construction ought to be conformable to the intention of the legislature. It cannot be presumed that the legislature intended any thing absurd. When, therefore, the words when taken in their obvious and proper sense, lead to it, it is necessary to turn them from that sense, just as far as is sufficient to avoid an absurdity, if from the whole purview of the law, and giving effect to all the words used in it, it may fairly be done.(a) The application of this rule is attended with less difficulty, when the words of the law are susceptible of two different senses; for then, the court will adopt that sense which will not lead to an absurdity.

§ 520. It is upon analogous principles, that although the general rule is, that the natural import of the words of any legislative act, according to the common use of them, when applied to the subject-matter of the act, is to be considered as expressing the intention of the legislature, unless the intention so resulting from the ordinary import of the words, be repugnant to sound acknowledged principles of national policy. Yet, if that intention be repugnant to such principles, then the import of the words ought to be enlarged, or restrained, so that it may comport with those principles, unless the intention of the legislature be clearly and manifestly repugnant to them.(b)

§ 521. In consequence of the application of these maxims, similar expressions in different statutes, and sometimes in the same statute, are liable to, and do receive different constructions, so that the true intent of the legislature may prevail. In the report of the judges, (c) this rule was applied. The question submitted to the judges for their opinion was, whether aliens were ratable

(a) Carthew, 134; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 400.

(b) Report of Judges, 7 Mass. R. 523.

(c) 7 Mass. R. 523.

polls, within the intent and meaning of the constitution of Massachusetts; and whether the towns, in ascertaining the number of their ratable polls, in order to determine the number of representatives they were entitled to send to the house of representatives, could constitutionally include in that number, aliens resident in said towns, and predicate a representation on such resident aliens; and whether such representation could constitutionally be predicated on the number resulting from the including in the number of polls, aliens resident in any towns within the commonwealth, and taxed and paying taxes therein.

§ 522. It was by them held, that although by the constitution, the elector of a senator must be an inhabitant of the senatorial district in which he votes, and the elector of a representative must have resided one year in the town, before he could there be a voter. Although an alien might be an inhabitant of a district, because he might there dwell or have his home, yet, that he could not vote; although he might be estimated among the ratable polls. After citing the rules above laid down, they say: "Now we assume, as an unquestionable principle of sound national policy, that as the supreme power rests wholly in the citizens, so the exercise of it, or of any branch of it, ought not to be delegated to any but citizens, and only to citizens. It is therefore to be presumed, that the people, in making the constitution, intended that the supreme power of legislation should not be delegated but to citizens; and if the people intended to impart a portion of their political rights to aliens, this intention ought not to be collected from general words which do not necessarily imply it, but from clear and manifest expressions which are not to be misunderstood. But the words, "inhabitants," or "residents," may comprehend aliens; or they may be restrained to such in

habitants or residents who are citizens, according to the subject-matter to which they are applied. The latter construction comports with the general design of the constitution. There the words "people" and "citizens” are synonymous. The people are declared to make the constitution for themselves and their posterity; and the representation in the general court is a representation of the citizens. If aliens could vote in the election of representatives, the representation would not be of citizens only, but of others." But they also came to the conclusion, that the several towns, in ascertaining their number of ratable polls, in order to determine the number of representatives they were entitled to send, might constitutionally include of their ratable polls, the polls of aliens residing in their towns, who were by law ratable to public taxes, and predicate a representation thereon. In this conclusion, they restrained the general import of the words "inhabitants" and "residents," used in some parts of the constitution, to inhabitants and residents who were citizens, so that they might not unnecessarily fix on the people an intention of imparting any of their rights of sovereignty to aliens. And at the same time they used the words, "ratable polls," according to their common acceptation, on the ground, that there was no principle of construction authorizing a deviation from it; so as to deny to the legislature the right of making the estates and polls of aliens ratable; and that the taxes assessed on the polls and estates of aliens had no effect upon their political rights, but merely influenced the apportionment among the towns.

§ 523. A statute is to be so construed so that it may have a reasonable effect, agreeable to the intent of the legislature. (a) In one case,(b) we find this instance of

(a) Gore v. Brazier, 3 Mass. R. 523, 540; Pease v. Whitney, 5 Mass. R. 380; Stanwood v. Pierce, 7 Mass. R. 458; Gibson v. Jenny, 15 Mass. R. 205. (b) Pease v. Whitney, 5 Mass. R. 380.

the application of this rule. A statute made landholders taxable for all lands in the town, in his own occupation, for the use of the school district in which he lived, but that his lands in the occupation of his tenants should be taxed for the use of the district in which the lands are included. By the subsequent general tax act, the assessors had a discretion vested in them, to tax the owner for lands in the occupation of the tenant, or to tax the tenant himself. It was contended, on the one hand, that this discretion extended as well to county and town taxes, as to state taxes. On the other hand, it was insisted, that this provision in the general tax act, did not extend so as to vest in the assessors this discretion, in assessing school district taxes. The court held, that although a subsequent statute would control the provisions of former statutes which were repugnant to it, according to its strict letter; but that there are exceptions to this rule, depending upon the construction of the last statute, agreeable to the intent of the legislature. If, therefore, the assessors, in making a school district tax, might by availing themselves of this discretion, counteract the equitable principle of equalising the school district assessments required in the first act, the general words of the general tax act ought not to be extended so as to produce that mischief, but should be constrained by a reasonable construction, on the principle that the legislature did not contemplate any alteration in that statute. That by the first statute, a school district, when defined, might vote to raise money for several purposes, as for instance, to build a school-house for the use of the district; and this money was to be assessed on the polls and estates of the inhabitants comprising the district, and on the lands belonging to non-resident owners, and the legislature manifestly intended, that the property of any man once lawfully assessed for the uses of one district, should not be again assessed for the use of

another district. And to secure this intent, the lands of non-resident owners, were to be assessed to the use of one and the same district, and could not afterwards be assessed to the use of another district, and this provision was made that the same lands might not be twice charged in two districts. If this discretionary election in the assessors were to be allowed, then, if in one year a schoolhouse was to be erected in the district where the owner dwelt, and a sum of money was voted for that purpose, the assessors might assess the owner for his land in the occupation of his tenant living in another district; and afterward, even in the same year, if the district in which the tenant lived should also vote money to build a schoolhouse, the assessors having this discretion, might for this tax assess the tenant for the lands in his occupation, and thus a portion of the owner's land, would be charged in two districts with the building of two school-houses, which would be manifestly against the intention of the statute. That intention clearly was, that in defining the district, a resident owner having land in his own occupation, should be assessed for all the lands in the district in which he lived, and his lands in the occupation of his tenants, should be assessed in the district in which the tenant lived.

§ 524. The same principle was applied in another case,(a) where a turnpike road was authorized by the legislature to be located and made from Bowdoin College to a certain place in Bath, and the sessions whose duty it was to lay out the road laid the same seventeen rods distant from the college buildings, and eight rods from the lands appropriated to the use of the college, it was held to be well laid out within the intent of the legislature that if the legislature, by "Bowdoin College," in

(a) Stanwood v. Pierce, 7 Mass. 458.