tion has been deduced the rule, that "in construing a statute, the intention of the lawgiver, and the meaning of the law are to be ascertained by viewing the whole and every part of the act. If any section be intricate, obscure, or doubtful, the proper mode of discovering its true meaning is by comparing it with the other sections, and finding out the sense of one clause by the words or obvious intent of another. (a) This, as Sir E. Coke observes, is the most natural and genuine method of expounding a statute;(b) and it is a true principle, that verba posteriora propter certitudinem addita ad priora quæ certitudine indigent sunt referenda (c)-reference should be made to a subsequent section, in order to explain a previous clause of which the meaning is doubtful. 'It is, in my opinion,' observes Mr. Justice Coleridge, in a recent case,(d) 'so important for the court, in construing modern statutes, to act upon the principle of giving full effect to their language, and of declining to mould that language, in order to meet either an alleged inconvenience, or an alleged equity, upon doubtful evidence of intention, that nothing will induce me to withdraw a case from the operation of a section which is within its words, but clear and unambiguous evidence that so to do is to fulfil the general intent of the statute, and, also, that to adhere to the literal interpretation is to decide inconsistently with other and overruling provisions of the same statute. When the evidence amounts to this, the court may properly act upon it; for the object of all rules of construction being to ascertain the meaning of

(a) Stowel v. Lord Zouch, Plowd. 365; Doe v. Bywater v. Brandling, 7 B. & C. 643, (E. C. L. R. vol. 42.)

(b) Co. Litt. 381, a.

(c) Wing. Max., p. 167; 8 Rep. 236. See 4 Leon. R. 248.

(d) Rex v. The Poor Law Commissioners, (St. Pancras,) 6 A. & E. 7, (E. C. L. R. vol. 33.)

the language used, and it being unreasonable to impute to the legislature inconsistent intents upon the same general subject-matter, what it has clearly said in one part must be the best evidence of what it has intended to say in the other; and if the clear language be in accordance with the plain policy and purview of the whole statute, there is the strongest reason for believing that the interpretation of a particular part inconsistently with that is a wrong interpretation. The court must apply, in such a case, the same rules which it would use in construing the limitations of a deed; it must look to the whole context, and endeavor to give effect to all the provisions enlarging or restraining, if need be for that purpose, the literal interpretation of any particular part.' "(a)

§ 504. It is another rule in the interpretation of written instruments, that the words shall be taken the most strongly against the party employing them.(b) Statutes, however, are not in general within the reason of this rule, because they are not the words of parties, but of the legislature; nor does this rule apply to wills.(c) Where, however, a statute is passed for the benefit of a canal, railway, or other company, it has been observed, that this, like many other cases, is a bargain between a company of adventurers and the public, the terms of which are expressed and set forth in the act, and the rule of construction in all such cases is now fully estabblished to be, that any ambiguity in the laws of the contract, would operate against the adventurers, and in favor of the public, the former being entitled to claim nothing which is not clearly given by the act.(d)

(a) Broom's Legal Maxims, pp. 253, 254.

(6) Co. Litt. 36, a.

(c) 2 Dwarris on Statutes, 688; Lord Bacon's Works, vol. iv. p. 30. (d) Per Lord Tenterden, C. J., Stourbridge Canal Co. v. Wheeley, 2 B. & Ad. 793; Priestley v. Foulds, 2 Scott N. R. 228, per Coltman, J., ibid.

§ 505. Another rule in the interpretation of written instruments, is, that in the absence of ambiguity, no exposition shall be made which is opposed to the express words of the instrument, or, in other words, it is not allowed to interpret what has no need of interpretation;(a) nor will the law make an exposition against the express words and intent of the parties.(b) The rule under consideration applies equally to the interpretation of an act of parliament, the general rule being that a verbis legis non est recedendum. (c) A court of law will not make any interpretation contrary to the express letter of a statute; for nothing can so well explain the meaning of the makers of the act as their own direct words, since index animi sermo, and maledicta expositio quæ corrumpit extum, (d) it would be dangerous to give scope for making a construction in any case against the express words, where the meaning of the makers is not opposed to them, and when no inconvenience will follow from a literal interpretation.(e)(ƒ)

§ 506. Falsa demonstration on nocet.(g) Mere false description does not make an instrument inoperative. Falsa demonstratio may be defined to be an erroneous description of a person or thing in a written instru

226; Gildart ▼. Gladstone, 11 East, 685; Barrett v. Stockton and Darlington Railway Co., 2 Scott N. R. 370; S. C. 3 Scott N. R. 803, per Maul, J.; Portsmouth Floating Bridge Co. v. Nance, 6 ib. 831; Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Co., 1 My. & K. 165; Thicknesse v. Lancaster Canal Co., 4 M. & W. 482.

