into the general fund or capital stock of such corporation, because the use of that capital thus employed, (to promote private ends,) may incidentally accommodate the public; that hence such an appropriation is for a public purpose. The purpose in such cases should be considered as private or local. The accommodation of the public, growing out of the use to which the sum donated is to be applied, does not and cannot make such appropriation one for a public purpose, within the spirit of the constitution. If it would, then any sum might by a majority vote, be donated to any number of individuals for the purchase of horses and stages, to run between Albany and New Orleans, for the carriage of passengers or property, for a just and reasonable compensation, to be paid to and divided between such individuals, for then the accommodation would be public, but the use or purpose private.

§ 280. Care must be taken not to confound the distinction between the import of the word purpose, as it is employed in the ninth section of the seventh article, and of the word use, adopted in the seventh section of the seventh article, of the constitution. What then is the true import of the word purpose in the one case; and of the word use in the other? They are by no means used as synonymous terms, or in the same sense. The word purpose, in the sense here used, is confined within a narrower circle, than is the word use in the other clause. It is restricted to the thing or object which is the residuum of the thing granted, or rather to that of which it is to become a constituent part, and there terminates: while the word use is far more comprehensive, and takes a more extensive range, embracing objects and things growing out of, and incidental to, the original purpose, extraneous from the purpose itself, and taking effect after that purpose is consummated and at an end. This distinction is one that has been recognized and adopted

in the construction of this constitutional limitation, contained in said ninth section of the seventh article. In the case of the bill to aid in the construction of a road through the oil spring reservation, the bill provided for a grant of $420 of the public money, to be applied in construction of that road. This distinction was taken by Mr. Talcott, the then Attorney-General: In that case the purpose of the appropriation was to complete, or aid in the completion of the road; that was a local purpose, although the USE of the road when completed was to be dedicated to the public or a public use. In that case the public use was one which would be entirely free and untrammelled by any exclusive chartered privileges of a corporation. There the word purpose was restricted to the sense now adopted, and would have had its consummation before the use (which was public) would have fairly commenced. Had the question submitted to the Attorney General in that case been, whether the legislature could under the seventh section of article seventh of the constitution, take private property for this road, making just compensation therefor, it must have been answered in the affirmative. On the other hand, had the question submitted been, whether the legislature could, by a majority vote, grant property which belonged to the state for the same purpose as the money, it must have been answered in the negative, on the ground that it would be as clearly within the circle of this constitutional restriction, as was an appropriation of $420 of public money to be applied to that purpose.

§ 281. "No statute or law should receive such a construction as will lead to absurd consequences." Respect for the framers will always induce courts, when a particular sense applied to a word will lead to such consequences, to infer, that such was not the sense in which it was used. To hold that the word purpose embraces

within it all the consequences which might flow, or result, from an act to which the thing granted might be applied, would lead to such a consequence. It is very much doubted whether a single legislator who should vote for such an act, could be found, so regardless of character, so destitute of moral sensibilities, and so reckless of consequences, as to be willing to be considered in the eye of the law as criminally or morally responsible for all the consequences, contingent or remote, which might thereafter result to society from the use to which property under such an act should be devoted, or be considered in voting for such an act, to have purposed such consequences and results. This sense, too, is consonant to one in which the word purpose is not unfrequently used. Thus, when it is said that the Creator of the Universe purposed to create man, it is understood that the creative energies of Omnipotence were to be directed to the formation of an organic frame, which should be subject to certain fixed rules and laws, to impart to that frame vital energies, and to endow it with certain physical, mental, and moral powers and capacities. This was the sum of the purpose to which those creative energies were to be directed, and marked the boundaries within which that purpose was confined. The purpose to create did not extend itself over the wide range of human action, or of human depravity, which might, or which did, thereafter flow from the exercise of those faculties thus created, nor were these comprehended within the original purpose of creation, when, in the councils of eternity, it was said, "Let us make man.”

§ 282. We shall next proceed to demonstrate, if possible, the accuracy of the construction we have adopted by reference to decisions which have been made on this question, in addition to the one above referred to. In 1843, the then president of the senate declared a bill to be a majority bill which, in effect, released to a rail road

corporation a $3,000,000 debt due to the state. That decision, we are aware, must be regarded as in direct conflict with the construction which we have put upon this clause. But we apprehend, that nearly all the other decisions which have been made under this clause, stand opposed to that decision, and according to our understanding of such decisions, most of them are in perfect harmony with our construction of this clause; such of them as do not must be regarded as standing opposed to the letter as well as spirit of the constitution. There are certain considerations worthy of special note, in reference to that decision, before proceeding to the consideration of the extent to which it is sustained by other decisions which have been made under this clause. It should be remarked, that the act of incorporation of the company to whom that debt was released, clothed it with certain rights, immunities, and privileges, to be exercised, used, and enjoyed by it for a period of years, exclusive of the public; among which was the right of the acquisition of property, which when acquired, became corporate not public property. It imposed no obligation whatever on the corporation to use its road when completed in any particular manner in reference to the public; nor was such use one of common law right. The duties and obligations of a common carrier did not attach to it unless thereafter it should voluntarily assume such obligations and duty. Its own use of the road was one of entire discretion, and the use of it by others for a period of years might be granted or denied as would best subserve its corporate interest, or gratify corporate caprice. It contemplated no increase of the public revenue, no enhancement of the public property, no diminution of the necessary public expenditures. Its claims were never urged on either of those grounds. It was not connected at either point of its termination with any great public work owned and prosecuted by the

state. To all human appearance, its tendency would be to divert travel and business from those internal artificial arteries, owned and sustained by the public revenue, and would necessarily detract from the sources of revenue necessary to keep them in repair. These considerations are important, because they distinguish that case from a numerous class of cases which have been supposed to be analogous, when, in fact, no such analogy exists. The cases to which allusion is now made, and which have been supposed to be analogous, are the act of 1823 in relation to the Albany pier and basin, the act of the fifteenth of April, 1822, to authorize grants for the purpose of promoting the settlement of public land in the counties of Essex and Franklin, and the act of seventeenth of April, 1822, to authorize and encourage the construction of the harbor of Buffalo creek, all of which were decided to be majority bills. All those acts it will be found have been sustained as majority bills, on the ground that the state was to derive benefit in its aggregate capacity, either because they increased its annual revenue, or enhanced the value of its public property, or diminished the amount of its necessary public expenditures. Mr. Talcott, in his opinion, submitted to the legislature in 1823, in relation to the bill concerning the Albany pier and basin, put all these cases upon this distinct ground; and it was after he had thus distinguished this class of cases from others, that he added:"If the question was now presented for the first time, it might be a matter of serious consideration how far it would be consistent with prudence to give such a construction to this clause of the constitution, as would exempt from its operation bills passed with a view to contingent or merely probable benefits, or even to a certain one, when there was no sufficient data to estimate its value."

§ 283. It will be perceived, that all those acts which