have been intended but the sustenance of a poor family, by this exemption. That to give the strict construction contended for, would be to convert the intended benefit into an injury, for the swine would be protected until it became fit for food, and then be at the mercy of the creditor. In answer to the position taken, that this statute was in derogation of common law, and to be construed strictly, he admitted this was true, but that it was also to be construed sensibly, and with a view to the object aimed at by the legislature."

(a) 15 Mass R. 205.

§ 526. The same rule was adopted and applied in the case of Thompson v. Egbert.(a) That case arose under the statute of New Jersey, which enacted, "If a husband shall hereafter devise to his wife, by a will duly executed to pass real estate, any lands or real estate for her life or otherwise, and without expressing whether such devise to her is intended to be in lieu or bar of dower or not, and the said wife shall survive her husband, that then said wife should not be entitled to dower, in any lands or real estate devised by her said husband, unless she shall, in writing, express her dissent to receive the said lands or real estate so devised to her, in satisfaction and bar of her right of dower in other lands," &c. A widow had lands devised to her by her husband, of which she had been evicted by title paramount, and the question was whether she was barred of her dower. The court held, that had the demandant continued in possession of the lands devised, she would, of course, have been barred of her dower under this statute. But as she had nothing under the will, if her temporary continuance in possession should deprive her of her dower, it would be manifestly against right. That whatever might be the literal signification of the words of the statute, it would be contrary to the spirit and intent of the act to make it embrace such a case. That in reference to jointures, if a widow be evicted of any part of it, it was expressly provided that she should be endowed of a proportionate amount of the residue of the husband's lands. So in reference to other testamentary provisions, in money or other chattel interest in satisfaction of dower, the court of chancery, after acceptance and enjoyment by the widow, will allow her to refuse it and claim her dower. This showed the gen

(a) 2 Harr. N. J. R. 459.

eral leaning of the courts and legislatures in favor of widow's rights, that dower was one of the favorites of the law. But if the construction contended for should be adopted, it would be otherwise in New Jersey. That the effect of such a construction in all similar cases would be, either to compel the widow to refuse the testamentary provision which was made in lieu of dower at once, or take the hazard of the insolvency of the estate. That nothing short of a manifest intent upon the part of the legislature, so clear as to leave no doubt, would justify a construction so harsh and unjust. That there was nothing plainer than that the general scope and intent of the legislature was to carry into effect the will of the testator. That this general intent characterized the whole course of legislative and judicial decisions. If it should declare that the widow had in this case not only lost the testamentary provision, but likewise her right of dower, it would violate the intent of the testator, expressed in his will, as well as the real and benevolent intent of the law, which has in general so carefully protected the rights of the widow. There could be no doubt, when the legislature said, "If a husband shall hereafter devise to his wife, by will duly executed to pass real estate, any lands or real estate for life or otherwise," &c., it should be a bar to a claim of dower, it was meant and intended that such devise should take effect according to its terms. That no other construction could be put upon this section consistent with the general scope and end of legislation on this subject. That it was not the object of the statute to bar her dower in such a

case.

§ 527. It is never to be presumed that the legislature had nothing in view in making a law; hence it is another rule that a statute should never be so construed as to render it a nullity, or quite elude its force, but such a construction ought to be put upon it as that it shall have

its full force and effect, and not to be made vain and illusive. (a) In mixed interpretation the rule prevails that we must give to all doubtful words or expressions that sense which will make them produce some effect, and this effect must in general be a reasonable one, and it must likewise be the same that the law makers intended to produce. By this we mean that they are to be so construed as to give them some meaning; for to take them in any sense that will make them produce no effect, is in reality to give them no meaning at all. The rule, therefore, of taking all doubtful words or expressions in such a sense as will make them produce some effect, amounts to the same thing as if we had said that all the words are to be construed in such a manner as will give them some meaning. Any other construction of them, instead of pointing out the intention of the law makers, is to suppose the law makers to have used the words without any intention at all. If the words or expressions are ambiguous, and are susceptible of two senses, either of which will produce some effect, the rule then goes further, and says that the effect must be a reasonable one.(b) This rule is founded in reason and good sense for since the reason of a law consists in the end which the law makers intended to obtain, or in the effect which they intended to produce by it; and since it cannot be supposed that they intended the end, without intending the means, if we give the words such a meaning as to make the law produce the effect which they intended to produce, we give them such a meaning as is agreeable to their intentions. This rule proceeds from the same general principles, from the necessity of giving the words the sense which it is presumed are comformable to the intent of the legislature :(c) and this is conformable to

(a) Hob. 97.

(c) Vattel, b. 2, c. 17, sec. 282, p. 381.

(b) Rutherf. b. 2, c.

7, sec. 8.

the rule of the civil law, that when a law was applied to a case included in its terms, there followed a consequence evidently contrary to the intention of the lawgiver, the law ought not to be extended to that case.(a)

§ 528. If a statute makes use of a word, in one part of it, susceptible of two meanings, and in another part it is used in a definite sense, it is to be understood throughout in the latter sense, unless the object to which it applies, or the connection in which it stands, require it to be differently understood in the two places, but it should. upon the whole be so construed that, if possible, no clause, sentence or word will be superfluous, void or insignificant.(b) Where the words of a statute are susceptible of two meanings, the one favorable and the other hostile to its principal design, the former should prevail and control the construction. (c) In the case of James v. Dubois, the question arose whether the act of 1784, relative to entailments, limited and cut down estate tail created by deed, as well as estates created by devise. The doubt arose from the last clause of the second section, which provided—" And that no entailment of any lands or other real estate shall continue to entail the same, in any case whatever, longer than the life of the person to whom the same hath been or shall be first given or devised by such entailment." It was insisted that the word entailment in this clause must be understood to mean devise, because this same word, in a preceding clause, was used as synonymous with that word. It was admitted that it was so used in the preceding clause, for the reason that the act used the two words in the following connection: "Agreeable to the devise or entailment, after the decease of the

(a) Domat, b. 1, tit. i. sec. 2.

(b) James v. Dubois, 1 Har. 285; Den v. Schenck, 3 Halstead, 34; Den v. Clark, Coxe R. 359.

(c) Lott v. Wyckoff, 1 Barber Sup. Court R. 635.