475. This extension of laws from the lesser to the greater, and from the greater to the lesser, is limited to the things which are of the same kind with those that are mentioned in the law, or which are such that its motive ought to be extended to them, as in the examples of the foregoing articles. (a) But we must not draw the consequence either from the greater to the lesser, or from the lesser to the greater, when they are things of a different kind, or such as the spirit of the law is not applicable to.(b) Thus, the law which permits persons who have attained to the years of marriage, although minors, to bind themselves by contracts of marriage, and to engage their estates for the performance of the covenants that are consequences of the marriage, would be wrongfully applied to other sorts of contracts, although of less importance. Thus, the liberty which an adult person has in his minority, to devise his whole estate by will, would not be rightly extended to the liberty of making over any part of it by a deed or gift that should take effect in his lifetime. Thus, the power which belongs to a lord of a manor, who has a royalty, or ample jurisdiction for the administration of justice within his

(a) In eo quod plus sit, semper inest et minus. L. 110, ff. de reg. jur. Cum quis possit alienare, poterit et consentire alienationi. L. 165, eod. Lex Julia, quæ de dotali prædio prospexit, ne id marito liceat obligare, aut alienare, plenius interpretanda est, ut etiam de sponso idem juris sit, quod de marito. L. 4, ff. de fundo dot.

(b) Thus, in the ancient Roman law, the license which fathers had to take away the lives of their children, did not extend to the license of depriving them of their liberty, and making them slaves. Libertati a majoribus tantum impensum est, ut partibus, quibus jus vitæ in liberas necisq; potestas olim erat permissa, libertatem eripere non liceret. L. ult. C. de patr. potest. Thus in the same Roman law, it was lawful for a man to give to his concubine, but not to his wife. V. 1. 58, et tot. Tit. ff. de donat. inter vir. et uxor. Thus by the same law, a husband was allowed to sell the lands which he got with his wife in marriage, if she consented to it; but he could not mortgage them, not even with her consent. Lex Julia fundi dotalis Italici alienationem prohibebat fieri a marito non consentiente muliere: hypothecam autem nec si mulier consentiebat. L. un. sec. 15, C. de rei ux. act.

own lordship, by the special grant of the sovereign, would be wrongfully applied to such as have grants only of an inferior jurisdiction, and in causes of lesser moment. Thus, the power of a lord chief justice will not infer that of a constable or bailiff. Thus, the laws which brand persons with infamy, would not be rightly extended to the confiscation of goods, although honor is much more valuable than any goods.(a)

§ 476. Mackeldey, in his Compendium of Modern Civil Law, considers the doctrine of interpretation, in its application to legal transactions. He divides and explains this doctrine in the following manner: "The interpretation of legal transactions is of three kinds, viz. authentica, usualis, or doctrinalis; according as it proceeds from the parties themselves, or is founded on the ordinary use of language, or on the rules of juridical hermeneutics. 1. In the interpretatio authentica, a distinction is to be made between contracts and testaments. In construing testaments, the doubtful passage must be taken in the sense in which the testator wished it to be undrstood.(b) The same rule applies to all other acts and instruments which proceed from a single party. But where several parties concur in a transaction, its authentic interpretation presupposes an accordance between them all, and therefore a one-sided explanation given by one of them cannot prejudice the rights of the others. 2. The interpretatio usualis applies particularly to cases where in a legal transaction words and phrases are employed, which have a strictly determined sense in the ordinary speech of the place, and it does not appear that the parties em

(a) Domat's Civil Law, vol. i. prel. book, tit. 1, sec. 2, p. 15, pl. 24. (b) Quisque verborum suorum optimus est interpres. Fr. 96, D. 50, 17.— Fr. 21, sec. 1, D. 28. 1.-Bucher, Recht der Forderungen, 2d edit. Leipsic, 1830, sec. 37.

ployed them in a different meaning.(a) Whenever cases of this kind occur in practice, it is important to ascertain whether the doubt, which arises from the expressions used in the transaction, has not previously presented itself and been removed by judicial decision. (b) 3. In the interpretatio doctrinalis the following rules are to be observed: 1. Every obscure and doubtful passage is to be explained according to the intention of the parties; and this we must endeavor to ascertain from the words, the usage of language, and also from the respective circumstances and relations of the parties to the transaction. (c) 2. If their real intention cannot be discovered with certainty, the obscure passage must be explained in such a manner as will deviate the least from the nature of the transaction, and hence adversely to him who puts in a claim which deviates from the nature of the transaction, and who ought therefore to have been careful to employ a clearer mode of expression.(d) 3. If there be a doubt respecting the amount of the debt, the doubtful passage must be explained in such manner as is least unfavorable to the promiser. (e) 4. And lastly, if, from the words employed in the transaction, it is altogether uncertain and doubtful what the party or parties intended, the transaction is invalid ;(ƒ) yet it is a principle

(a) Arg. fr. 37, 38, D. 1, 3.-Fr. 21, sec. 1, in fin. D. 28, 1. See also fr. 69, sec. 1, D. 32.-Fr. 9-12, D. 33, 6.