(a) Chitty on Contracts, 3 ed. 99; per Kelynge, C. J., Lanyon v. Carns, 2 Saund. R. 167.

(6) Co. Litt. 147, a, 7 Rep. 103.

(c) 5 Rep. 119; cited, Wing. Max. p. 25.

(d) 4 Rep. 35; 2 Rep. 24; 11 Rep. 34; Wing. Max. p. 26.

(e) Eldrich's case, 5 Rep. 119; cited, Argument, Gaunt v. Taylor, 3 Scott,

N. R. 709.

(f) Broom's Legal Maxims, p. 268.

(g) 6 T. R. 676.

ment;(a) and the above rule respecting it may be thus stated and qualified: as soon as there is an adequate and sufficient definition, with convenient certainty, of what is intended to pass by the particular instrument, any subsequent erroneous addition will not vitiate it.(b) "I have always understood," observes Lord Kenyon, speaking with reference to a will, (c) " that such falsa demonstratio should be superadded to that which was sufficiently certain before, there must constat de persona; and if to that an inapt description be added, though false, it will not avoid the devise ;" and this observation is applicable not only to wills but to other instruments; (d) so that the characteristic of cases strictly within the rule is this, that the description, so far as it is false, applies to no subject, and, so far as it is true, it applies to one subject only; and the court, in these cases, rejects no words but those which are shown to have no application to any subject.(e) The rule, therefore, may be thus stated: Prasentia corporis tollit errorem nominis, et veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationis.(f)(g) This rule, in the case of The Watervliet Turnpike Co. v. M'Kean, (h) was held to apply to statutes as well as deeds and wills. In the case last cited, where a statute referred to another by

(a) See Bell, Dict. and Dig. of Scotch Law, 420.

(b) Per Park, B. Llewellyn v. Earl of Jersey, 11 M. & W. 189; Com. Dig. "Fait," (E. 4.)

(c) Thomas v. Thomas, 6 T. R. 676. See also Mosley v. Massey, 8 East, 149; per Parke, J., Doe d. Smith v. Galloway, 5 B. & Ad. 51, (E. C. L. R. vol. 27; per Littledale, J., Doe d. Ashforth v. Bower, 3 B. & Ad. 459, (Id. 23;) Gynes v. Kemsley, 1 Freem. 293; Hobart, 32, 171; Greene v. Armsteed, Id. 65; Vin. Abr. "Devise," (T. b.) pl. 4.

(d) London Grand Junction Railway Company v. Freeman, 2 Scott, N. R. 705, 748.

(e) Wigram, Ex. Ev. 2d ed. 81.

(ƒ) Bac. Max. reg. 24; 6 Rep. 66; 1 Ld. Raym. 303; 6 T. R. 675; Doe v. Huthwaite, 3 B. & Ald. 640, (Id. 5.)

(g) Broom's Legal Maxims, p. 269.

(h) 6 Hill, 616.

several descriptive particulars, some of which were manifestly false and others true, it was held the former might be rejected as surplusage, provided the remainder was suffered to show clearly what was meant. That a statute was not to be nullified, because some of its provisions were absurd, repugnant or untrue. It should be so construed as to make it effective rather than to destroy it.(a) If enough remained, after rejecting the parts which were inappropriate, to show what was intended by the legislature, that would suffice. In The Chancellor of Oxford's case, (b) it was resolved, that in an act of parliament, the misnomer of a corporation, when the express restriction appeared, should not avoid the act no more than a will for parliament testament, et arbitramentum, were to be taken according to the minds and intentions of those who are parties to them. And therefore, when the description of a corporation in an act of parliament, or in a will, is such that the true corporation intended was apparent, and it was impossible to be intended of any other incorporation, although the right name was not expressly followed, yet the act of parliament should take effect. The same principle has been adopted in Massachusetts in a case where a statute referred to a vote of a town, by a wrong date, it was held that the date might be rejected as surplusage, the reference being clear without it; and on this principle effect was given to the statute. (c) In this connection, it should be observed, that in construing deeds, it is a rule that non accipi debent verba in demonstrationem falsam quæ competunt in limitationem veram; (d) if it be doubtful

(a) Bullon v, Ward, 2 Rolle's Rep. 127; Moore v. Hussey, Hob. Rep. 93, 97.

(b) 10 Rep. 57.

(c) Shrewsbury v. Boylston, 1 Pick. 105.

(d) Bac. Max. reg. 13.