(b) E. g. fr. 13, pr. D. 28, 2.-Fr. 17, sec. 1, D. 30.-Fr. 10, sec. 1, D. 34, 5.

(c) Fr. 219, D. 50, 16.—Fr. 67, D. 50, 17.—E. g. fr. 3, sec. ult. D. 33, 10.-Fr. 33, D. 34, 2.-Fr. 22, D. 34, 1.-Fr. 14, D. 33, 1.—Fr. 75, D. 32.

(d) Interpretatio facienda est secundum naturam negotii: fr. 3, D. 12, 1. Fr. 11. secs. 1, 2, D. 19, 1.-Fr. 72, pr. D. 18, 1.-Interpretatio facienda est contra eum, qui clarius loqui potuisset ac debuisset. Fr. 172, pr. D. 50, 17.--Fr. 39, D. 2, 14.-Fr. 21, D. 18, 1.-Fr. 38, sec. 18, D. 45, 1.—Fr. 26, D. 34, 5.

(e) In dubio id quod minimum est sequimur. Fr. 9, 34, D. 50, 17. Fr. 52, D. 19, 2.-Fr. 1, sec. 4, D. 45, 1.

(f) Fr. 188, D. 50, 17.--Fr. 2, fr. 10, pr. fr. 21, 27, 28, D. 34, 5.

of law, that the interpretation of a transaction shall favor its validity as far as possible." (a) (b) These rules have a more direct application to deeds and testaments than to statutes; although they serve in some respects to elucidate the general doctrine of interpretation now under consideration.

§ 477. No civil law writer has laid down rules of interpretation with greater precision than Vattel. We shall now proceed to state such elementary rules as we deduce from this writer, so far as we consider them applicable to statutes. We shall not quote his precise language, but extract from it those rules which we apply to statutes. We give these elementary rules from a conviction that they will greatly assist the legal student in getting a clear understanding of the reason and foundation upon which the rules hereafter stated rest; and also from our firm conviction, that what Domat has said is true to a great extent, when applied to the present age. He has justly remarked: "There is great danger of misapplying the rules of law, if we have not ample knowledge of all the particular rules, and of the several views that are necessary for interpreting and applying them aright."(c) This remark is as pertinent to statutory interpretation as to that of any other kind of laws.

§ 478. The first general maxim of interpretation laid down by this writer is, that it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation.(d) When the words of an act are in clear and precise terms,-when its meaning is evident, and leads to no absurd conclusions, there can be no reason for refusing to admit the meaning

(a) Fr. 12, D. ibid.-Fr. 80, D. 45, 1.

(b) Kauffman's Mackeldey, sec. 180, pp. 172, 3. (c) Domat, prel. b. tit. 1, p. 17.

(d) Vattel, b. 2, ch. 17, sec. 263.

which the words naturally present; to go elsewhere in search of conjecture in order to restrict or extend the act, would be but an attempt to elude it. Such a method, if once admitted, would be exceedingly dangerous, for there would be no law, however definite and precise in its language, which might not by interpretation be rendered useless. However luminous each clause might be, however clear and precise the terms of it, all this would be of no avail, if it be allowed to go in quest of extraneous arguments, to prove that it is not to be understood in the sense which it naturally presents. Puffendorff says, "If the words of the law express clearly the sense and intention, we must hold to that.(a)

§ 479. The next general maxim which may be applied to statutes is this: that if the framers of a statute use language that is wholly unintelligible, or which conveys no meaning, courts, by interpretation, cannot make it express what upon its face remains unexpressed, or which cannot, by any fair rule of interpretation, be made out of the language the law-maker has seen fit to employ. Such an instance as this will rarely if ever occur in any modern act of the legislature.

§ 480. The sole object of interpretation of a statute is, to discover the intention of the framers. That intention is, however, sometimes very obscurely expressed. Whenever we meet with an obscurity in a statute, we are to consider what probably were the ideas of those who drew the act, and to interpret it accordingly.(b) This is the general rule for all interpretation. It particularly serves to ascertain the meaning of particular expressions, whose signification is not sufficiently determinate. Pursuant to this rule, we should, in remedial statutes, take those expressions in their utmost latitude,

(a) Law N. & N. pr. b. p. 13, sec. 12. (5) Vattel, b. 2, c. 17, sec. 270.